Democracy in Tanzania?: The Role of NGOs in Fostering Government Accountability

By

Corey Mason

A Senior Honors Thesis

Submitted to the Department of Political Science in
Fulfillment of the Requirements for Honors Notation

at

Indiana University Bloomington
May 2011

Advisor:
Professor M. MacLean

Second reader:
Professor Brass
# Table of Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... Page 3

Relevant Theories of Democracy ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ Page 6

History of NGOs in Tanzania ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... Page 10

Methodology ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. Page 12

Results .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. Page 14

Discussion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... Page 15

HakiElimu Case Study ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ Page 29

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. Page 39

Appendix ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. Page 42

References .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. Page 43
Introduction

Do non-governmental organizations influence democratization? Scholars have long debated what factors contribute to the democratizing process. Conventional wisdom claims that democracy is dependent on an active, well-resourced civil society that is able to engage and limit the autocratic reach of the state (Gyimah-Boadi 1997; Fomunyoh 2001; Habib and Opoku-Mensah 2003; Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006; Opoku-Mensah, Lewis, and Tvedt 2007). Civil society here is understood as “the public realm of organized social activity located between the state and the private household” (Tostensen, Tvedten et al. 2001). Examples are associations or organizations that act independently from the government. The assumption that a civil society with a strong organizational culture strengthens democracy gained prevalence in the 1990’s during a wave of democratization across the African continent (Opoku-Mensah 2009).

Abrahamsen (2000) conceptualized the linkage between civil society and democracy by asserting that economic liberalization decentralizes decision-making, leading to the development of a civil society that is capable of limiting the power of the state and providing the basis for liberal democratic politics. In addition to countering an oppressive exercise of state power, civil society supplies the key values that inform the political sphere.

Non-governmental organizations are one type of civil society actor. They are independent voluntary associations of people working continuously for a common purpose. NGOs are free from public authority, non-profit making, apolitical in nature, and non-violent and non-criminal. Scholars dichotomize the NGO discourse into two major camps: NGOs are beneficial or they are deleterious, oftentimes in unexpected ways. Proponents argue that NGOs partake in educative, advocacy, watchdog, and empowerment roles that serve to strengthen civil society (Allen 1997; Diamond 1994, 1999; Habib and Opoku-Mensah 2003; Gyimah-Boadi
Civil society is independent from the state and can act as a check on government actions. NGOs are important agents of democratization because they provide the resources to citizens to organize into a variety of networks. These can include educative associations, loans organizations, or health and food organizations that are vital to civil society. These networks enable an independent sphere that is free from government intervention and control. NGOs have perceived advantages because they work closely with grassroots organizations. Citizens are empowered with the provisions from NGOs, allowing them to assert more control over their lives. NGOs and local grassroots organizations can align, or “link up,” by joining federations or networks of service associations to strengthen their service provisions and more easily and effectively supply provisions to their beneficiaries. When NGOs provide resources, citizens are equipped with more opportunities to curtail the reach of an authoritarian regime.

Critics argue that NGOs exhibit location biases (Mercer 1999), giving a false impression of the extent to which resources are provided to beneficiaries. Edwards and Hulme (1992) claim that NGOs address poverty without actually tackling the root causes. NGOs can erode the power of progressive political formations by preaching change without a clear agenda of how change should be attained. Angell and Graham’s (1995) study in Latin America explores similar themes, claiming that within much of the Latin American public service sector there is often a regressive distribution of resources, indicating that those who are poor receive provisions, but those who are in the most dire situations may not receive necessary resources. Others argue that NGOs are too dependent on donor funding, obscuring their mission statements and ideologies, and rendering their ability to provide services ineffective (Ryfman 2007).
This paper contributes to this debate within the context of democracy. Analysis of NGO strategies and projects reveals that NGOs promote deliberation and participation at both the local and national levels. Analysis also shows that creating an atmosphere that engages the opinions of all citizens is more important for the democratizing process than the resources themselves. This thesis explores how democracy, the transition to more political rights and civil liberties, is influenced by a participatory culture engendered by NGOs. Components of democracy include freedoms such as the ability to freely organize, to elect officials without coercion, and to question the actions of the government.

The United Republic of Tanzania is used to explain the manner in which NGOs affect democracy. Tanzania provides an apposite lens from which to study because the country has seen an explosive growth of NGOs over the past three decades. From 1984 to 1992 NGO-sponsored schools increased from 85 to 258 (Lange 2000). In 1993, there were 224 registered NGOs in Tanzania and in 2000, the number was 8499 (Stiftung 1999; Tripp 2000). And the numbers continue to increase. Historically, Tanzania has been an impoverished nation. The Household Budget Survey in 2007 showed that the level of poverty remained high at 33.6 percent while the absolute number of the poor increased by 1.3 million (The World Bank). An increased need for provisions from NGOs means they have a greater political role in Tanzania. Moreover, since independence in 1961, Tanzania has exhibited one of the best records of political stability in Africa (ibid).

The paper is organized as follows: The first section identifies theories that correlate with democratization. From these theories, four variables are distinguished: development, inequality and diversity, education, and the sustainability of NGOs are highlighted and their causal linkages to democracy are explained. The second section describes the history of NGOs in Tanzania and
Mason

their significance in the country. The methodology follows, as well as results from quantitative analysis, to identify correlations between the highlighted variables and democracy. Next, a case study examining a Tanzanian NGO, HakiElimu, explains how participation created by NGOs influences democratic progress. The paper ends with concluding remarks.

Relevant Theories of Democracy

Interest in NGOs began after the introduction of structural adjustment programs and economic liberalization policies in the 1980’s (Kiondo 1995; Gibbon 1995). Government instability, poverty, and payment problems to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank engendered an influx of NGOs into the Global South (the developing world). NGOs had perceived advantages. They were small-scale, cost-effective, easily managed and able to further policies of decentralization, eliminate corruption, strengthen civil society, and facilitate political participation at the grassroots level (Frantz 1987, Bebbington 1993). When the state withdrew from social services, the continent, including Tanzania, experienced the first massive influx of foreign NGOs to respond to crises (Bratton 1989, Kiondo 1995, Teka 1991; 1994).

A rival theory to democratization is that increased development increases democracy. One of the most cited researchers of democracy theory is Seymour Martin Lipset. In 1959 he opined that economic growth helps foster democracy. He was one of the first scholars to advance the idea that in addition to economic growth, non-material factors were needed to increase democracy. His work, including “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” illustrates a correlation between democracy and a state’s socioeconomic development. His work from 1960, 1993, and 1994 built on this premise. Hans Peter Schmitz (2004) demonstrated how socioeconomic levels affect the sustainability of
Mason
democracy. He concluded that economic development is positively correlated with democratic
governance but only if wealth is distributed evenly among citizens.

Edwards and Hulme (1992) addressed the role of NGOs and poverty. They claimed that
NGOs address poverty without actually tackling the root causes. NGOs can erode the power of
progressive political formations by preaching change without a clear agenda of how change
should be attained; “by encouraging income-generating projects in favor of a few poor
individuals, but not ‘the poor’ as a class...” (Edwards and Hulme, 1992: 20). Angell and
Grahams’ (1995) study in Latin America explores similar themes, claiming that within much of
the Latin American public service sector there is often a regressive distribution of resources,
meaning that those who are poor receive provisions, but those who are in the most dire situations
do not necessarily receive any resources.

Another rival theory in the literature is that inequality and ethnic diversity have a
negative effect on democracy. Elections do not always represent the will of all population
groups, especially in ethnically diverse states (Przeworski 1999, Lijphart 1977). Many
governments acknowledge that majority rule makes constitutionally guaranteed minority rights
unnecessary. Furthermore, democratically developed states are less likely to experience
organized internal violence. Reilly (2001, 2002) and Varshney (2001) both argue that in
segmented societies democracy is difficult because it can encourage zero-sum political behavior,
usually by the majority group. Moreover, class inequality leads to less political participation,
detracting from the political wishes of the poor (Marx 1978; Marshall and Bottomore 1992;
Skocpol 2003). Participation is an essential constituent of democracy. Without the voiced
concerns of the populous, citizens are left at the autocratic hand of the government, its actions
not necessarily reflecting the needs of the populous.
Education levels have also been cited to influence democratization. Various theories show a correlation between education and political participation. Citizens with higher education levels are privileged with better jobs and have more time to be politically active (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996). Verba et al’s (1995) study identifies education as a mechanism that influences political participation. Verba and Nie (1972) argue that education engenders citizenship engagement. Researchers have identified the importance of participation from grassroots populations and NGOs for democratic processes. Many researchers claim that high failure rates of development projects can be traced to the lack of participation by local populations (McNeish 2001; Brett 2003; Ferguson 2006). In 1992 the World Bank stated that participation is the process by which populations, especially disadvantaged populations, engage in decision-making that directly affects them. Many NGOs have been taking on responsibilities that were once provided by the state (Bebbington 1993; Alatorre and Aguilar 1994), which facilitates political participation at the local level (Frantz 1987; Bebbington, 1993). Yudelman (1987) reports an increase in NGO participation in project designs, concluding that oftentimes they do not reflect the wishes of their beneficiaries. Angell and Graham (1995) believe that only by encouraging local participation and involvement will the democratic system overall be strengthened, which will lead to better provisions of health and education services at the local level by paying attention to the needs and demands of the local population.

Research also points to faults that lie within NGOs themselves, which could be a cause for little or no effect on democracy levels. Sustainability of NGOs is a current theme in the literature. Lewis (2003) writes in his article about organizational culture that the sustainability of an organization depends on values espoused by both internal and external actors (donors). Jasmine Gideon’s study of NGOs in Latin America criticizes NGO involvement. She claims that
NGOs have not been able to secure effective citizenship for their beneficiaries or to promote democratization. The reason is that neo-liberal strategies have led to the creation of an aid market in which NGOs are forced to compete for resources. When competing for resources, NGOs lose sight of their own ideology, which sometimes leads to the demise of the organization. Edward and Hulme have argued that when NGOs compete for resources they become dependent on donors, which can influence the decision-making process of the organization. Ebdon (1995) writes that “when existing NGOs are forced to scale up their activities in order to compete, they abandon their original ideologies in the attempt to meet targets and performance indicators.” These targets may not reflect the wishes of beneficiaries. When scaling up occurs, NGOs align with each other. Sometimes they lack cohesive ideologies, organizational procedures, or effective communication, resulting in ineffectual programs or the death of the organizations themselves.

Later I will demonstrate how the experiences of a particular Tanzanian NGO, HakiElimu, showed that linking up and collaborating with NGOs was actually helpful for the implementation of projects. It was one of the most important mechanisms by which democracy was advanced. HakiElimu’s partners helped advocate issues and open a political discourse that encouraged Tanzanians to question their government. I found that it is not so much the process of linking up, the causal mechanism, that engenders increased democracy, but rather the participatory culture that is created when NGOs bring issues to the forefront for deliberation. The government is held accountable when civil society as whole scrutinizes its actions and demand transparency. To appreciate this process more clearly, a cogent understanding of the significance of NGOs is needed and leads directly into a discussion of the historic role NGOs have played in Tanzania.
History of NGOs in Tanzania

NGOs were present in Tanzania even during colonial times. Initially, the country was witness to religious organizations and associations, sports clubs, and dance societies that were able to cut across religious and ethnic lines. These organizations not only brought societies together, but also provided resources to members. For example, some ethnic associations provided burial assistance and loans. Lange (2000) claims there were 51 organizations in Dar es Salaam with a total membership of 6,500 in 1954. In rural areas there was a strong community of cooperative unions, totaling 617 in 1959. Forty-two percent of workers were members of unions by 1969, compared to only six percent in Kenya at that time. Unions were elemental for the growth of NGOs in the country because many NGOs synthesized their efforts with organizations and associations that were already established.

Tanzania’s independence marked a turning point in the country’s developing civil society. In 1964, with the abolition of the chiefdom system, Nyerere’s government began centralizing national control by using his political party Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU) as an umbrella for development efforts. The government created mass organizations that operated under the ruling party, giving them a monopoly to organize people in a distinctively top-down process. Due to a lack of popular support and resources, these government-led organizations were unable to extend provisions or services and experienced low participation compared to independent organizations at the time. However, the government continued shrinking civil society and reducing participation in the social sector until an economic crisis forced the government to reevaluate its strategies.
From 1974 to 1988 real wages in Tanzania fell by 83 percent (Lange 2000) and the state could not provide even basic services. Increased oil prices, a war against Uganda, and a drought that affected agricultural exports only exacerbated hardships on Tanzanians. Between 1964 and 1977 the average GDP growth rate was 5.4 percent, but between 1978 and 1983 the average was only .28 percent (Ndulu 1984). Elliott-Teague (2008) writes that Tanzania had to turn to donors to finance its debts. The state tried to restructure its own economy in the early 1980s, but failed, and in 1986 it adopted an International Monetary Fund restructuring plan. Part of the restructuring required reduced service provision in education, health and internal security. Many newly formed groups stepped in to meet citizens’ needs the government had abandoned. The result was that many people organized themselves into welfare organizations and the government ignored previous bans that had once abolished these types of associations. Community organizations became more important and a “private space,” in which voluntary associations could organize, expanded in light of state tolerance (Spalding 1996). As the state withdrew from social services NGOs began filling the void. The government accepted their increased presence, thereby lending them greater legitimacy, because of its lack of capacity to provide necessary resources. National integration had concretized since independence, reducing anxiety over ethnic conflict, which also facilitated the government’s willingness to accept increased NGO presence in the country. In 1986, the state called on churches and NGOs to provide education services. From 1984 to 1992 NGO-sponsored schools increased from 85 to 258 (Lange 2000).

International donors actively contributed to NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) during the 1980’s, believing that NGOs had relative advantages that included a close relationship with beneficiaries at the grassroots level (Tripp 2000). As real wages dropped and unemployment rose, Tanzanians realized that donors were more willing to donate directly to
NGOs, and the number of NGOs escalated (ibid). In 1993, there were 224 registered NGOs in Tanzania and in 2000, the number was 8499 (Stiftung 1999; Tripp 2000).

Policies were initially constricting in the 1990’s, as the Tanzanian government conceded to NGOs for service delivery. While there were control mechanisms in place, the government has made efforts to improve relations between the state and NGOs, recognizing that NGOs are an important part of the development process. Since 1996, local and international NGOs, CBOs, and religious organizations have been involved in the policy process, creating several drafts for new NGO policies. These organizations have also been invited to workshops to share their views and voice their opinions.

Methodology

Qualitative and quantitative methods were employed in this research. From the literature, four separate variables were identified for investigation. These included development, education, inequality and diversity, and sustainability, which can be devolved into long-term and short-term. The variables development and education were operationalized and a reverse correlate function was run with SPSS in order to test if a correlation existed between the variables and democracy. Primary education (% gross) was used to represent education. GDP per Capita and Human Development Scores were used to operationalize development. Human Development Scores are composite scores of education, GNI per capita, and life expectancy. This score was used because the multidimensionality of the score accurately conceptually quantifies development, a multi-factorial variable. It gives a clear representation of material and non-material factors that influence development.1 As a second indicator of development, GDP

1 Human Development Report only published Human Development Indicator scores for the years 1991, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. Interpolation was used to identify cases for missing years.
Mason

per capita was used. Freedom House Scores were used to indicate democracy levels. Freedom House Scores measure political rights and civil liberties on a scale from 1 to 7. A score of 7 signifies that a state is “least free” with few freedoms and civil rights, while a 1 indicates a state that is “most free.” FHS is a germane tool for measuring democracy because scores are based on questions that gauge the extent to which deliberative and participatory political structures are in place in a given country. Furthermore, the scores correlate well with Tanzania’s political atmosphere, indicating an accurate depiction of democratic governance. For example, FHS cites a decrease in civil liberties in 1994. Tanzania reinstated a multiparty democracy in 1992, precipitating eleven nationally recognized political parties, and held elections in 1994. The incumbent party, CCM, won the elections. Tanzanians claimed the elections to be fraudulent and the government acted harshly in response. The decrease in civil liberties in 1994 in FHS correlates succinctly with the stern actions by the government.

Data from the Afrobarometer was used to discuss diversity in Tanzania. Information from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer, conducted in June and July, 2008 illuminated trends among Tanzanians. The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan survey instrument that gauges the social, political, and economic atmosphere in various African countries. It surveyed a representative, random sample of 1,208 Tanzanians. The sample yielded a margin of error of +/-3 percent and a confidence level of 95 percent (Afrobarometer 2009), indicating a fairly accurate measure of Tanzanians’ opinions. Literature was used to interpret the sustainability of NGOs in Tanzania. Information about HakiElimu helped depict how NGOs influence democracy. Media, newspapers, and publications helped clarify NGOs’ role in democratization.

Until 1996, Tanzania had a comprehensive listing of operating NGOs in the country. That data is no longer available to the public. In order to show an increase in the independent
variable, number of NGOs, data was collected from scholars from over two decades. Mercer (1999) identified a large concentration of NGOs in the main cities of Tanzania, concluding that not all citizens were receiving provisions. Igoe (2003) writes that “in 1978 there were only seventeen registered NGOs in Tanzania” (Kiondo 1993: 166). By 1994 the number had risen to 813 (PMO 1996: 1). Due to the overwhelming volume of applications, the Tanzanian Government suspended NGO registration in 1996 and the numbers have only increased. Scholars report that in 1993, there were 224 registered NGOs in Tanzania. Seven years later, in 2000, the number was 8499 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 1999; Tripp 2000). While no concrete numbers are available for the quantity of NGOs operating in Tanzania, the literature demonstrates an increase over time. There also appears to be a discrepancy between scholars as to the official numbers of NGOs within Tanzania. No comprehensive NGO list exists for the country. However, it is possible to investigate the effects NGOs have on democratization on the ground level based on empirical evidence.

Results

According to the analysis, development and education were highly correlated with democracy\(^2\). When the HDI scores were compared with Freedom House scores over twenty cases (years), the coefficient of association was .817, signifying a very strong relationship. When Freedom House scores were compared with GDP per Capita over twenty cases, the correlation was .840. This is expected given that income is a constituent of the composite HDI score. Compared with education or primary school enrollment (% gross) over 19 cases, the correlation was .814.

\(^2\) Refer to Table 2
The correlate function was used to analyze the data solely to test if a correlation existed between the variables. Due to the lack of operable information on the number of NGOs in Tanzania, I was unable to statistically test the independent variable, number of NGOs. For this reason, only a relationship could be established. From the literature, I have identified that NGOs contribute greatly to civil society, development, and (especially) education in Tanzania. For example, the number of NGO run schools tripled in just eight years from 1984 to 1992 (Lange, Wallevik, and Kiondo 2000). The statistical analysis demonstrates a strong correlation between development, education and democracy, warranting further analysis into how NGOs contribute to democratization.

Discussion

Research asserts that development and education are significant factors for democratization. Freedom House Scores cite Tanzania as being “not free” from 1973 until 1991 and only “partly free” from 1995 until today, with interim years from 1992 to 1994 fluctuating between “partly free” and “not free” (Freedom House Scores, Country Ratings). While these scores show a steady increase in political liberties and civil rights, the effects of NGOs on democratization are more pronounced when analyzing their effects on government legislation. This leads into a discussion of the causal linkages of the identified variables and how they influence democracy.

Education is cited as a significant factor for democratization because it engenders increased political participation. Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996) and Verba and Nie (1972) argued that education constructs citizenship engagement. Education levels increase participation because it enables the ability to secure better jobs, which leads to more income, free time, and
more extensive social networks, resulting in higher levels of engagement in political activities and the acquisition of civic knowledge and skills such as literacy and letter writing. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) showed that education influences voter participation in the United States. Research has also demonstrated that different elements of socioeconomic status, which include education, income and occupation, influence different kinds of political participation by Americans (Verba et al. 1995).

NGOs have been providing education to Tanzanians since the government’s retrenchment from the social sector. Lange, Wallevik, and Kiondo (2000) write that from 1984 to 1992, the number of NGO run schools tripled from 85 to 258. Therkildsen’s (2000) research asserts that government provisions for primary education have fallen, while donor funding for all levels of education continue to grow, meaning that NGOs have an even greater role in supplying educative services to Tanzanians. Moreover, school committees have been identified as the most common type of organizational association in Tanzania (Lange 2008). Lange’s (2008) case study on development projects in Tanzania emphasizes the need for participatory involvement at the local level. He argues that local participation is essential for the successful implementation of development programs, signifying that social networks and associations are excellent platforms for development advocacy. Considering school committees are the most common associational structures in Tanzania, one would expect education to have a more pronounced effect on democracy. Question 57h of the Afrobarometer asks “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Addressing educational needs?” The majority, 57 percent, of Tanzanians believe the government is addressing educational needs fairly well. Twenty-two percent of respondents
claimed the government is doing very well. Results were congruent among urban and rural respondents.

Scholars have claimed that a segmented society is detrimental to democracy. An unequal distribution of wealth detracts from the sustainability of democracy (Hans Peter Schmitz 2004). The World Development Indicator published the GINI coefficient for Tanzania for the years 1992, 2000, and 2007. The scores were 34, 35, and 38 respectively, the CIA World Factbook placing Tanzania as the 88th most inequitable country in the world. Although inequality is increasing it is doubtful it has an effect on democratization. Information from the Afrobarometer demonstrates that economic problems are not the main concern of Tanzanians. The majority of Tanzanians, 14 percent, believed that water supply is the most important problem facing the government. The next most pressing issue, cited by 10 percent of Tanzanians, was infrastructure/roads.

In an ethnically disparate society, zero-sum behavior and patrimonialism can delimit the participation of minority groups (Reilly 2001, 2002; Varshney 2001). The political participation of all ethnic groups is essential for a sustainable democracy. Ninety-nine percent of Tanzanians are African. Of these, 95 percent are Bantu, consisting of more than 130 tribes (CIA World Factbook). Research would argue that such high diversity should retard democratic progress, however, information from the Afrobarometer reveals the contrary. In the fourth round of the Afrobarometer survey, conducted from June to July, 2008, participants were asked “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Tanzanian and being a [Respondent’s Ethnic Group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?” Sixty-nine percent of respondents reported they felt only Tanzanian. Nine percent claimed to feel more Tanzanian than their ethnic group. Thirteen percent identified themselves as being equally
Tanzanian and their ethnic group (Afrobarometer 2009). This information reveals a nationalistic sentiment among Tanzanians despite the predominance of ethnic diversity, indicating no effect on democratization. In addition to assessing the ethnic composition of Tanzania, it is beneficial to explore possible political inequalities that could affect democracy. Question 45c of the Afrobarometer asks “In your opinion, how often, in this country: Are people treated unequally under the law?” Interestingly, 45 percent of urban respondents claimed that their compatriots are often treated unfairly under the law. Eight percent believed they are always treated unjustly. Compared to rural respondents, 37 percent of which believed people are often treated unequally, one can discern a noticeable difference between urban and rural settings. Claire Mercer’s (1999) study of NGOs in Tanzania identifies a location bias. She concludes that the majority of NGOs are concentrated in large, urban cities. This has particular implications for Tanzania because three-fourths of citizens live in rural areas (CIA World Factbook).

An important component of democratic progression according to conventional wisdom is socioeconomic development. This study operationalized socioeconomic development with Human Development Indicator scores and GDP per Capita. However, a theme that is pervasive in the literature is the participation of multiple actors in development projects. Scholars argue that those affected by poverty must be involved in decision-making. Drawing on information from the Afrobarometer, Chaligha et. al. (Uncritical Citizens) wrote that Tanzanians have a relatively substantive understanding of democracy that is based on the delivery and distribution of economic goods and social services. Furthermore, Tanzania led other African countries in terms of support for democracy, which is interesting because in 1991, four in five people said they opposed a multiparty system. The survey shows that no more than five percent of Tanzanians turned to the government for economic or aliment support (Afrobarometer 2009).
even when Tanzanians’ perception of the legitimacy of local government officials has increased (Nayaran 1997), substantiating the literature and asserting that the presence of NGOs is prevalent and that they are crucial suppliers of resources.

Through the Afrobarometer, one finds that compared to other Africans, Tanzanians exhibit some of the highest levels of interest in politics and involvement in mobilized forms of political participation such as rallies, campaigns, and community meetings. At the same time, they have quite low levels of participation in more individual, unprompted forms of participation such as contacting their political leaders or joining community organizations. Edwards and Hulme (1992) contended that many actors are needed in the decision-making process, especially at the grassroots level. Angell and Graham (1995) argued that decentralization, diffusing decision-making governance closer to the people, will have a positive impact on local populations. This presumption is based on the belief that encouraging local participation and involvement strengthens the democratic system overall, which in turn engenders better provisions of health and education services at the local level by paying attention to the needs and demands of the local population—those most considerably affected by poverty (Angell and Graham 1995: 197).

Expounding on the theme of local participation, emboldened by a democratic semblance, Gideon (1999) wrote that NGOs are rarely involved in the design of a development project; they are merely invited to execute the project. Gideon’s research in Latin America affirmed that NGOs have not been able to secure effective citizenship for their recipients or to promote democratization and empowerment. This is largely due to the hegemonic policies initiated by autocratic states in order to circumscribe the provisions of NGOs to solely resources that do not involve advocating political rights. The Tanzanian government passed the NGO Act of 2002,
which mandated new procedures for NGO registration with the state and increased oversight by
the government, thereby delimiting NGO activities (Elliot-Teague 2008; Tanzania Development
Gateway). Working under restrictive legislation, NGOs resolve to pursue social rights rather
than political rights, which saves face with the government, trying to maintain its autocratic
control as much as possible. This often leads to the creation of political clients rather than
political citizens (Gideon 1999). This could explain the abstracted position of the local
population in the decision-making process, which scholars contend is essential for the
development process. If common citizens and those most impressed by the effects of poverty
were to be incorporated into the decision-making process, perhaps NGOs can better implement
development programs, thereby strengthening civil society and democracy. Eliminating
Tanzanians from the development discourse could be a disservice to development, and ultimately
the consolidation of democracy. Strikingly, in HakiElimu’s case, it created a space for the
participation of all Tanzanians, which had far-reaching effects on democracy.

Recent research has begun to investigate the structure and operations of NGOs. Scholars
have argued that donor dependency and inter- and intra-organizational procedures negatively
impact service delivery. NGOs that rely primarily on donor funding for development projects
may find their own agenda distorted. Neoliberal policies have generated a volatile atmosphere in
which NGOs must compete with each other to procure donor funding, leading NGOs to adopt
strategies that may actually be detrimental to their beneficiaries.

Ryfman (2007) wrote that thirty-percent of public aid for development passes through
NGOs in the USA alone. Opoku-Mensah (2009) writes that the evolution of NGOs in Africa is a
direct consequence of donor funding and policies. His case study in Ghana reported that
transfers from the donor system accounted for over 70 percent of the central government’s
budgetary expenditure (58). He also asserted that many of the interactions between NGOs and African governments are outcomes of external actors, donors. One area of critical policy interaction between NGOs and African governments occurs in the discourse of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). PRSP’s are documents required by the IMF and World Bank before a country can be considered for debt relief within the Heavily Indebted Poor Country program (HIPC). In order to procure a sense of national ownership over poverty reduction policies, African governments consult development stakeholders, including NGOs. Opoku-Mensah wrote that underneath the rhetoric of national ownership the following occurs: “The formulation of the PRSPs is a condition set by external donors for qualification in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and to receive soft loans from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors (59).” The HIPC is a program implemented by the IMF to provide debt relief loans to the world’s poorest countries. “The participation of NGOs in preparing the PRSP is a requirement by donors (ibid).” The literature shows that donor funding is a huge component of NGO relations with the state and beneficiaries.

Many scholars conclude that NGOs lose their autonomy, and oftentimes, lose sight of their own mission statements when they are induced to compete for donor funding or bend to the will of donors, negatively effecting the distribution of provisions for their beneficiaries. Yudelman (1987) has claimed that much of the increase in NGO participation in project design since 1988 consists of projects in which NGOs apply to the government for sub-project funds. NGOs may not necessarily have an active role in designing the projects. Therefore, NGOs are employed as contractors to implement programs without actually reflecting the poor people’s priorities (182). In Gideon’s (1999) study of Latin American NGOs she claims that when NGOs assume quasi-governmental roles of service provision they tend to find their own agenda
distorted and have a reduced ability to ascertain and respond to the demands articulated by citizens. The ability of NGOs to create or execute development programs is entirely contingent on the availability of funds. If external donors, those funding the programs, put earmarks on certain projects, NGOs will initiate the project plan, oftentimes without the consent of the beneficiaries. Sometimes the project may not even be an immediate concern to those it hopes to help. There must be a congruent vision between donors, NGOs, and their beneficiaries in order to successfully implement development strategies.

A process that has gained a lot of scrutiny by scholars could also prove detrimental to development projects. “Scaling up,” also referred to as “linking up,” is a strategy in which NGOs synthesize their efforts in order to garner more donor funding for projects or advocate policies or legislation. The strategy is detrimental when the organizations have differing organizational strategies or ideologies. When the NGOs cannot agree to specific goals or procedures, both organizations may die due to the inability to gain support from donors, which ultimately means no money is donated and development projects are not initiated. Literature helps illustrate this phenomenon.

Lewis (2003) conducted observational research on NGOs and their involvement in the World Bank’s Silk Development Project in Bangladesh. The silk project was a developmental program designed to provide support for the sericulture (silk farming) sector in Bangladesh. The silk project was successful in many respects, however, the problem of sustainability was pervasive throughout the implementation of the project. Lewis argued that organizational culture, the managerial structures and processes that govern the operation of NGOs, is a useful entry point for analysis of development projects (213). He highlighted intra-organizational or interagency structures and processes that affect service delivery abilities of his case studies. His
study followed two NGOs with varying organizational cultures. Organization 1 had clearly
demarcated roles and individuals rarely left the boundaries of these roles. Organization 2
contained systems that acted relatively independently from individuals (219).

Lewis identified three interrelated levels of institutional sustainability. These include
financial sustainability, which refers to a project’s ability to generate resources from a variety of
sources and reduces its dependency on development assistance funds; organizational
sustainability, or the capacity of organizational arrangements to provide a continued framework
through which resources to the poor can be delivered over time; and benefit sustainability, which
refers to the continuing availability of benefits such as services beyond the life of the project.
Lewis’ research implied that the sustainability of NGOs is dependent on internal and external
actors.

There were many actors involved in the Silk Project. The World Bank, the Silk
Foundation, and many NGOs and grassroots organizations were active participants in the
development project. Lewis identified differing values espoused by different NGOs and even
within NGOs themselves. For example, the World Bank and Silk Foundation wanted to build a
single, coherent logic of market-based sustainability among all the project actors. However,
many of the participating NGOs were founded for a completely different purpose. Lewis also
identified that some NGO staff themselves at the local level subscribed to ideals that were not
congruent with senior staff members. He also discovered aspects of organizational culture that
affected the performance of NGOs’ development projects. From interviews, it was found that
communication between the Silk Foundation and the NGOs was not conducive to effectively
implementing the project. The Silk Foundation was located in Dhaka, one of the wealthier parts
of the city. It was removed from the local NGOs and the people that work closely with the
impoverished. Workers expressed disapproval of the distance between the Foundation and the local population, claiming that some staff members did not even know how to act in culturally appropriate ways. Lewis concluded that the incompatibilities between NGOs and among staff members have profound implications for the sustainability of the project. He writes

“differences in relation to a profit-maximizing versus social benefit approach to business activities have created a situation in which the financial viability of the Silk Foundation is in doubt once the project period is completed. From the point of view of organizational sustainability, the differences of opinion that exist in relation to the formation of producer cooperatives as opposed to multipurpose, community-based organizations cast doubts on the project's ability to contribute to self-sustaining organizations of the poor, which can continue as a framework for poverty reduction activities and secure income generation through silk production. Finally, in considering the sustainability of project benefits, tensions in relation to cultures of professionalism in relation to the provision of technical assistance to poor silk producers who have tended to stress top-down, hierarchical relationships may have restricted the impact of training in improving technical practices at the grassroots level (223).”

Mercer’s (1999) research of NGOs in Tanzania also demonstrated a distance between NGOs and their beneficiaries. She debated that the extensive space opened to NGOs in Tanzania does not actually represent the interests of the poorest. Instead she believed that the majority of NGOs were based in urban settings, primarily in Dar es Salaam. Her research showed that there is a high concentration of NGOs in the largest cities in Tanzania such as Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Kilimanjaro, and Morogoro. This could prove a disservice to those who benefit from their provisions because they are distanced from those they try to serve. Mercer conducted interviews with actors involved in the development process and discovered there is an opacity that blurs communication between the projects’ most important players. For example, her interview with an assistant district planning officer, a person in command of procuring donor funding, revealed
Mason

that he found it difficult to distinguish between the local state and the NGO sector. Mercer
claims that what occurs is a confused picture in which neither the state nor NGOs are aware of
their respective roles or what the others are doing.

Ideological incongruencies among actors in the development process are also evidenced
in Macpherson’s (2009) ethnographic research. He examined NGO-government partnerships in
southern Tanzania within the context of a “rights-based” approach (also referred to as RBA by
Macpherson) to development. The rights-based approach to development is a recent concept in
international development discourse that emphasizes the rights of citizens and the state’s
obligation to provide services to the poor. Macpherson interviewed staff from an NGO,
ActionAid Tandahimba, and government officials over 13 months in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of NGO-governmental partnerships on development. The mission of ActionAid
Tandahimba was to “support, develop, and establish a mobilized and empowered community of
rights holders.” It also encouraged a “responsive and accountable government of duty bearers
(266).” He identified an ideological disconnect between ActionAid International, an overarching
organization that delegates project plans, and ActionAid Tandahimba, which implements the
delegated projects.

The rights-based approach to development was directed to ActionAid Tanzania from
ActionAid International. Project implementation was then diffused to ActionAid Tandahimba.
ActionAid International was integral for creating the RBA discourse. The ideological
framework for RBA was projected from above, designating ActionAid Tanzania as a facilitator
and partner to its implementation. ActionAid had a hierarchical structure because certain
policies from the center were adopted by all country programs. Macpherson writes that
ActionAid International had both administrative power and specialist knowledge (273). The
specialist knowledge of the RBA was governed by power structures themselves. Consequently, ActionAid International exerted power and control over ActionAid Tanzania. ActionAid Tanzania was relatively powerless because it had not created the RBA and its actions were prescribed by the discourse of the RBA and the authority of ActionAid International. ActionAid Tanzania had no option but to implement the program, its funding stemming from ActionAid International. No clear definition or operational guidance was conferred in the policy, leaving ActionAid Tanzania to define RBA itself. This had significant implications for the NGO, ActionAid Tanzania, and local government. Ultimately, the RBA agenda could not be successfully executed because ActionAid Tandahimba, a division of ActionAid Tanzania, clashed with local government. The government viewed the vision of the NGO as a threat and circumscribed its efforts. The top-down direction of policy initiatives highlights a disconnect in ideology that affects the distribution of resources.

Research on indigenous NGOs in Tanzania elucidates the atmosphere in which NGOs compete for donor funding. Sometimes NGOs die out because they cannot resolve internal issues. Hodgson (2002) wrote that the indigenous rights movement has been fractured by disagreements over priorities, competition over resources, and tensions over membership representation. The indigenous NGOs began forming in the early 1990’s, organizing Tanzanians around the claims of a common identity based on ethnic identity. Many organized to advocate land and economic rights, of which the indigenous have historically been disenfranchised.

The indigenous rights movement in Tanzania had well over one hundred NGOs by the late 1990’s. Many of the organizations had their own agenda, leaders, constituencies and donors (1088). They delivered services such as healthcare, water to remote areas, and raising awareness among constituencies for problem solving (Ole Morindat 2000; Sangale 2000a, 2000b).
Hodgson (2002) conducted her research during a workshop that brought leaders from the country’s indigenous NGOs (INGO) and experts and observers to address problems and voice concerns of local populations. She found that many participants at the workshop identified structural problems within INGOs that prevented them from being effective service delivery organizations. Participants claimed there was a lack of clearly defined goals, including short- and long-term objectives; poor leadership qualities; weak or ineffective governing boards; poor administrative, management, and financial reporting systems that resulted in the misuse of funds and resources; and a lack of transparency and communication with community members. Many participants argued that some NGOs, especially pastoralist NGOs (also called PINGOs) were organized like an oligarchy, a few individuals making decisions for many. They complained that there needed to be more participation from local members.

The organizational problems identified by members at the workshop were also voiced in discussions about relations between NGOs, donors, and the state. Donors complained that many INGOs lacked effective communication and leadership and project management skills, and suffered from inadequate and infrequent financial reporting. INGOs declared that donor dependency leads to vulnerability of the organization and creates pressure to comply with donor economic and political agendas. In order to rectify institutional problems within the INGOs, they collaborated to create an “umbrella” organization, which would serve to facilitate communication among organizations with shared or similar visions. Essentially, the NGOs adopted the “scaling up” strategy to facilitate the procurement of donor funding. Ultimately, Hodgson concluded that the structural predicaments of INGOs are intense and numerous. She asserted that building political alliances in the form of umbrella organizations has a direct
influence on the sustainability of development programs (1094), and ultimately, the beneficiaries of such programs.

Elliott-Teague (2008) researched coalition lobbying, in which NGOs aligned in order to advocate specific policies. She followed six NGOs as they advocated different issues and legislation in Tanzania. There were many small NGOs, involved in one particular issue, peasants’ land rights. With fewer resources to expend, they decided to form a coalition to advocate more effectively. Elliott-Teague wrote that the coalition formed in 1997. Some of the NGOs divided their attention between two coalitions, which began having conflicting demands. The result was that the coalition died by 1998. This data emphasizes the need for congruent ideals to be adopted by all players in the development process.

The literature presents salient examples of issues of sustainability in the development discourse. Sometimes NGOs lack organizational procedures that are conducive to the successful implementation of development programs. The availability of donor funding forces NGOs to compete with one another. When NGOs wish to advocate a specific piece of legislation or issue or when they wish to procure donor funding for programs, they “scale up,” which oftentimes proves detrimental to the sustainability of the organizations themselves. This is due to conflicting ideals, agendas, or visions. Brinkerhoff’s (2008) research described coordination between similar aid agencies (networking, federations). He asserted that actors that haven’t worked together struggle to develop interagency procedures, shared perspectives, and joint protocols. These difficulties were evinced by the scaling up or coalition lobbying of NGOs in the case studies. In Lewis’ research on organizational culture, he posited that sustainability of organizations is contingent on values espoused by both internal and external actors (2003).
It is important to view NGOs and democracy holistically. Yes, there has been an increase in the number of NGOs over time, but what does that mean for democracy? Is the government more accountable? Is there increased transparency with a buttressed civil society? Evaluating the experiences of a Tanzanian NGO, HakiElimu, identifies key factors in the linkages between NGOs and democratization. Resources that contribute to development and education alone do not induce a democratic civil society. For instance, increased student enrollment or wider access to primary school does not necessarily correlate with a quality. A student may enjoy access to a primary education but does that education equip him with the resources to challenge his government and participate in decision-making processes locally and nationally?

HakiElimu Case Study

Quantitative analysis demonstrates that democracy has been increasing over time in Tanzania. From the literature, it is clear that inequality and diversity have no effect on democratization. In addition, scholars have asserted that inter- and intra-organizational procedures and ideological incongruencies are harmful to NGOs. NGOs’ capacity to provide resources that are vital to strengthening civil society becomes limited, producing a negative effect on democratization. Here I argue that it is not the resources themselves which engender democratic processes, but rather the participative, democratic culture created by NGOs that foster democracy. Evidence from a Tanzanian NGO, HakiElimu, illustrates how participatory approaches to service provision and advocacy can help shape a democratic atmosphere that holds the government accountable to the people.

HakiElimu, founded in September 2001 by thirteen Tanzanians, is an NGO dedicated to transforming public education for all Tanzanian children. Its mission is to support communities
as they work to influence policy-making, ultimately reconstructing the Tanzanian education system. Its vision, that every child in Tanzania enjoys access to quality basic education in schools that respect the human rights of all people, is echoed in its program strategy:

“to ensure that every person in Tanzania – without discrimination – is able to enjoy his or her right to quality basic education at the primary and secondary level, the kind of education that promotes a culture and practice of human rights, democracy and active citizenship (Annual Report 2002).” The phrase “every person in Tanzania—without discrimination” is indicative of a democratic ideology. Its services are targeted at everyone. Moreover, the NGO explicitly states that its focus on the engagement of citizens is consciously inclusive, and involves students who have been historically marginalized. Examples it cites are the poor, rural women, and people with disabilities. Later, evidence from program implementation will demonstrate how this participatory ideology is actualized on the ground and how it helps create a democratic culture within Tanzania.

HakiElimu’s Annual Report for 2002 revealed that the organization had a hierarchical structure with clearly demarcated roles and positions but encouraged democratic decision-making. The Board of Directors was responsible for the governance of the NGO. Seven members comprised the Board. Its duties included developing overall policies, overseeing financial guidelines, supervising program implementation, and appointing the executive director. Board members were obligated to adhere to term limits of two years. In 2002, there was a total staff membership of about forty; women comprised sixty percent of staff while men comprised forty percent. Work was carried out in the Dar es Salaam office.
Although the organization was hierarchical, decision-making welcomed the active participation of all members. HakiElimu wrote that its decisions were reached through a process of consensus that encourages dissent and diverse viewpoints. Discussions were structured to be open, inclusive, and informal (Annual Report 2002: 22). In HakiElimu’s case, such a structure encouraged disagreement, which scholars have argued is detrimental to the sustainability of the organization (Lewis 2003). HakiElimu was able to circumvent problems associated with dissent by initiating activities that involved the participation of all members in the design, implementation and assessment of projects. Eight years after its formation, it ingrained strategies to foster participatory relations among its staff. In 2009, one of the activities for the Executive Directors Office (EDO) was to increase the involvement of staff in all stages of project implementation. The EDO informed staff about research from Action Research, which was titled “Reasons that hinder women from being active participants in FoE Movement,” and implemented strategies and policies from the findings (Annual Report 2009: 34). Furthermore, the organization created a newsletter that highlights its projects and synthesizes information that is pertinent to its vision and mission statements. Membership is free so as to encourage the poor to participate.

The participatory culture within HakiElimu’s organizational structure was present in its external relations as well. In its founding year of operation, HakiElimu linked up with various organizations and actors in order to advocate educational policies. They communicated with local council leaders and established partnership agreements in Serengeti and Ukerewe districts (Annual Report 2002: 2); worked with Femina Magazine, a youth centered magazine, to publicize education issues; and partnered with ActionAid, Maarifa ni Ufunguo, Save the Children, Oxfam, Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) and regional networks to
Mason

support journalists in an investigation of the government’s implementation of the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) (10). The PEDP was initiated in January 2002 and attempted to increase the primary school enrollment rates of boys and girls.

Also in 2002, HakiElimu collaborated with NGO coalitions like TANGO, FemAct, and the human rights network led by the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) (Annual Report 2002: 11). It was an active member in networks with local, national, and international NGOs. In its Annual Report 2002 it cites partnerships with the Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO), the Feminist Activist Coalition (FemAct), the food security campaign (KIHACHA), the Tanzania Education Network (TENMET), and the NGO Policy Forum (NPF). In addition, HakiElimu held leadership positions in the steering and management committees of three of the networks (12). They collaborated with TAMWA to strengthen media coverage of education and civil society issues and YCIC on facilitating community engagement. They partnered with TGNP, Aide et Action, REPOA, TADREG, WDP, Save the Children, ActionAid, and CARE to make NGO engagement in policy processes more effective.

The majority of these organizations are based in urban cities such as Dar es Salaam like Mercer’s (1999) research suggests. However, an important component of HakiElimu’s strategy was to include the participation of all people. In 2002, it established communication with community based organizations (CBOs) across the country, including impoverished and remote rural areas. Examples include working in rural areas like Kiteto with a parents group and marginalized suburbs of Dar es Salaam. It also enabled people to participate in key policy meetings. Citizens came from Kigoma, Mtwara, Serengeti, Ukerewe and other rural areas to learn about the PEDP (19). While Mercer may be correct in identifying a location bias of NGOs in Tanzania, it may
not necessarily correlate with the reach of NGOs and their ability to engage citizens from even rural areas of the country.

HakiElimu’s early linkages proved to be beneficial for keeping the government accountable. In 2002, the Tanzanian government began attempts to implement legislation that would circumscribe NGO activities. The NGO Act of 2002 called for new procedures and oversight that could hinder NGO activities (Tanzania Development Gateway). In response, NGOs utilized their networks and coalitions to advocate against the government’s policies. Elliott-Teague (2008) writes that the core group consisted of six organizations: HakiElimu, TGNP, HakiArdhi, TANGO, the LHRC, and the NGO Policy Forum (NPF). HakiElimu and NPF were founded only in the previous year and had less funding and less staff than the other organizations. By synthesizing their efforts, the NGOs were able to make significant amendments to the NGO Act of 2002. Their work achieved international recognition in newspapers such as Pambazuka, published in South Africa, and the Southern African Documentation and Cooperation Centre (SADOCC). Their actions included a legal analysis of the Bill and proposed amendments, an awareness campaign, mobilizing civil society, and advocacy with the government, parliamentarians, and donors. Despite having scant financial capital, HakiElimu and others were able to garner increased donor funds for their advocacy. One donor was the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Elliot-Teague 2008). The result was that significant amendments were made to the Bill. One supportive NGO of the coalition, the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT), had particular legitimacy. It was supported by professional lawyers and members of the Faculty of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam, and the government relied on it for information (Elliott-Teague 2008).
Even early in its existence HakiElimu and its coalitions and networks were able to challenge the government, engendering a political space for deliberation by incorporating the participation of fellow NGOs and donors and generating national and international recognition for the issue. Linking up strategies actually buttressed NGOs’ efforts to effect change. The coalitions and dialogue created in the news increased their legitimacy and led to the government amending autocratic legislation. While the Bill passed by parliament retained some restrictive laws, it still presented NGOs with the ability to act as a check on government actions by inviting the participation of many actors.

While some scholars contend that linking up strategies can serve as a hindrance to the sustainability of NGOs, HakiElimu continued to increase its partnerships with similar organizations throughout its existence (Annual Reports 2002—2009). The organization admitted in its 2002 Annual Report that “the concept of groups organizing to advance their own interests was in itself a challenge to many, including HakiElimu staff” (3). In Section 3.9, International Networking, HakiElimu writes that as it gained recognition, opportunities for international exchange increased significantly and risked becoming a distraction from core work. It claimed that “great care was exercised to choose projects carefully, and to decline many invitations that do not contribute to the organizations core purposes and staff development (Annual Report 2002, 19).” This echoes Edwards and Hulmes’ (2002) assertions that incongruent ideologies are deleterious to the sustainability of organizations. However, HakiElimu provides a section in its Annual Report 2002 that states “HakiElimu will need to be careful not to be perceived as a donor and not over extend its capacity for follow-up, monitoring, and documentation (12)." The organization acknowledged the difficulties associated with collaborating with partner NGOs and
between staff members and also maintained procedures for avoiding these obstacles that may have a negative effect on its sustainability.

When developing its Program Strategy for 2004 to 2007, HakiElimu recognized there had been a huge increase in student enrollment in primary education, which was directly related to the implementation of the PEDP. The International Budget Partnership, an organization that works with civil society organizations across the world to increase transparency in government budgets, writes that primary school enrollment increased from 90.5 percent of the relevant age group in 2004 to 97.3 percent in 2007. HakiElimu went on to address the lack of quality education in Tanzanian schools and created and implemented a campaign to address this issue. In 2005, an election year, the government had planned on using the massive increase in student enrollment as a campaign platform. The report publicized by HakiElimu, led the government to place an interdict against it in September, 2005 (Analysis to Impact, Annual Report 2005).

HakiElimu employed the assistance of its partner NGOs to confront the government. The issue also sparked a national dialogue into the legitimacy of the government’s actions. Students, teachers, and donors participated in the national discourse.

HakiElimu’s program strategy for 2004 to 2007 focused on the research it found from Tanzanian teachers. Partnering with the Tanzanian Teacher’s Union, it conducted interviews with teachers to discover how the education system was actually being affected by the implementation of the PEDP by the government. Of 1,383 teachers surveyed, the organizations found that half the teachers would quit teaching for an alternative job. Seventy-five percent claimed that pay was inadequate. Forty-one percent of urban teachers and eighty percent of rural teachers received their salaries after the 5th of the following month. Teachers are to receive their salaries by the end of the month. More than half of respondents reported living in
accommodations that amount to fifteen percent of their salary (Analysis to Impact). This information led HakiElimu to create its 2004—2007 project plan. It focused on community level involvement by enabling parents, teachers, students, and community leaders to influence decision making by participating in local government; stimulating public engagement, information sharing, and networking by the general public; and broadening political participation in the national policy-making process (Annual Report 2005). It used the media to promote these issues and foster debate. In addition to using radio spots to advocate the issue, it also produced 44 publications and distributed them to the public. 1.8 million copies were sent to partner NGOs and community members and leaders (ibid).

The government reacted by placing an interdict against HakiElimu and banning it from all its activities in schools. In a speech on October 5, 2005, President Benjamin Mkapa declared that HakiElimu had “misinformed the public about the state of education in the country (Analysis to Impact; Pambazuka News).” The Ministry of Education and Culture Circular No. 5 of 2005 accused HakiElimu for “a) disparaging the image of the education system and b) repeatedly failing to conform with directives given to him by the Ministry of Education (Pambazuka News).” In addition to interviews with teachers, the reports by HakiElimu were based on records from the Ministry of Education. The actions of the government cast serious doubts on the degree to which civil society in Tanzania was free and spurred a national discussion from many participating actors at the local, national and international levels. ActionAid Denmark cited the ban as a means to advocate for popular participation as an integral component of democracy (Jensen). A November issue of Pambazuka criticized the justification and legal basis for the Ministry of Education’s ban on HakiElimu. The issue asserted that HakiElimu’s activities were well within its legal rights and protected by the laws and policies of Tanzania.
Mason

national strategic plan, MKUKUTA, called for the reduction of income poverty, improvement in quality of life, and better governance and accountability. The plan was to be implemented from 2005, the same time the government banned HakiElimu, to 2010. NGOs collaborated and were quick to chastise the government. In an issue of Pambazuka they cited Section 6.3.2 of MKUKUTA, which recognizes the role of civil society organizations in monitoring and evaluating the impact of policies and enabling communities to adopt similar roles. MKUKUTA also called for CSOs to “advocate for accountability of its members and government to the people (Ministry of Finance).” They also cited section 3.4.2 of the Primary Education Development Plan, which calls for CSOs to “share information” and “to conduct education policy analysis and advocacy (Pambazuka News). At the end of the issue are ninety-six signatures of NGOs, many of whom linked up with or partnered with HakiElimu.

President Jakaya Kilwete came to power in December 2005. By this time, many newspapers, articles, journalists, and citizens had strongly criticized the government’s actions. In response to public opinion, the President formed a task force to investigate teachers’ demands, including late payments of salaries that had been identified in HakiElimu’s program strategy for 2004 to 2007. Although the government acted on the public opinion of Tanzanians, it refused to lift the ban against HakiElimu. HakiElimu then published a booklet in 2006 that contained 32 feature articles, 10 editorials from national newspapers, 22 letters to the editor, 16 statements from CSOs, and 23 news stories about the interdict (Analysis to Impact). The booklets produced widespread discussion among Tanzanians. Finally, in August 2007 the Ministry of Education lifted its ban on HakiElimu. In January 2007 the government increased the minimum wage for teachers from 80,000 Tanzanian shillings (US$ 60) to 100,000 Tanzanian shillings (US$ 75) (Tanzania Teachers Government Salary Scale: 2007). The number of teachers employed in
primary schools increased from 135,013 in 2005 to 154,895 in 2008, while the number of
government primary schools increased from 14,257 to 15,673 and secondary schools from 1,202
to 3,039 (Basic Education Statistics in Tanzania: 2009). The teacher-pupil ratio in primary
schools decreased from 1:56 in 2005 to 1:52 in 2006 (Basic Education Statistics in Tanzania:
2005, 2006). Moreover, the International Budget Partnership wrote that teachers were receiving
their salaries before the end of the month with fewer difficulties. The organization claimed that
journalists have written more than 1,000 articles about the state of education in Tanzania.
HakiElimu has contacted more than 2,000 sources, primarily ordinary citizens, for their views on
various aspects of education (Analysis to Impact; HakiElimu Media Unit).

HakiElimu continues to employ the participation of other NGOs and citizens. In 2011, it
partnered with other NGOs to ensure funds from capitation grants were actually received by
schools. They had the mandate to monitor at least 100 schools in at least 20 regions (The
Citizen). The process is an attempt to keep the government accountable and to maintain the
policies advanced by MKUKUTA and PEDP.

HakiElimu employed democratic governance within its organizational structure. Its
program strategies were inclusive of all Tanzanians and invited all citizens to participate in the
decision-making process. Deliberation and dissenting opinion were welcome among staff in
program strategies. The organization utilized linking up strategies, forming coalitions and
partnerships with NGOs and donors in order to advance its mission and keep the government
accountable. Collaborating with partner NGOs allowed for more resources and opportunities to
reach citizens at both the local and national levels. Using news and media outlets disseminated
more information to Tanzanians and fostered an environment in which citizens could engage in a
political discourse. The NGO Act of 2002 and the interdict against HakiElimu in 2005 provided
opportunities for NGOs and citizens to participate in a dialogue that scrutinized the legitimacy of
government actions, which ultimately effected democratic change at the national level. The most
prominent changes were government responses to the wishes of the populous. 2011 is witness to
continued checks on government actions with HakiElimu and partner organizations monitoring
the distribution of grants to Tanzanian schools.

Conclusion

Democracy has increased over time in Tanzania. Various theories in the literature
suggest that democratization is influenced by the development of the nation, education, or
inequality and diversity. Other scholars argue that the sustainability of NGOs themselves can
negatively impact democratic reform. This thesis identified a significant correlation between
development, education, and democracy over twenty years in Tanzania. Data from the
Afrobarometer revealed that Tanzanians were overwhelming nationalistic despite the fact that
there are many ethnic groups within the country. Information from research on HakiElimu
showed that linking up strategies, criticized by scholars like Edwards and Hulme, were actually
beneficial for the sustainability of the NGO, its partners, and its programs. More importantly,
these strategies enabled HakiElimu and its partners to advocate locally, nationally, and
internationally, spurring a participative discussion among all Tanzanians.

Even though HakiElimu was a young organization, its linking up strategies and
transparent democratic organizational structure garnered the support of donors and NGOs across
Tanzania. The resources and support of these partner organizations proved beneficial during the
design and deliberation of the NGO Act of 2002 and also when the government placed an
interdict against HakiElimu in 2005. While linking up was a successful strategy, it was actually
the degree to which these issues were discussed and acted upon by Tanzanians that kept the government accountable. Tanzanians began questioning the validity and justification of government actions. This popular participation is a necessary driving force behind democratic progression in Tanzania and is evidenced in increased Freedom House Scores over the past twenty years.

It is evident from HakiElimu’s experiences that linking strategies can and do work. Hodgson argued that the indigenous rights movement (INGOs) failed due to “disagreements over priorities, competition over resources, and tensions over membership representation.” HakiElimu proved that it is possible to overcome sustainability issues by incorporating democratic and participatory decision-making into organization governance. Within the organization, membership was free and all members were treated equally and given equal opportunities. When HakiElimu linked up with other organizations it was oftentimes a member of the decision-making board. Because it encouraged deliberation, it was able to evade the problems encountered by INGOs because all organizations had a hand in the decision-making process. Hodgson is correct in her conclusion that building political alliances in the form of umbrella organizations has a direct influence on the sustainability of development programs. It is, however, the ability of all organizations to have a say in the planning and decision-making and the institution of democratic policies that ultimately affect the sustainability of the organizations and programs.

This thesis highlighted prevalent democracy theories and tested their relevance to democratization in Tanzania. Inequality and diversity have no effect on democracy in the country. This can be ascribed to Nyerere’s propagation of ujamaa, which mitigated ethnic differences and fomented nationalist sentiment. Development and education are highly
correlated with democracy but those findings only begin to scrape the real, causal structures for

democratic change—participation and deliberation. HakiElimu demonstrated that inter- and
intra-organizational participation drove its success. Despite an interdict for two years of its
eleven year existence, it was able to effect change at a national level. Its efforts were legitimzed
by the voiced support of partners and coalitions, which HakiElimu had gained through linking
strategies. Tanzania will continue to see democratic change as long as NGOs operate within, and
drive, a participative culture.
Appendix

Table 1. Trends in Democracy, Development and Education, 1990-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>Combined Scores</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita</th>
<th>Human Development Report</th>
<th>Primary School Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0.3293</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>0.3296</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>0.3299</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0.3302</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.3305</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>0.3308</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.3311</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>0.3314</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>0.3317</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>0.3396</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>0.3472</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>0.3548</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>0.3624</td>
<td>100.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>104.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>107.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>109.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>110.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PR= Political Rights, CL= Civil Liberties; *Highlighted cases indicate interpolated years.

Table 2. Correlations between Democracy and Development and Education, 1990—2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Freedom House Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita (current US Dollars)</td>
<td>Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Indicators</td>
<td>Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Enrollment, Primary (% gross)</td>
<td>Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Combined Scores= Average Freedom House score of Political Liberties and Civil Rights.

References


Afrobarometer. Summary of Results Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Tanzania.


CIA World Factbook, Tanzania.


Human Development Report. International Human Development Indicators, Tanzania.


Project Management Office of Tanzania. 1996.


