THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF US GRAND STRATEGY AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY:
A CASE STUDY OF THE GEORGE W. BUSH AND BARACK OBAMA PRESIDENCIES

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To my parents,
Yoochul Kim and Youngeun Cho

To my grandmother,
Jungwook Lee

To my uncles,
Jungwoo Cho and Jungjin Cho

Last but not least,
To the Chairman of Seoyoung Alcohol Co., Ltd.
Il-Woo Kim

I did not take a single international relations course during my entire academic career in America. I knew nothing about international relations except that I live in the age of US-China competition, just like anybody else. Because I had no prior knowledge about the topic, I was fortunate enough to be working with a blank canvas. That process started on a commonly suggested path, reading the sources recommended by my advisor, Dr. William Thompson. As I read the literature on grand strategy I began to eagerly get more acquainted with the international relations field in general, mostly on the traditional "isms" debates.

During my journey to familiarize myself with the "isms" of IR, especially through viewing interviews and videos with important figures, what hammered my brain was John Mearsheimer's discussion of theory during his interview in "The Conversations with History." Mearsheimer stated that making theory is not a course in an academic program but rather the process of pushing a researcher's intellectual instinct that creates the original logic. Therefore one cannot be taught to make a theory without a pre-established critical faculty to do so. What the heck? His assertion challenged me and led me to ask myself if I have such a natural ability. So I attempted to make a theory for the first time in a deductive way. But I failed. Realizing that I apparently did not have such faculties, I gave up making one to simply do my job and finish the work until I unexpectedly made an inductive realization through my observations of Sino-US relations. It may be that what I created cannot even be called a theory at all, but rather a contingent empirical generalization. But in my second attempt, at the least, I think I failed more successfully than the first time. My two failed attempts might have led my thesis to be too long of a paper and thus it is not an appropriate format as an undergraduate thesis. Even if that is the case, I am happy enough that I had a chance to stretch my brain as much as I could, and that Dr. William Thompson helped me move past my first mistake toward my more productive second attempt. Without his helpful guidance, I am sure that I would have failed less productively. Additional gratitude goes to my second reader, Dr. Judith Failer, whose generosity and advice allowed me to move forward. I also owe my thanks to Dr. Gerald Wright, whose challenging questions during Honors Colloquium helped me avoid conceptual errors in the beginning stages of my thesis. My two attempts could not have happened from the outset had I not been given an opportunity to write such a document. I appreciate the Department of Political Science at IUB for providing me the intellectual opportunity to do this research. I am glad that my intellectual voyage in creating an influential and powerful International Relations theory has not stopped but has just begun. Albeit wishful thinking, right now, this small first step with my thesis is just enough for me.
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CHAPTER 1: GRAND STRATEGY

Introduction

States utilize various material means to seek their ultimate ends. The more powerful a nation is, the more likely it is that its leaders can achieve their goals. These leaders attempt to predict future international environments and act strategically so as not to squander their national assets, namely, their economy, military, or technology. Prominent heads of state are among the most influential actors in deciding how the mechanism of employing means to meet ends should be implemented. They mobilize their followers into embracing their domestic and international worldview. It is not surprising that the ideology of national leaders immensely shapes how states behave abroad. Inevitably, these ideologies are domestically manifested in economic and social policies, and internationally in foreign policies. Whether or how these ideologies are reflected in the domestic and international policy arenas, they are not congruent with the thinking about why and how states use their material means to seek their ultimate ends, or even their short-term interests. Mainly this is so because, simply put, ideologies are not material factors.

Grand strategy is a term that deals essentially with the states' machination of means-ends chains in international politics. The relationship between ideology and grand strategy is not immediately apparent. To be sure, there is no disputing the fact that states are interest-seekers in international politics, however diverse in type and scope those interests may be. This study examines the relationship between ideology and grand strategy through simple hypothesis testing.

This study specifically deals with national leaders' ideologies of democracies, and particularly those democracies whose governance structure lies in a presidential system. The historical case I examine directly is the United States, a democracy with a presidential system (This, of course, establishes by default a limitation of geographic scope on the study).
Consequently, the scope of head of state ideologies will be limited to that of specific US presidencies, meaning that I do not take into account ideologies other than presidential ideologies, which fall along the entire US conservative-liberal spectrum. To be sure, not all democracies in the world may subscribe to the American political continuum, but for the sake of consistency with regard to my historical case, the United States, this study mainly covers only the two primary political alignments—conservative and liberal.

My study seeks evidence of the association between presidential ideology and grand strategy, in particular, whether presidential ideology is associated with grand strategy. In so doing, I make a continuum of the grand strategy concept—realist and liberal—to observe any correspondence with the conservative/liberal ideological spectrum. Particularly, realist grand strategy is theoretically oriented from the realism school of thought in international relations. The same holds for liberal strategy from liberalism in the same discipline. The values of both of these grand strategy concepts are developed later in this thesis.

Presumably, the notion of grand strategy leads to foreign policy choices. According to political scientist Christopher Layne (1998, 8), grand strategy is "the process by which a state matches ends and means in the pursuit of security." Similarly, Barry Posen (2014, 1) views grand strategy as "a nation-state's theory about how to produce security for itself." The implication of these definitions is that grand strategy is not so much about a specific plan but is closer to a vision of a state. It is an element of mental outlook—or sensibility—encompassing thoughts and intuitions about the relationship between vision and the available resources needed to actualize that vision for a state. It is purely practical in that it is elastic enough to respond to crisis. Drawing from these definitions of grand strategy, my definition of grand strategy for the purpose of this study is a state's application of its military power in the pursuit of its security. This definition is not a radical departure from established scholarship. It is grounded on Robert J. Art's conceptual distinction between foreign policy
and grand strategy. Art (2003, 2) argued that both grand strategy and foreign policy embody various means (economic, military, and political) of statecraft to achieve interests, but the former "concentrates primarily on how the military instrument should be employed."

Likewise, Posen (2014, 1) notes, "grand strategy focuses on military threats, because these are the most dangerous, and military remedies because these are the most costly." This study focuses mainly on US military power, hence, US security policies that employ military power will be scrutinized.

Overall, the geographic scope of my research is restricted to the United States and its presidencies because there has been abundant literature developed by scholars on US grand strategy. In exploring the puzzle, I have focused on two presidencies that have competing ideological characters for the purpose of an in-depth case study. For the selection of a particular presidency, the recent George W. Bush presidency and the first term of the Barack Obama presidency are viable case studies in that they represent, respectively, conservative (Republican) and liberal (Democrat) ideological characters. For the same purpose, I chose to study realist and liberal grand strategies by focusing on the work of Henry Kissinger (realist), Zbigniew Brzezinski (realist), Charles Kupchan (liberal), and Jeffrey Legro (liberal).

It is reasonable to posit that a Republican presidential candidate's ideology does not automatically mean, if elected, that the president's ideology will be conservative. The same could be argued on the liberal side. However, the purpose of this study is not about surveying the field of American politics and international relations and integrating them into a one-dimensional project. Rather, it is about probing the relationship between domestic politics and international politics through three variables: presidential ideology, international environment, and grand strategy. In fact, much research practice in observing the interplay between domestic and international politics has already been performed by scholars such as Randall Schweller, Fareed Zakaria, and William Wohlfarth in neoclassical realism (Schmidt
2005). For conceptual clarity, I take the concession that "because we have only two parties, we can have only two-party platforms, and so we are forced to choose between a Democratic ideology - which today we call liberalism - and a Republican ideology - which we call conservatism" (Noel 2013, 18). It follows that "party and ideology today are much more tightly aligned than they were a generation ago, with liberals and conservatives sorted into the Democratic and Republican parties" (Levendusky 2009, 1). Therefore, references to presidential ideology in this study point to the predominant conservative/liberal ideological label of the presidency holding it. I examine whether presidential ideology is associated with grand strategy through testing whether conservative (Bush) and liberal (Obama) foreign policies are congruent with realist (Kissinger and Brzezinski) and liberal (Kupchan and Legro) grand strategies.

To sum up, the realist and liberal grand strategies—those based on the work of Henry Kissinger (realist), Zbigniew Brzezinski (realist), Charles Kupchan (liberal), and Jeffrey Legro (liberal)—will be studied to test their correspondence with the presidential ideologies of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. To do this, I also study the foreign policy practices of each administration. Therefore, the whole purpose of this thesis project is to find answers to the primary questions and hypothesis I outline below:

**RQ1.** Do grand strategies—realist and liberal—correspond to the predominant ideological character—conservative and liberal—of the presidency?

**Hypothesis.** Liberal grand strategy arguments should be more compatible with liberal foreign policy practices (during the Barack Obama presidency) and realist arguments should be more congruent with conservative practices (during the George W. Bush presidency).

The smaller sub-research questions:

**RQ2.** To what extent are the two liberal arguments congruent? What about the two realist arguments?
RQ3. Does realist grand strategy influence conservative presidential ideology?

RQ4. Does liberal grand strategy influence liberal presidential ideology?

Methodology

In terms of measurement methodology, the research orientation of this project will be based on a qualitative case study approach. Case studies are important because they deal with real-life accounts and, consequently, they allow researchers to achieve a refined view of reality and extract meaningful inferences while testing their theories. As psychologist Hans Eysenck (1976, 9) noted, "Sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases—not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something!" In short, case study methodology creates an opportunity for the perceptive researcher to advance human knowledge.

I studied the grand strategy arguments of the four scholars through primary sources written by these figures and through secondary sources dealing with their work. In measuring their work and constructing a grand strategy spectrum, I looked at realism and liberalism in international relations. Realism and liberalism are analytical tools that inform realist and liberal grand strategy. I selected indicators to measure realist and liberal grand strategy based on the study of Realism and Liberalism. In terms of presidential ideology, I also took a qualitative approach. I compared scholars' definition and values of liberal and conservative ideology to the arguments of George W. Bush and Barack Obama on domestic policies to observe whether both are congruent. To assess their arguments, I reviewed transcripts of presidential candidate debates because they took diverse domestic topics into account.

With respect to international environments, quantitatively, I looked at the distribution of material capabilities in the international system from military perspectives. Most of the data I employed originated from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. In assessing foreign policies during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies, I
mainly explored US security policies, since the grand strategy arguments of the four scholars and the concept of grand strategy are purely concerned with how US military power as the most critical tool of statecraft should be used. With regard to the Obama presidency, since his second term continues as this thesis is being written, I only looked at policies during his first term. The sources for analyzing policies vary. I used both primary and secondary sources. They generally included White House documents, press reports, policy analyses from think tanks, and journal articles on policies.

**Regional concentration**

Before reviewing the literature on US grand strategy scholarship, it is noteworthy that in examining the four scholars' grand strategy arguments and security policies of the two presidencies, I focused on two specific regions, namely, Europe and East Asia. The reasons are twofold, both of them historical. First, there were states in both Europe and East Asia that played an important partnership role with the United States in its grand strategy projection, particularly Germany and Japan, but notably no countries in Latin America, South Asia, Africa, or the Middle East (Katzenstein 2005). One of the primary reasons for the lack of a strong partner in those other regions is because "apart from the United States, almost all of the world's strongest military powers are concentrated in Europe and East Asia" (Art 2003, 133). It is intuitively logical for the United States to make sure that its strategic relationships with militarily powerful states in these two significant regions are not antagonistic. Second, America's security interest since 1776 has been regionally focused on Europe and East Asia. George Washington emphasized the importance of a temporary alliance with Europe to make sure that European nations did not project their security interests across the Atlantic Ocean. Washington's successors basically applied his advice to East Asia to assure that East Asian nations did not enlarge their geopolitical influence across the Pacific Ocean (Ross 2013).
Having followed George Washington's advice and having created effective strategic partnerships, "the American alliance system and the forward-deployed military forces in Europe and East Asia gave the United States a direct and ongoing superordinate role in the capitalist-democratic world" (Ikenberry 2009, 77). Even though many security policies focusing on Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and other regions have been created during the Bush and Obama presidencies, I chiefly explore Europe and East Asia because the overriding significance of the two has historically been the greatest foreign policy concern for the US presidents.

*Literature Review*

The most prevalent variable in explicating American grand strategic behavior is the international environment. This environment can be characterized by the distribution of material capabilities, as realists would prefer, or by the spread of democracy, information, and globalization, as liberals would favor. Many scholars focus on a period starting at the end of the Cold War era (c. 1990/1991) to explain the structure of the international system that has been shaped largely by the US superpower, namely, the US-unipolar moment (Mastanduno 1997; Posen and Ross 1997; Adrift 1997; Art 1991). Different interpretations of the international environment could lead to different or even identical recommendations for a specific grand strategy. Varying understandings of the international environment form an intellectual basis in American grand strategy literature (Rose 1998).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the single largest global superpower. The international system changed from bipolarity to unipolarity because the United States remained as the dominant world power (Layne 1998; Mastanduno 1997; Krauthammer 1991; Art 1991; Art 2003).¹ Much discussion takes the post-Cold War era as a departure point to assess important questions: How should the U.S maintain its hegemonic

¹ These concepts are defined and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
power? What military threats challenge the United States? What resources are available for the United States to utilize?\(^2\) What kind of grand strategy should the United States adopt in order to pursue its objectives and to face these threats? The basic underlying approach to these questions makes the assumption that the United States's global position has to be maintained. Sustaining the unipolar moment of American primacy should be the primary objective of US grand strategy.

Discussions have addressed what grand strategy is most appropriate for the United States after the Cold War. The United States's post-Cold War interests included protections of United States homeland territory, maintenance of international economic interdependence, the promotion of democracy, and the prevention of wars among potential great powers in Europe and East Asia. The utilization of US military power can accomplish those goals because the merit of widespread US military power in the Post-Cold War Era has been proven (Art 1991; 2003; Mastanduno 1997).

Traditionally, the fact that America is geographically protected by two vast oceans also makes the continuance of the unipolar moment more feasible; challenging the United States is a costly option for potential great powers in Europe and Asia simply because America has too great a natural advantage (Ravenal 1991; Nordlinger 1995; Bandow 1994; Layne 1993). The U.S. commitment to ensure that these two oceans are not militarily dominated by Eurasian great powers has been a catalyst for Washington leadership to project its naval power in almost all major oceans and politically engage in international affairs. The United States's globally powerful position would be weakened by an isolationist posture, so the United States instead took an integrationist stance in international politics beginning in WWII to sustain its global position. This stance continued in the post-Cold War era, in which two primary consistencies can be identified, namely, economic interdependence and the

\(^2\) Military resources that permit the United States to maintain its global position will be a key component of my own analysis later.
dominance of the US military power. More importantly, America has been successful in avoiding—or even preventing—an unfavorable balance of power against it. Therefore, selective engagement and offshore balancing may be applicable to post-Cold War US grand strategy (Art 1991; 2003; Gilpin 1983; Muravchik 1996; Kurth 1996; Krauthammer 1991; Wohlfarth 1999; Mearsheimer 2001).

In his analysis of America's global position, Nye (1992; 2003) argued against unilateralism, but also accepted the reality that the U.S.'s political influence has widened more than ever, thus recognizing the significance of the U.S.'s unipolar moment. Traditional military power, however, would not help the United States to sustain the moment. Rather, institutions, transnational cultural appeal, and agenda-setting influences are also types of power that would aid the United States to face twenty-first century transnational problems such as climate change, thereby preventing the potential reduction of the United States's influence in the world. Nye called the former exercise of power “hard power” and the latter "soft power." Counter-intuitively, Nye argued that America should avoid the grand strategy of primacy in the unilateral exercise of hard power if it did not want to lose influence.

Quite apart from the analysis of realists, political scientists Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington viewed post-Cold War US grand strategy as a necessary step in protecting the West-driven liberal democracy. Fukuyama (1989) saw the international environment after the end of the Cold war as the demise of past influential political ideologies, such as fascism and communism. The world, according to Fukuyama, could be portrayed as a map of democratic and nondemocratic states, susceptible to interstate conflicts between the two sides. To adjust to these new features of international environment, Fukuyama argued, US grand strategy should be primed to spread liberal democracy and economic liberalization outside its borders. This vision would improve the security of the United States because, following Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace thesis, democracies do not
engage in war-generating conflicts with each other (Fukuyama 1992). Thus, the major geopolitical threats to the United States would come from non-democracies.

Similarly, Huntington saw that liberal democracy had become the most imperative feature in the postwar international environment. However, he also noted that liberal democracy was unique to the West and lacked universal appeal throughout the rest of the world. Instead of states, Huntington viewed civilizations as the most important actors in international politics. He describes eight cultural groups that represent these world civilizations, namely Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African (Huntington 1993). The major geopolitical threat to the West would be the blended cultural group: Confucian-Islamic. In other words, the greatest threat to the United States would be China and Middle-Eastern Islamic states, the two most dominant cultural groups among whom liberal democracy has very little appeal (Huntington 1993). The empirical scope of US grand strategy against these threats should encompass the larger West because "the survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies" (Huntington 1996, 20). The West, and so too America, cannot eliminate any civilization that is hostile to it; rather, to sustain its survival and global position, the United States must compromise and coexist with such hostile civilizations by containing the military power of Confucius-Islamic states.

The vast majority of both realist and liberal scholars emphasize the importance of, and use as a starting point, the international environment. Their analysis highlights perceived threats which rationalize why the US grand strategy should conform to their views. Put simply, these scholars' theoretical constructions of the US grand strategy take a top-down approach. The only exception to this conventional practice comes from political scientist Jeffrey Legro. From a constructivist framework, Legro considered grand strategy to have
socially resulted from "national ideas toward international society" (Legro 2005, 8). The United States is no exception to this rule, and he argues that the post-Cold War US strategy is one that has been practiced since the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency, namely the strategy of liberal internationalism because of the dominantly shared national belief that changes to this strategy would be too risky (Legro 2009). Unlike realists and liberals, constructivists hold that the process of grand strategy creation is rooted in a "bottom-up" approach.

Researching the correspondence between predominant ideological character—conservative and liberal—of the presidency and grand strategy serves as a supportive anchor rather than a radical counter against the already well-established scholarship. By taking into account international environment and presidential ideology, I refuse neither realist scholars' methods nor those of constructivists. This methodological direction is feasible because grand strategy encompasses not only structural-material factors but also cultural-domestic factors.
CHAPTER 2: GRAND STRATEGY OF REALISTS AND LIBERALS

Grand Strategy Categories

Before explaining the four scholars’ (Kissinger, Brzezinski, Kupchan and Legro,) grand strategy arguments, I attempt to make distinctions between grand strategy types by classifying them as realist or liberal. This is necessary because such distinctions enable me to test my main hypothesis. Indeed, classifying grand strategy types in this way is not original; scholars of strategic studies have examined grand strategy types according to a range of variables such as national interests, use of force, and nuclear proliferation. What I attempt to do is to reshape the established distinction between the analytical anchors of realism and liberalism. The grand strategy types I mainly take into account are primacy, selective engagement, collective security, regional collective security, and cooperative security. First, I delineate what features of realism and liberalism are relevant to my classification. Second, I describe and analyze the grand strategy arguments of realist theorists Kissinger and Brzezinski. The analysis includes descriptions of what type of strategy each advocates and the differences within their camps, thus helping me confirm whether their grand strategies are indeed realist. Third, I follow the same procedure for the liberal Kupchan and Legro strategy arguments.

Realism

There is no doubt that Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) monument, *Theory of International Politics* contributed significantly to the advancement of international relations as an academic discipline. Because international politics is driven by complex factors, some notable scholars like Hans Morgenthau considered that international relations (IR) cannot be a separate study. It is worth noting that both Waltz and Morgenthau were realists whose substantive contributions ultimately gave birth to the current academic field of IR. This brief historicity of the beginning of IR studies implies that the study of realism has encompassed a much
longer period absorbing countless research programs, even involving classical realist Thucydides. Due to realism's historical tradition, it is impractical to explain every aspect of its features. Thus, I mainly grapple with the particular schools of thought—defensive and offensive realism—within the tradition of realism that are useful for measuring whether Kissinger and Brzezinski's grand strategies are indeed realist.

**Defensive Realism**

Defensive realism argues that despite the anarchic setting in which there is no ultimate arbiter or authorized entity to guarantee agreement among states, great powers should strengthen only their security and not their power. According to such a model, even with the existence of international anarchy, world politics is benign because security is plentiful (Rose 1998). Especially in the multipolar international system, peace and stability persist among great powers who feel relatively less pressure to pursue hegemony. Such a world provides fewer external stimuli about which to be belligerent (Copeland 1996; Van Evera 1991; Zakaria 1992). In this model, maximizing power (or pursuing hegemony) is self-defeating and can cause other great powers to balance against hegemony-seeking states. In particular, these powers would counterbalance by mobilizing military resources, building up their arsenals, and creating coalitions of the willing rather than bandwagoning alongside hegemonic states. The hegemony-seeking state would be self-defeating because it would be tempted towards strategic overstretch; states may adopt grand strategies that do not lead to power expansion to avoid this problem. According to defensive realism, therefore, great powers should only seek the minimum amount of power—or in Waltz's expression “appropriate amount of power”—they need to gain the security that ensures their survival (Waltz 1979, 40).

**Offensive Realism**

Unlike defensive realism, the offensive realist camp notes that security hardly exists
in the international system. To ensure survival, therefore, states have to gain an overwhelming amount of power. More importantly, states have to maximize that power by pursuing offensive grand strategies at the expense of their geopolitical rivals (Zakaria 1999). Because insecurity is prevalent in world politics, it is natural for states to seek offensive expansionist strategies to gain security and meet the security challenge inherent in international politics—the increase in security of a state leads to the decrease of another's security (Zakaria 1999; Jervis 1978). In this setting, states do not know the specific amount of power they need to acquire to gain security. Thus, they maximize their power until they accomplish hegemony. However, the fall of Roman Empire and the subsequent hegemonic states' failure to maintain their status, provides a lesson for great powers. That wisdom is that states understand that seeking to achieve hegemony in the international system would least likely guarantee their survival. Instead, learning from the lessons of the past, states espouse relative hegemonic power in their own regions, reducing threats from their adjacent geopolitical rivals (Mearsheimer 1990, 2001).

**Liberalism and Neoliberalism**

Liberalism in international relations features a historical set of classical theorists and philosophers who have outlined basic liberal assumptions. These persons include Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson. However, there is no definitive category of liberalism that can be labeled as canonical since scholars' discussions on this particular school of thought have been intertwined over many centuries. However, for the purpose of my study, I introduce one argument of a liberal philosopher, Immanuel Kant, which relates to the liberal side of the study of grand strategy.

In “Perpetual Peace,” Kant argued that liberal states would not fight with other liberal ones but rather with non-liberal states and, thus, peace is feasible among liberal states. In fact, they actively build peaceful relations with each other. However, three conditions have to be
met. First, the liberal republic has to be the foremost form of state in which all citizens are under legal equality and live within the rules of government. Second, these types of liberal republic states will expand in order to establish peace among similar states, a process which is facilitated through "pacific unions"— institutions that "will establish peace within a federation of free states and securely maintain the rights of each state" (Doyle 1986, 1158). Through federalizing, the geographical scope of the pacific union will gradually expand, which would then expand the existing peace among liberal republic states with more similarly-oriented participants. Three, the peace among these states should be institutionalized on a constitutional basis (Doyle 1997). This gradually expanding pacific union is, however, not a world government, nor is it a single treaty guaranteeing eternal peace. Rather, it is a collective security agreement and cosmopolitan law which, according to Kant, basically states that offensive encroachment on a foreign country is unjustified, and citizens have the right to exchange their intellectual ideas and engage in economic activities with members of the union (Doyle 1983).

Kant's core argument—the notion that international peace is achievable because liberal states do not engage in war with each other—leads to the important assumptions of neoliberalism. For this school of thought, international anarchy does not prohibit cooperation between states whose interests are no longer constrained to ensure survival (Keohane 1984). In this sense, for neoliberals, state interests are of procedural significance for the broader social task of cooperation because "states are able to work together to mitigate the effects of anarchy, produce mutual gains, and avoid shared harm" (Jervis 1999, 45).

To promote international cooperation among states, important transnational machinery has to be employed to moderate political interactions and international institutions (Baldwin 1993). The underlying basis for the notion that international institutions can promote peace among states is founded on the idea that such institutions are independent
from states, and thus can effectively facilitate behaviors of member-states to pursue common interests. In other words, they are self-sufficient entities conducting political arrangements without preference to any specific state. This self-sufficiency allows institutions to create more favorable circumstances and conditions for states to cooperate (Jervis 1999). Due to the less conflict-prone nature of anarchy and the subsequent possibility for cooperation among states, states understand that they should pursue absolute gain regardless of other states’ acquisitions and capabilities (Niou and Ordeshook 1991). It follows, therefore, that a state’s "capabilities count only insofar as they affect the preferences and intentions of states" (Baldwin 1993, 8), meaning that socially embedded intentions of states influence international outcomes and thus should be privileged over the material capabilities states possess upon which realists focus.

Since we have observed two dominant themes of international relations theory—realism and liberalism—the next step is to extract indicators from these two frameworks that are linked to the grand strategy study so that we can determine whether Kissinger and Brzezinski’s strategies are realist and Kupchan and Legro are liberal. Essentially, the main realist strategies are primacy and selective engagement and the liberal strategies are collective security and its derivatives, regional and global collective security. Realist strategies typically call for unilateral action and forward military posture, all the while continuing to sustain United States-centric interests. This means that the strategy should focus on serving the national interests of the state first and foremost, and serve the interests of allies as a secondary function. International politics is fundamentally power politics. The balance of power may be shifted adversely from the leading hegemonic state by other great states, thus shaping the world outlook in more pessimistic and despondent ways from the perspective of the leading hegemonic state. However, this does not necessarily mean that
achieving hegemonic world order should be relinquished by great powers who maximize their resources.

Liberal strategies, on the other hand, call for the broader global employment of transnational actors like international institutions. Although military use of force is inevitable in certain circumstances, it should be used primarily as a defensive posture. However, non-violent policies should typically be privileged in resolving international conflicts through multilateral actions utilized in negotiations and even in military activities. Because international anarchy does not necessarily constrain cooperation and democracies are not adversarial toward each other by their nature, the world outlook is more progressive, evolutionary, and sophisticated—alluding to the idea that international institutions are involved in international politics to promote global peace. Therefore, concerning the measurement of Kissinger and Brzezinski strategies, I chose primacy, selective engagement, unilateral action, and the balance of power (precisely the multipolar world order as a preferred international outlook) as major indicators of liberal strategy. For Kupchan and Legro, I selected regional collective security, global collective security, multilateral action, and international institutions as indicators. Before I attempt to extend this measurement, however, I must clarify the features and characteristics of the strategies of primacy, selective engagement, collective security, and regional collective security.

Concerning primacy strategy, political scientists Barry Posen and Andrew Ross's work (1997) provide helpful explanation. Primacy strategy is founded on core assumptions that are inextricably linked to the Mearshimerian version of offensive realism. The strategy of primacy asserts that the maximization of US power (to hegemonic status) is the best self-serving primus mobile for creating world peace. Therefore, United States-centered unipolarity is preferred for the distribution of capabilities in the international system, meaning that no state other than the United States should play this unipolar role as the world's
most dominant power. This is chiefly because peace cannot be ensured except by the United States. The end of the Cold war opened the US unipolar moment (Krauthammer 1990) and the next step was to maintain and prolong the scope of US influence to maximize its power and ensure peace. Because there is no such permanent status-quo great power, attaining hegemonic power is inevitably a great state's most vital interest (Mearsheimer 2001), and this offensive posture paradoxically ensures peace as well because it is inherently grounded in primacy strategy.

Primacy strategy mainly cares about great powers in the international system. The states that have potential incentives to pose a geopolitical threat to the United States enjoy enormous political, economic, and military influence in the world next to the United States. Therefore, these nations are the main actors that Washington leadership seeks to manage. These nations include Russia, China, Japan, and European Union members (especially traditional powers such as Germany, Britain, and France). For US strategists pursuing primacy, international conflict between these great powers must be avoided, and peace and stability among them should be the main policy agenda. This conservative attitude serves two ends of primacy: (1) to prevent the rise of regional hegemons that could potentially compete with the United States and (2) to ensure that the vitality of US unipolar power is not compromised (Posen and Ross 1997). In essence, primacy strategy argues that the United States should be the most influential actor—rather than the most powerful single state—in international power politics (Art 2003).

To meet these two ends, there are necessary means to be employed. The most important instrument is military strength. Since the end of the Cold War, America's military strength, with the addition of its soft mass cultural power, has been unrivaled. From a primacy perspective, the continual modernization of military forces with a technological edge should be maintained. For this reason, defense spending is expected to increase; it is assumed
that American military preeminence would deter other great powers from challenging it (Posen and Ross 1997). US military strength needs a forward presence in key regions such as Europe and East Asia to prevent, respectively, the disintegration of alliance structures, which should instead be rather, or the emergence of a regional hegemon, be it China or Japan (Posen and Ross 1997). Reducing regional conflicts is therefore the primary aim for the US military outside its territory, with additional attention paid to growing security concerns such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that can increase the cost of US military interventions.

The significance of military force in primacy strategy as a necessary means to meet ends suggests that international institutions have less chance to achieve those ends. International institutions or organizations are effective players when hegemonic powers need a diplomatic umbrella from the irregular challenges presented by small- and medium-sized powers. International institutions are important actors in the sense that they behave in a multilateral framework, and thus—conceptually—have an ability to influence states' actions (Posen and Ross 1997). However, in most cases, international institutions have very little effect on state behavior, at least in the American historical context (Mearsheimer 1994). Therefore, it is believed that such institutions "can do little to maintain or, particularly, restore peace" (Posen and Ross 1997, 39).

Unlike a grand strategy of primacy, selective engagement is based on assumptions about world politics that share its values with defensive realism and traditional balance of power realism. Political scientist Robert Art's works (1991; 2003) provide the most comprehensive explanation of this realist strategy. Selective engagement strategy accepts defensive realism's proposition that there could be cooperation between great powers who are driven by a shared fear of a security dilemma, thus possibly resulting in mutual security (Jervis 1999). For selective engagement strategy, such a presumption could lead to the
promotion of peace—because peace is divisible. Thus, using American leadership to actualize a state of peace is a top priority for Washington policy makers (Posen and Ross 1997). Subsequently, selective engagement claims that achieving peace specifically among great powers in Eurasia where most militarily and economically powerful states are located is an essential US interest. Consequently, Russia, China, Japan, and the European Union are the main contestants that have gained the greatest regional currency. Although the Persian Gulf is also an important region for the United States militarily, only mid-sized and lesser powers are located in the region. Europe and East Asia are more significant because there are more great powers in those regions (Art 2003). Wars, or any serious security competition among the great powers of these two regions, must be avoided since "such a war would wreak havoc on economic openness and would dramatically enhance incentives for nuclear spread" (Art 1991, 45). The less significant US interests are the liberal principles of democracy, human rights, and economic openness, but they cannot be compromised at the expense of great power peace and US homeland security. In fact, homeland security "is the prime directive of any grand strategy" (Art 2003, 47). In essence, selective engagement is an amalgam of other grand strategies with an overwhelmingly national interest-centered approach that borrows factors from other strategy types it finds useful (Posen and Ross 1997). Put differently, selective engagement is constitutionally kaleidoscopic.

To achieve ends—a Eurasian great power peace and homeland security—military force is the most imperative means. Selective engagement seeks to counter any regional hegemon through cooperation—meaning that the United States should rely on its allies both unilaterally and multilaterally, by taking the lead and mobilizing others, respectively. In this sense, selective engagement calls for "à la carte multilateralism" or "coalitions of the willing," which are de-institutionalized mechanisms for implementing military operations by the United States leading its preferred allies in necessary battlefields (Shaker 2001; Art 2003).
Threats to the US military are not conventional attacks but asymmetrical ones, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from Third World leaders and radicalized terrorists. Other than cruise missiles, which the United States can already counter, any direct conventional attack is unlikely because it would not be successful by any means due to American technological preeminence (Art 2003). With regard to asymmetrical threats, therefore, the necessity of military force becomes nuanced as a preventive measure in selective engagement. The dominant assumption is that it is better—and less costly—to be proactive than reactive in meeting any serious geopolitical challenge to the United States through forward defense deployment overseas.

Whereas primacy and selective engagement strategy emerge from realism, collective security and its derivative—regional collective security—are developed analytically by liberalism (Posen and Ross 1997). Collective security is more of a theoretical and normative approximation than a purely empirical program in making suggestions for creating world peace. This strategy does not deal with any issue of promoting power, nor does it discuss maximizing the power of any hegemonic state. Rather, the strategy essentially relates to the notion of the indivisibility of security and peace. In the international system, without first achieving peace, security cannot be attained and vice versa (Claude 1964; Claude 2006). For a collective security system to be established successfully in world politics, the distribution of military powers in a multipolar world should be handled and managed carefully because the prime objective is to prevent interstate war and any war of conquest through the communal devotion of member-states. The arbitrary use of force would be restrained (Art 2003).

To build such a system, collective security calls for a highly institutionalized international agency whose mission is to bring states to pledge and submit their national security interest to the broader framework, that is, to a globally shared community of international security. By becoming contributors, states share a sense of being all-for-one and
one-for-all; Alfred Nemours, representative of Haiti, vividly propounded, "Great or small, strong or weak, near or far, white or coloured, let us never forget that one day we may be somebody's Ethiopia" (Claude 2006, 357). For states that agree to be involved in this collective security system, therefore, the realist security dilemma is possible to overcome because every member-state within the system shares an equal amount of security burden (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995). Put another way, the increase in one member-state's security does not necessarily decrease that of another. As its name indicates, international security should be institutionally collectivized. This idea subsequently implies that a security threat to one member-state is a security threat to all member-states, thus resulting in mobilization of all member-states' military resources to respond collectively and automatically to any potential aggressor outside the system (Mearsheimer 1994). Power politics are reserved only to keep the existing collective security system viable; however, in principle, negotiations are a preferred mean to solve disputes. Hence, defense, rather than aggression, is the prime motive for military action (Claude 2006). In essence, a collective security system aims to ensure world peace by providing a deterrence against war. It calls for the collective action of member-states to partially subordinate their individual national security concerns to those of the broader international community. In order for this to work, these states should trust each other and believe that the actions of other member-states are confined to the norms promised by the security system to which they are loyal (Claude 2006; Mearsheimer 1994). The impact of collective security in the American context can be readily observed in the excerpt below.

Promotion of the idea of collective security has created a psychological situation in which the United States cannot turn its back on the concept, not because of what collective security can accomplish...but because of what millions of people...believe it may accomplish in time. Collective security has come to be the chief symbol of hope
that...a community of nations will develop in which there will be no more war.

(Arnold Wolfers, as cited in Betts 1992, 5)

Aiming for the prevention of war through an international, agency-driven, institutionalized security structure, the idea of collective security is theoretically an ideal grand strategy for the United States with historical roots dating back to Woodrow Wilson's presidency. As political scientist Wolfers noted, it is a socially constructed configuration of collective identity by which the United States spreads its liberal principles of democracy and liberty. These two characteristics combined with the conceptualization of peace and security as indivisible units tell us that collective security harbors a sense of political-social homogeneity in its direction for and association with the broader progress of human conditions in war.

Regional collective security involves the main principles of collective security: the indivisibility of peace, strong military power, and trust-founded collective action. However, one key difference between the two related strategies lies in their scope of application in world politics. While regional collective security confines the applicability of its influence to specified regions, by definition of its name, collective security requires all states to become the members of the system. A regional variant of collective security adheres to a different proposition in which an aggressor might appear even among the member-states of the security system (Art 2003). This is primarily due to the smaller number of states involved in the arrangement. The member-states of a regional system must share equal amounts of the security burden but because of the small number of participants, a fair distribution could be difficult. Militarily, there should be no single state that can dominate other members because this would weaken the vitality of regional multilateral architecture. A diffused power distribution (a multipolar framework) is therefore desired. To manage the regional system in accordance with above qualities, members must trust each other just as they would in a global system. This prerequisite affinity among member-states becomes more essential as more
aggressors appear. Therefore, the efficient mobilization of military resources to respond to aggressors requires careful responsibility from member-states.

The formative theoretical conceptualization of a collective and regional security system should be supplemented through its empirical subsidiary—cooperative security—to account for the American context. Traditional international conflict among great powers is no longer a critical security issue for Washington due to the fact that their domestic political agreements have for the most part been shaped by democracy. The belief is that as more great powers become democracies, democratic peace will proliferate as Kantian liberalism promised because they will not go to war each other, thus creating a space for international cooperation (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991). For the United States, the security threats are, instead, non-democracies which have the will and means to acquire weapons of mass destruction and nuclear arms. Consequently, nuclear nonproliferation as well as prevention of war are Washington’s prime security goals (Posen and Ross 1997).

To meet these new challenges through cooperative security strategy, Liberal strategy dictates that the United States should engage in multilateral action with international and regional institutions, respectively, such as United Nations and NATO who would accommodate and moderate collective action among member-states. It follows that military power is also an indispensable tool in envisioning cooperative security, and is particularly suited for humanitarian intervention to prevent civil wars that could lead to large-scale interstate conflicts (Posen and Ross 1997). In this sense, not only defensive but also offensive military capabilities should be considered to deter any aggressors' abuse of their national power (Art 2003).

To conclude the conceptual differences in grand strategy classifications, realist strategies such as primacy and selective engagement build means-ends relationships on the preconception that the defects of international anarchy permit interstate conflicts which must
be mitigated by a power-balancing game. Conversely, liberal strategies such as collective security and its regional and cooperative variants establish means-ends calculations based on the presumption that international agencies and democracy are the chief mitigating vehicles to reduce disadvantages of anarchy and to facilitate international cooperation and peace. Consequently, these transnational factors seem to create a universally institutionalized political entity that is placed above states, but not at the level of a world government with absolutist rule. In other words, liberal strategies may be inferred to be heading toward a termination of anarchy by replacing it with experimental entities and processes fabricated to produce global peace that might otherwise be unattainable unless a world government is created in the near term. Realist strategies encourage states to improve their status within the anarchy by competing to become the chief leader, whereas liberal ones create roads for states to liberate themselves from international anarchy and to engender non-state structures that can produce world peace.

Before examining whether the Kissinger and Brzezinski strategies are consonant with realist strategies, I first explore their arguments and subsequently provide my analysis. I follow the same procedure later for the liberal Kupchan and Legro strategies.

**Kissinger's Grand Strategy Arguments**

When America entered the international scene after World War II, it had sufficient power to project its economic and security preferences to major powers in Eurasia. In the twenty-first century, however, America's power has become diffused most notably in the areas of the military and the economy where major powers such as China, India, Japan, and Russia are competing against the United States. This trend has become more nuanced after the Cold War which lasted about 40 years. The ability of the United States to employ its power has decreased. The international system which America is entering is a new setting
that will be characterized by global factors that would have not been imaginable in the past (Kissinger 1994, 806). The new international system will be a multipolar international order similar to Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kissinger 1994, 23).

Defining the role of America in this emerging new world order sets the beginning stage of Kissinger's basic grand strategy premises.

The premise of Wilsonian principles, which emphasize moral aspirations and values such as democracy and liberty as applying universally to non-democratic states, has become less practicable because American exceptionalism has lost its strength and the United States has become a nation among others. Instead, Kissinger strategy suggests that American leaders should maintain a balance of power with carefully identified national interests in Europe and Asia (Kissinger 1994, 810). The concept of balance of power, however, cannot be the sole basis for American strategy. A legitimacy based on shared values must be included because America's tradition rests on the idea of liberty. Even in the most precise strategic calculation of cost and return in the conduct of policy, however, a limit exists on America's moral influence. Therefore, leaders must conceive a balance between moral and strategic elements, and it is in this balance that the United States's top priorities should be established (Kissinger 1994, 811). According to Kissinger (1994, 812), "America must be careful not to multiply moral commitments while the financial and military resources for the conduct of a global foreign policy are being curtailed" (Kissinger 1994, 812).

Geopolitics gives a good sense of direction in defining US top priorities. Geographically located between two vast oceans, the United States has enjoyed fewer territorial threats as a major sea power country than land power countries in Europe and Asia. The strategy of isolationism is an easy and natural option when leaders decide not to engage unnecessarily in world affairs. Eurasia, however, is an important region where resources and population surpass those of America. If either of the two spheres—Europe or Asia—were to
become dominated by a single power, America's global economic and military power could vastly diminish (Kissinger 1994, 813). Even if the regional hegemon in one of the spheres were benevolent, it would still be a strategic danger in the international system, as the United States's ability to shape global events would be weakened.

In Atlantic relations, the United States and Western Europe share similar responsibilities and share such values as democracy, open-market economies, peace, and multiethnicity. Wars between these two great powers are inconceivable since their security challenges are not targeted toward each other. Rather, wars are most likely to happen in the peripheral regions, especially where ethnic conflicts are contentious. Thus, the prospect of wars between traditional nation-states has faded considerably. What matters is how the Atlantic partnership and cooperation can reinforce Europe’s and the United States’s interests together (Kissinger 1994, 820). In doing so, revitalization of two key institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, is required.

For much of the Cold War period, America supported a security umbrella for Europe. This trend has changed in the post-Cold War world because wars between major powers in Europe are inconceivable and, thus, America feels less need to protect Europe. In turn, European states, particularly Germany, feel a strong need to accelerate expansion of their economic self-interest. The advance of the European Union, however, does not mean that it could create an institution that is incompatible with America's self-interest. Independent military action is implausible as America's political support is necessary in Eurasia (Kissinger 2001). For handling current and future problems of successor states of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Central Europe, NATO is necessary to prevent military threats and the European Union is essential for economic growth and political stability.

In East Asia, the political, military, and security competition between nations including China, Japan, India, Korea, and Russia is intense. Their relationship is not based on
economic and ideological grounds but on strategic and security sources. Resembling the geopolitical setting of nineteenth century Europe, these nations are strategic rivals with large military expenditures that are conducive to ensuring security protection against one another. Immediate wars are not likely, but this does not mean that wars are unimaginable in the future. In order to create and maintain peace in East Asian politics, the strategy of balance of power requires the United States to play a major role to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon (Kissinger 1994; 2001).

Legitimacy in conducting foreign policy brings moral support to leaders who take strategic and time-honored actions. America's national priorities that are compatible with other major powers' national priorities would bring shared responsibility in the international system. However, incongruity among them could create chaos. However chaotic or peaceful the system, national security must be preserved above all else. American leaders must protect the right to secure it (Kissinger 2006).

Surely, a multilateral approach to foreign policy might sound morally appealing as it matches Wilsonian principles. However, the 9/11 attacks have shown us that the coin of power today is technology, not territory. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and states that are in opposition to America's self-interest would be a major security problem to America. Defense against and preemption of these agents is unilaterally necessary if required by emergency, as in the case of 9/11 (Kissinger 2001). As a sovereign nation, America's crucial national interests should be preserved, if necessary, by taking unilateral approaches and actions.

However, America should not fall into the gap between multilateralism and unilateralism in conducting policies. The superfluous practice of unilateral action is doomed to overextension; the uncritical employment of a multilateral approach is fated to empty formal consensus. It is essential to make America's national interest compatible with interests
of other major powers (multilateral), but it is also important to preserve the right to defend America's self-interest (unilateral) when necessary (Kissinger 2004). Thus, building political, social, and security conformity among major states is an essential task in the international system as it would contribute to US security, which has strategic pre-eminence in the "polar" world (Kissinger 2004; 2010). In this sense, nuances and actions can take place in the form of multilateralism and unilateralism, but selectivity among them depends on the needs of unilateral vital American interests.

Brzezinski's Grand Strategy Arguments

America's standing in the age of globalization has been hegemonic. Its power in economic, military, political, and global social appeal exceeds former European powers in the twentieth century (France, Germany, and England) and even emerging powers in East Asia (China, Japan). With the increase of America's hegemonic power, global security is now significantly influenced by the degree to which US national security is manifested and achieved. Historically, however, no state has enjoyed hegemonic power indefinitely. So too, America's preeminence will eventually fade, and it is, therefore, important to set the stage for America's hegemonic power not to be replaced by another dominant hegemon or a coalition of major powers (Brzezinski 2004, 2-3). Using its power to maximize hegemonic status or to lead the world to create a new global system of shared interest is a choice that America should make.

In Brzezinski's view, the nature of US national security inevitably affects global stability, so poorly managing this security would increase global vulnerability and eventually cause global chaos. The notion of total security is flawed and impossible to achieve because of the global interconnectedness driven by technological advancement. Insecurity, rather than total security, is the norm today. Minimizing insecurity's effect, therefore, is in fact empowering security (Brzezinski 2004, 17). The international environment in which America
stands and US security experience in the twentieth century sheds light on the prospective
direction of grand strategy.

Especially in the wake of 9/11, threats from unidentified non-state actors have shown
that the scope of external attacks faced by American has enlarged to a global scale. This
changing nature of security threats is augmented by the development of telecommunications,
and these conditions increase global vulnerability (Brzezinski 2004, 25). Protecting American
territory from unidentified and even unimaginable threats can be justified to respond to the
expanded spectrum of both internal (within America) and external (outside America)
potential attacks. Therefore, the isolationist security strategy of the twentieth century only
creates a space where enemies can build up their arsenal from all over the world.

Brzezinski predicts that if US military forces are withdrawn from Europe, East Asia,
and the Persian Gulf, the likely geopolitical outcome is global chaos. Russia, Japan, and Iran
would rearm to compete with regional rival powers (Brzezinski 2004, 17). The United States
plays a role of global balancer whose national security control contributes to world peace.
Therefore, Eurasian security is politically manageable with US engagement. The changing
nature of threats calls for an alteration in security strategy. Hence, the rationales for
maximizing American national security are substantial (Brzezinski 2004, 16).

During the four decades of the Cold War era, the United States's ideological and
security rivalry with the Soviet Union was grounded on a simple, yet central geostrategic
concern: domination of the Eurasian continent by a single state. The United States had to
strengthen its military power to compete with Soviet nuclear capability and the Soviet Union
had to politically manage its two-thirds of the Eurasian continent successfully in order to
dominate the rest. The United States's main effort was to prevent the continent from being
dominated because of Eurasia's unique appeal to major powers: a politically active population
with various sociocultural dynamics, and, most importantly, two of the most economically
advanced regions, East Asia and Europe. In fact, even after the Cold War these two regions are still the United States's main geopolitical objectives (Brzezinski 2004, 41-42). It is therefore important to engage selectively in these two regions to maintain US security predominance, which would then minimize global vulnerability. Put simply, preventing the birth of a regional hegemon from the Eurasian continent should be the prime US security interest (Brzezinski 2004, 41).

To engage wisely in Eurasia, America needs partners because achieving total security by itself is unthinkable in the global order. An integrated Europe could become a security partner in Eurasia as both the United States and Europe have shared security interests during and following the two World Wars. The United States's decision to change NATO from a traditional defense alliance to an expanding security alliance with the addition of Poland, together with the European Union's economic expansion, has created an environment in which two powers can act accordingly in global affairs on a flexible basis (Brzezinski 2004, 67). Through these webs of institutions, the two powers can coordinate interests in military, economic, and political spheres to move forward toward stabilizing Eurasian security and promoting trans-Eurasian cooperation. The more integrated Europe would appear in the form of a supranational European Union which would be linked with America, without reclaiming the nineteenth century European hegemonic power (Brzezinski 2004, 67).

If Europe plays the role of America's security partner in the Atlantic community, Japan could play a similar role in the Pacific community. Japan's military might, together with that of the United States, could establish a security balance in East Asia to counter the reemergence of China's power. Even though critics argue that Japan's economic status is regressing due to stagnation, its economy, which is comparable to that of China, is still the second largest in the world. Japan strongly favors democracy in its domestic affairs in congruence with America's universal principles: democracy and freedom. Similar to Europe,
Japan is a US security partner that could contribute to the regional stability in East Asia (Brzezinski 2004, 67). Both Europe and Japan share similar social values and democratic principles with the United States, implying that the legitimacy of US global leadership can gain international acquiescence. Since threats can come from non-state actors, as happened on 9/11, the prospect for the twenty-first century US grand strategy calls for trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific strategies. America, to create these strategies effectively, needs cooperative relationships with its most significant security partners, Europe and Japan.

In the Atlantic framework, the power synchronization of Europe and the United States is the core of global stability. Building a symmetrical relationship between the two, however, is not easy. Europe having military and economic power competitive to the United States would be equal to creating a regional hegemon in the western portion of the Eurasian continent. This would threaten the United States's preeminence in Latin America and the Middle East (Brzezinski 2004, 91). Even if Europe gains military power comparable to the United States, it cannot become a serious geopolitical rival because breaking the Atlantic alliance would only thwart its emerging yet slow political unity and rekindle traditional strategic vulnerabilities between Germany and its rivals such as England and France (Brzezinski 2004, 95). More importantly, unless Europe's political integration is achieved, it would take some decades for Europe to gain serious military capabilities, and although Europe might ultimately acquire weighty military power with European Union support, it would not be comparable to that of America. Therefore, Europe's military power is not likely to be autonomous from America in the Eurasian security order (Brzezinski 2004, 106).

Most importantly, however, what leaders of the Atlantic alliance know is that without Europe, America would lack global reach because multilateralist Europe's political and economic organization (as the European Union) permits Washington to engage in Eurasian affairs with flexibility, particularly with regard to creating Middle East policies by joining US
military might with the EU's political and financial support for regional stability. At the same time, Europe without America would be powerless in Eurasia because of its slow progress toward the political integration that is a necessary prerequisite to the creation of independent military capability (Brzezinski 2004, 67, 73, 95). In other words, the two bodies' joint security moves can powerfully be orchestrated all over the world, and this constitutes the core of stability of global security (Brzezinski 2004, 96). The strength of this core is influenced by the enlargement of the EU and NATO. The enlargement of these two institutions implies an expanded security zone of the West that would eventually involve Russia.

In the near future, EU's political unity will be difficult to witness and its zone of influence, therefore, will be confined to the economic side. Enlarging NATO requires arrangements between prospective states and NATO members, which would require military and political involvements. Ukraine, which revealed its aspirations to join NATO in 2002, could become a new member if it meets criteria (Brzezinski 2004, 98). Following Ukraine, encouraging other post-Soviet states to join the EU and NATO is crucial to hampering the rekindling of Russia's imperial ambition. Russia will not become a member in the near future even though it knows that a geopolitical contest with America is irrational and that allying with China means losing its self-respect. In the much longer term, Russia is likely to join NATO because of its need for the West to provide resources in the Far East areas where the number of inhabitants is falling and they have a growing need to protect the natural wealth of Siberia from external territorial threats (Brzezinski 2004, 101). Russia eventually joining NATO would enable more prompt reactions against struggles in Central Asia, and would create a more solid military basis within the Euro Atlantic community to serve in global stability.

3 The recent developments in the relation between Ukraine and Russia have been militarily intense. Russian leadership under Vladimir Putin has projected its security influence into Ukrainian territory, which caused the United States and its European allies to impose economic sanctions on Russia. This study acknowledges these active situations but cannot discuss them as they are beyond the chronological scope of this study.
In the Pacific framework, East Asia is a key region that resembles the geopolitical setting of Europe prior to 1914. With the growth of its economy and its stable one-party politics, China, which is similar to Germany before World War I, reemerged as a regional preponderant actor that competes with America-allied Japan. As Brzezinski describes the nation, China takes haughty postures toward Russia, is irritated by Japan, recognizes an unavoidable pragmatic role for the United States in East Asia, and has a condescending stance toward India (Brzezinski 2004, 107). China and India are true nuclear powers. North Korea wants to become one as well in the near future. Japan should be considered a de facto nuclear power, and is unofficially recognized as being such. Japan feels uneasy about China in their security competition (Brzezinski 2004, 107). It is only a matter of time before Japan remilitarizes depending on the state of the East Asian security order. The Korean peninsula is potentially explosive and the two Koreas will not reunite unless China can benefit from the reunification. The denuclearization of North Korea is a litmus test for major powers in East Asia as to whether the multilateral approach to sharing and solving common problems will be practical (Brzezinski 2004, 122).

Although many states in East Asia influence peace in the region, in fact, regional stability is heavily contingent on the exercise of Japan’s and China’s power, and, more importantly, on how America influences their behavior. Therefore, the key in East Asian security order is the strategic yet balanced triangular relationship between China, the United States, and Japan (Brzezinski 2004, 108). It may seem that this triangular relationship could be easily broken apart. America is allied officially to Japan and South Korea and unofficially to Taiwan. These security interactions could be viewed as an anti-Chinese alliance.

However, as long as Japan is the United States’s principal military partner, unilateral military provocation of China in East Asia is senseless because of the geopolitical setting in the region. Not only China but also Japan largely depend upon each other for their economic
survival through maritime commerce conducted through the ports of Shanghai and Yokohama (Brzezinski 2004, 109). Economic stability in East Asia would be shaken if those ports were attacked. China would not militarily collide with United States, as it knows it lacks the economic power to do so. Even if war breaks out, the United States would bring a halt to China’s foreign trade and oil imports, and the fact that ally Japan’s naval forces are the most advanced in the region would also discourage Chinese military provocation (Brzezinski 2004, 109, 110, 118).

China's rise to overt regional power is a fact in East Asia. Thus, to promote regional stability requires a more carefully calibrated and balanced triangular relationship of the United States, China, and Japan. Without US engagement a war would probably break out. China has been moving toward a post-communist phase following 9/11 and recognizes the economic and practical value of a stable relationship with the United States. In this setting, China would favor Japan’s military buildup and its security dependence on the United States because, paradoxically, this would ultimately vitalize the triangular relationship and outweigh the former Chinese doctrine-oriented view of the world (Brzezinski 2004, 114, 115).

Concerning the Chinese post-communist era, the strategic US move should be to upgrade Japan’s security role. In this way, the Chinese propensity to sustain its relationship with the United States, to continue to favor United States-Japan security ties, and to maintain the triangular United States-Japan-China relationship would increase (Brzezinski 2004, 114, 115).

Peace in East Asia relies upon continued US strategic engagement with its principal ally Japan who should not feel vulnerable to China nor offended by its dependence on the United States. Upgrading Japan’s security role by advancing its air and naval forces will increase the likelihood that China will continue to sustain its relationship with the United States and the larger triangular United States-Japan-China relationship to promote peace in the region and prepare its post-communist era (Brzezinski 2004, 120). The triangular
relationship could then develop into a trans-Pacific security order that would be embodied in the larger Eurasian security framework.

Ultimately, Brzezinski claims that America's global policies should be grounded on the security of the American people. America's own security must be the foremost national interest, but to achieve this America needs global support because of changes in global security threats. Europe and Japan are the principal partners of American security. It is their support that makes American globally omnipotent. Global stability now depends in large part on American national security, and thus the United States should seek greater security than other states. However, that security agenda should include the interests of others in promoting America's grand strategy toward a community of shared interests (Brzezinski 2004, 217, 218). The vortex of three factors—America's soft power such as culture, English language, brand recognition (Brzezinski 2004, 182), its hard power such as military capability, and alliance partners Europe and Japan—would shape a future world order that would not allow another hegemonic power to replace America. Delivering American primacy through global partners in Eurasia, structuring transcontinental security institutional frameworks, and eventually creating a security umbrella that constructs and protects a community of shared interests; this is the essence Brzezinski's vision of the trajectory of American grand strategy (Brzezinski 2004, 229).

Having completed my exploration of the Kissinger and Brzezinski strategy arguments, the next step is to code the characteristics of these realist strategies in order to compare them to the foreign policy practices of the Bush presidency. In my project, the description of the Kissinger and Brzezinski arguments indicates that a president following a realist grand strategy would pursue security policies based on primacy, selective engagement, and balance of power. In particular, primacy requires the United States to increase its military capability and balance any challengers in Eurasia to maintain the United States-driven unipolar
international system. Selective engagement indicates that the United States should engage in
the Eurasian continent to create peace among major powers, and therefore a multilateral
framework is suggested. It follows that a conservative president would pursue policies to
ensure that the United States is the most preponderant and influential military power. Balance
of power signifies that the United States is required to balance any rivals in Eurasia
offensively with the utilization of its military power, thus minimizing any potential
geopolitical attempt to change or reduce US unipolarity. Therefore, these three elements will
be key criteria in my analysis of George W. Bush's policy decisions.

Realist Strategy: Analysis

Kissinger

Kissinger's grand strategy arguments in the above section are the realist
manifestations of both primacy and selective engagement. In terms of the former, it might
seem odd that he adheres to the assumption that that the United States should be the most
influential player in international politics. This is because his conceptualization of the United
States's place in twenty-first century world politics is based on the distribution of material
capabilities that are characterized by the multipolar power system. To Kissinger, the United
States has not entered a unipolar period even after the successful end of the Cold war; instead,
the bipolar and multipolar world systems have been constantly maintained. Such a view of
the world from Kissinger is contrary to the unipolar international system that primacy
strategy upholds. However, it should be stressed that what the Kissinger strategy asserts and
favors is not exactly the security system in which there are more than three or more polar
powers. As a matter of fact, the Kissinger strategy supports a hybrid of multipolarity and
unipolarity, and uni-multipolarity. Samuel Huntington explained this blended system, "With
one superpower and several major powers, the settlement of key international issues requires
action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major powers;
the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states” (Huntington 1999, 36). This hybrid world order is reflected in the Kissinger strategy which suggests that the United States should act "as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic pre-eminence [emphasis added]” (Kissinger 2004). Only primacy strategy stresses that the United States should be the most preponderant power and this agrees with Kissinger’s view as well.

With respect to threat perception and US national interest, Kissinger’s strategy maintained selective engagement remonstrations. His strategy established East Asia and Europe as the most critical regions for the concentration of America's military power. In those two areas, any great power aspiring to become the regional hegemon must be restrained by American power because these two areas comprise the two dominant spheres in Eurasia where most resources are intact. America’s power would be weakened even if a regional hegemon if there were any, were benevolent. Essentially, the threat perception of the Kissinger strategy is exactly same as those of selective engagement: prevention of any regional hegemon to promote Eurasian great power peace.

The fact that the Kissinger strategy prefers the uni-multipolar distribution of power connects directly to the notion of unilateral action. As Huntington indicated, this specific world order presumes the superpower to behave in both unilateral and multilateral approaches to international negotiations with other major powers. Accordingly for the Kissinger strategy, it follows that unilateral action is preserved to "defend its vital national interests, if necessary, alone" (Kissinger 2006) and multilateral action is reserved for "making the definition of national interest of other nations as much parallel to its own as possible” (Kissinger 2006). In this sense, the Kissinger strategy sustains unilateral action, and relegates multilateral action to a conceptual level, namely, through the framework of shared interests with its Atlantic alliance member-states.
To sum up, the Kissinger grand strategy is indeed a realist version. It is built theoretically upon the core assumption of realism: international politics is essentially power politics. A power-balancing game is what the United States should do in Eurasia to prevent a regional hegemon in East Asia and Europe through maintaining strategic primacy among major great powers in world politics. The Kissinger strategy vindicates primacy strategy through adopting the concept of uni-multipolarity, which endorses American strategic supremacy. The Kissinger strategy favors selective engagement strategy as both agree with the threat perceptions and the type of means to use. More importantly, the Kissinger strategy embodies the notion of unilateral action. It emphasizes that the United States should defend American interests alone when circumstances require while at the same time supporting the ideas and framework of multilateralism, if not actually multilateral action.

Brzezinski

Unlike Kissinger’s strategy, Brzezinski’s grand strategy takes an expansive view of the role of the United States in world politics. To start with, it assesses that after the Cold war the distribution of material capabilities has largely shifted to the American hegemony. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, in other words, unipolarity is what has characterized the international system. As history taught statesmen that there are no perpetual hegemons, Brzezinski’s strategy acknowledged that the United States-centric unipolarity would be gone too. However, the Brzezinski strategy preferred a future world order that is not replaced by a different great power.

The Brzezinski strategy suggests that the US unipolarity period should be extended even while realizing that it would not be as hegemonic and powerful as it once was immediately after the Cold war. The United States-driven unipolarity should be considered relative to its geopolitical competitors and not just in isolation. As long as the United States holds preponderance superior to any rival, how hegemonic they once were or will be
becomes less important. It follows that the buttressing of US unipolarity has become more important since 9/11. The increase of global vulnerability is an unpleasant fact as more non-state actors can assault great powers like America. Due to this change in the nature of threat, therefore, the United States should maximize its security, which is conducive to world peace and global stability. The Brzezinski strategy's preferred world order and the rationale for it corresponds to that of primacy strategy.

To make sure that no state replaces American unipolarity, the Brzezinski strategy argues that the United States should militarily balance Eurasia concentrating on East Asia and Europe with key partners such as NATO and Japan. This approach to regional prioritization and international cooperation agrees with that of selective engagement, which supports prevention of Eurasian great power peace through ally-based cooperation. The Brzezinski strategy recognizes that Europe cannot militarily go alone against America, but America could face Europe alone. US security would be maximized if European allies' resources were mobilized along with Washington's, thus permitting United States-driven NATO military power to reach anywhere efficiently and quickly. Although it may seem that the Brzezinski strategy espouses US multilateral action with regard to its allies, it actually preserves or even warrants US unilateral action to achieve its national interest. "If it should become necessary to cut the nexus between the proliferation of WMD and conspiratorial terrorism, the United States has the means to act on its own, as it proved in bringing down the recent Iraqi regime" (Brzezinski 2004, 72). In this sense, the Brzezinski strategy vindicates a coalition of the willing, also embodied by selective engagement, because this multilateral framework ensures US unilateral military action as a leader with its allies (NATO and Japan) in a cooperative manner under necessary circumstances (Europe and East Asia).

To sum up, the Brzezinski strategy strongly champions the realist strategies of primacy and selective engagement. Taking these two strategies together, the Brzezinski
strategy calls for Washington policy makers to prolong the US unipolar moment by preserving unilateral military action. These moments should set the stage for constructing an international system where the United States would not be militarily balanced by other great powers in Eurasia, be they China or Russia or even a militarily independent European Union. Even if American preponderance is diminished, as long as no state can challenge it, the United States still has a powerful political and strategic edge in creating world peace. With each having different nuances in the notion of unilateral action and preference of world order, both Kissinger’s and Brzezinski’s grand strategies are indeed realist strategies adopting primacy and selective engagement. What differentiates their arguments distinctively lies in the degree of their sophistication and form but not in substance, where both firmly subscribe to realist measures. Specifically, the Kissinger strategy takes a minimalist form of the primacy goal, to sustain American strategic preeminence. When that US strategic preeminence is maintained deliberately in the multipolar world, then the extant order changes to a uni-multipolar international system. The Brzezinski strategy, on the other hand, takes a maximalist form of primacy goal, achieving and maintaining the United States-centered unipolarity, while holding a selective engagement threat perception similar to Kissinger strategy. It is the most expansive and offensive strategy in that world peace and global stability can only be ensured by US unipolar military power. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski recognizes both hard and soft power as conducive to a burgeoning American leadership, making it, in Brzezinski’s words, "Superpower Plus" in the international system. For the Brzezinski strategy, although economic and ideological factors do matter in sustaining American preeminence, they can be backed up by cooperative allies with democratic values who are economically interconnected to the United States in order to build American unipolarity with international legitimacy. Put in simple terms, the Kissinger strategy is defensive and minimalist whereas Brzezinski’s is offensive and maximalist. These
differences and similarities between the Kissinger and Brzezinski strategies allow me to answer part of RQ2: To what extent are the two realist arguments congruent?

Kupchan’s Grand Strategy Arguments

America's power is unrivaled today with its military, economic, and technological superiority. Its power far exceeds those of other great powers. Even its cultural popularity contributes to a nonmaterial dominance, thereby creating images of global celebrity. America's presence generates global public attention. American prominence in the global scene is the by-product of its success in the Cold War. The waning of communist ideology and the United States's nuclear competition with the USSR opened a new geopolitical stage for the winner of the war to enjoy its power: the beginning of America's preponderant era.

Kupchan claims, however, America wasted its era of dominance by having no definitive grand strategy. The United States adopted the misguided notion that its primacy would last over the long term. It was only after the events of 9/11 that US officials decided to practice a strategy of preponderance that emphasizes unilaterism and preemption. This strategy is inadequate, as its international manifestations have shown that US preponderance may not be stable. America's western partners such as France, Germany, and Russia have attempted to stop the United States's war against Iraq (Kupchan 2003a). Pacific partners such as China, Japan, and South Korea are ambivalent about the United States's lack of political effort in dealing with North Korea, particularly after DPRK resumed its nuclear weapons program. The results of abandoning partnerships are the expansion of anti-Americanism, the loss of international legitimacy, and the lethargy of institutional innovation and international development (Kupchan 2003a).

The events of 9/11 opened up a new geopolitical vulnerability not only for America but also for other major powers. The Islamist attack on one of the most economically
advanced cities in the West signaled the fact that other western cities could be future targets. The incident catalyzed other major players to unite to defend against the threats of terrorism, and this new geopolitical reality illuminated the fact that the traditional great power rivalry has reemerged. America not only squandered its preponderant time in creating an impracticable strategy but also realized that its preeminent days had already faded away (Kupchan 2003a).

Due to the consequences of the new geopolitical landscape, Kupchan explains, America's once unrivaled power could be replaced by other major players and an America-centric world order and stability would then slip away too. The rising powers would compete for primacy, and the development and progress of globalization would lose its vitality due to America's lowered global status. Because the rising powers would replace America, America would face security threats not from non-state actors like those that it did in the events of 9/11, but from the traditional geopolitical rivals in Europe and East Asia (Kupchan 2003a).

In essence, America should prepare for a new geopolitical reality that is comprised of a multiple great power rivalry system. America must envisage the new order and stability that will soon appear on the global scene. America still has resources available, however, to meet the new geopolitical challenge, as long as it does not rest upon unnecessary ideas of isolationism and unilateralism (Kupchan 2003a). Traced back to the founding fathers, America has a strong natural inclination to distance itself from foreign relations when the costs of engagement seems too unpredictable (Kupchan 2003a). Kupchan argues that the United States should resist this inclination in order to ensure its role in a shifting global power balance.

However, it is important to note that Kupchan does not believe that America should meet the international challenge of a multipolar world with traditional military rivalry. Although America's preponderant period is already slipping away, its military and economic
capability far exceeds any single state in the world politics. European states and those in East Asia for many decades complained about the presence of US troops, but this emotional opposition, rooted in anti-American sentiments, would never transform into actual military balancing against America. Also, the fact that the United States is located between two massive oceans makes America less appealing for military engagement, especially given the United States's possession of the most advanced naval forces in the world (Kupchan 2003a).

The change in the distribution of power would derive from three sources: the more integrated Europe, the rise of East Asia driven by two leading states Japan and China, and the attrition of liberal internationalism in US domestic politics (Kupchan 1999; 2003a). In spite of Europe's inability to militarily balance against America, it can do so in economic and political arenas, gradually emerging not as an Atlantic partner but a geopolitical rival (Kupchan 1999). Both the economic advance of China and the economic recovery of Japan could offset the United States with China already rising as a regional power in East Asia. Kupchan warns that America's dismissive attitude toward multilateral actions and international institutions—the two constituents of liberal internationalism—would contribute to a chaotic global order (Kupchan 2003a).

The rise of Europe stems mainly from its economic power, which is becoming a threat to America. The economic output of both America and the European Union are roughly similar. Based on Europe's economic power, the euro has reached a global economic status that could replace America's dollar as the stronger currency (Kupchan 2002). Because of the currency rivalry between the two, the financial institutions that represent each also compete for the control of international institutions. The Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank fight for position in influencing the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and United Nations. The politically divergent views of both institutions could instigate a conflict in managing the overall international monetary system. Supported by the single
market and a single currency, the EU could continue to accumulate its economic muscle, which can be attributed to the growing collective financial weight of the European community (Kupchan 2002).

However, the EU would not be an active military balance against America as it would be difficult for the EU to increase security capabilities that could rival those of America, and the EU has no interest in exercising its military power globally. However, conflict would likely arise in politically managing security structures between the two in that the culture of both entities' force conceptualization is different. The EU views America's military power as excessive and unnecessary whereas America views the EU as weak, ignorant, and dependent on multilateral institutions (Kupchan 2002). The EU would further claim to become independent from America in its security arrangement, which could damage the Atlantic framework. By the EU being outside of the US security umbrella, US military practices will be projected in non-Atlantic regions. Eventually, the spirit of the Atlantic alliance would be diminished (Kupchan 2002).

The divergent views among older and younger generations within the European community in the notion of "the more integrated Europe" brings a new political discourse that threatens the Atlantic alliance. The older generations viewed integration as a stability-seeking vehicle to depart totally from the traditional great power rivalry among European nation-states whereas the younger generations who are absent from war experiences see it as a power-seeking mechanism in international politics (Kupchan 2002). With war memories flying out into the pages of history, the angle of political dialogues in the notion of European integration is slanted towards the younger views.

The economic potency backed by the euro, the independent-security seeking moves outside America, and the new political reality of power-seeking European integration suggest that Europe could be a serious counterweight to America. It would expand its influence in
Eurasia, thus becoming a geopolitical rival power to the United States, the global influence of which would then decrease. The Atlantic alliance would lose its vitality and multilateral institutions' political influence that bridged between them would also totally be consumed.

The rise of East Asia would take much longer than that of Europe. However, the region's vitality in advancing its economy is underway and will ultimately contribute to the enlarging Pacific economic framework. Japan will eventually recover from its recession, and China with huge consumer power would continue to foster its already expanding economy (Kupchan 2002). East Asia would constitute another center of power in the new geopolitical environment.

One of the biggest threats to the eroding American preeminence is not its replacement by other powers but the degree to which Americans can deal with the new geopolitical landscape shaped by them. The domestic political environment—unilateral initiative and apathy to world affairs—is reducing the merit of liberal internationalism. Part of the reason why this merit has been reduced is because of the general publics' lessened interest in international affairs. They have become less acquainted with world affairs because their main political attentions are tilted towards domestic issues; the increase of Internet usage and digital developments following it shaped this phenomena (Kupchan 2003b, 320-321). The Bush administration's foreign policy decisions, such as disengagement from the Kyoto Protocol and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, pushed political discourse towards self-interest-seeking agendas that dilute the value of multilateral actions and international institutions (Kupchan 2003b; 320-321). These signs of unilateralist and isolationist bents, together with the rise of Europe and East Asia, would make the United States less prepared than it currently is to meet foreign challenges in the coming multipolar power world.

The change in the distribution of power from unipolarity to multipolarity in the global system is self-evident. Kupchan argues that in response to this change, America should
formulate a grand strategy of global collective security order through regional centers of power in North America, Europe, and East Asia. In essence, this grand strategy is about constructing a concert system, for example the Congress of Vienna that existed until the outbreak of WWI. This grand strategy identifies that the major great powers in the concert system are Russia, the United States, Japan, China, and the European Union (Kupchan 2003b, 296). In so doing, the United States must recognize and not hamper the geopolitical ambitions of Europe and East Asia and must form relationships with them in such a way that they do not balance against the United States. The guiding principle, therefore, should be global engagement through multilateral actions with other great powers.

To translate this grand strategy of a concert system into a reality, international transnational institutions are one of the most important means. Some of the historical and current examples include the United Nations and NATO, with other economic-based institutions as well such as NAFTA, WTO, and the IMF. However, most of these are under the dominant political influence of great powers, and particularly under the prevailing US leadership in NATO and the UN. To build a concerted regional system effectively, US political power within these institutions must be more equally distributed to other great powers (Kupchan 2003b, 303). To do so is to ensure that institutionalized balancing against aggressors can be implemented in a rule and norm-based environment. International institutions can facilitate cooperation among states because they add social character to the rampant international system (Kupchan 1995).

In the near future, the Atlantic framework will consist of a security-independent EU and America, having equal and more mature partnerships. In the Pacific framework, the US security presence should continue at the moment, but political efforts to lessen historical animosities between Japan and China must begin eventually so that regional security can be
established without American troops (Kupchan 1995). In essence, US officials should make both EU and East Asia independent of US military might.

The agglomeration of regional powers can check and address issues in regions that remain on the boundaries: Latin America by the United States; Russia, the Middle East, and Africa by Europe; South Asia and Southeast Asia by East Asia. This would promote stability and peace in the world as the major powers' interests would be shared and coordinated in common manners (Kupchan 2003a). Imbued with these future geopolitical prospects, the end of America's primacy will not be the beginning of another great powers' primacy.

Legro's Grand Strategy Arguments

In the international system, great powers are the most active political actors. The material capabilities they project to the world result in a distribution of power. In order to do so effectively, they mobilize their resources, public opinions, and other political and institutional means in a way that should be conducive to their interests. The structure of the international system they participate in can be designated as multipolar (consisting of two or more great powers), bipolar (two powers), or unipolar (one power). Because great powers are unitary actors equipped with rational behavior propensities in the anarchic order, they must devise a grand strategy to maximize their relative power over other great powers (Legro 2005, 40). However, power must be synthesized with ideas which serve a pivotal role in explaining great power grand strategy since the two World Wars.

Since World War I (WWI), historically, America has been one of the many great powers in the international arena, together with traditional European powers, Russia, Japan, and China. Yet, America's standing has also oscillated between "integrated-within" and "separated-from" world politics. Although America became a dominant power after WWI, it did not actively participate in global issues. However, under the staunch political leadership
of Franklin Roosevelt, America became deeply integrated into the international order during World War II (Legro 2000). America has embraced a grand strategy of internationalism since the end of WWII.

However, counter-intuitively, it was not American power per se that guided its grand strategy after the war, but the collective ideas about international politics—together with power—that transformed American foreign policy (Legro 2000; 2005). The purpose here is not to illustrate how the dynamics of collective ideas shaped American foreign policy during WWII historical periods but to be cognizant of what the basic premises of the dynamics are and, from those dynamics' attributes, what grand strategy America would likely pursue in the twenty-first century. This is particularly of interest because the attacks on 9/11 mark an event of strategic shock that will inevitably shape the ways Americans think about the world in the long term.

The dynamics of collective ideas are fundamentally an analytical anchor in answering the central question of why states continue or change their foreign policy. In short, states considerably modify their foreign policies when their dominant foreign policy ideas change—the ideational change as a priori. The process of this change involves two steps. First, dominant collective ideas must crumble, and second, incorporation of new replacement ideas must be in shape to change the policy direction. Because consensus on collective ideas is required and difficult to realize within many domestic groups, facilitating change in foreign policy ideas rarely happens, especially in a world of uncertainty and complexity (Legro 2009).

Diving deeper into each stage, two key factors that influence change are the shock and consequences of events. Shock involves external threats such as non-state actors' practice of terrorism and conventional military attacks from foreign countries. The consequences of events refer to foreign policy success or failure. Taking these two aspects into account, in the collapse stage, ideational change is likely when the dominant collective ideas face shock, the
consequences of events do not meet social expectations, and, thus, the overall experience outcomes are extremely objectionable to preexisting thoughts. If there are no replacement ideas or, just as confusingly, too many ideas to rally social support, the dominant collective ideas would again take the lead even if the consequences are unpleasant because of their strong bipartisan support (Legro 2005, 13-15).

Therefore, in most cases, it is unlikely for states to change their foreign policy because preexisting national ideas about world politics among societal members are rarely modified even in the presence of external shocks (Legro 2005, 13-15). The shocks would not be of such weight as to cause the acclimatization of an entire predominant collective ideational system. After all, the political weight of shock is de-leveraged by social expectations and consequences of events. Hence, the external shocks could generally instigate potential short-term change in foreign policy. Unless reform ideas lead to extraordinary success at the end, it follows that past overarching ideas would come back to the stage (Legro 2009).

Considering the above analytical apparatus, we are left to ask what the grand strategies for America in the Bush and Obama presidencies would be. Since World War II, American grand strategy has been shaped by one critical fundamental principle: be faithful to internationalism. The essence of internationalism is grounded in the idea that the collective good is attainable for America when it devotes itself to the merits of international institutions and exerts its national military power to engender not rivalry but peace-partner relationships with great powers in Europe in the Western Hemisphere, thus promoting international cooperation and multilateralism (Legro 2000). Such thinking started after WWII and lasted up until 2001, signifying, in Legro’s view, that the joyful era of American preponderance was not caused by the successful finish of the Cold War (Legro 2000).

In the wake of 9/11, the Bush administration declared war on terrorism. The
underlying principles of the Bush strategy were grounded in American unilateralism, namely, advocacy of unilateral action on its exercise of military power to increase security, the preventive use of force, and of the regime change of rogue states to facilitate democratization by force with unprecedented reach outside the Western Hemisphere. These foreign policy agendas clearly deviated from post-World War II American internationalism whose ideas lie on multilateral action, conscious containment of potential threats, and international cooperation through engagement not of coalitions of the willing but of international institutions. These basic guidelines of Bush's national security strategy shaped America as a revisionist power in the international arena whereas those of internationalism framed America as integrationist (Legro 2009).

In the absence of further non-state actors' attacks or of any potential imminent security threats on the American soil, however, the likelihood was that the Bush foreign policy agenda would return to orthodox American internationalism. Still, the traditional liberal internationalists are a substantial part of the foreign policy community who would challenge the new agendas, especially when the policy consequences would not meet the desired expectations (Legro 2009). The degree of success which new thinking should achieve was so immense that the great powers of Europe would experience incongruities with America. Predominant policy preferences would be reasserted and the great powers of Europe would experience incongruities with America, thus returning to post-World War II internationalism.

Although America has not faced a tangible threat after the 9/11 attacks, rising powers could balance against the United States in political and economic arenas within the international system, notably China. Just as American foreign policy was shaped by its dominant ideas about the world since WWII, so too will the choice of Chinese grand strategy be decided by their national beliefs and ideas about the world politics. So far, fortunately,
China has not tried to destroy or totally separate itself from the extant international system since the Deng Xiaoping era (Legro 2007). Rather, China has generally remained quite peacefully as an integrationist power by joining international institutions (G8 and WTO), albeit showing varying nuances in practice such as in issues about Taiwan (Legro 2007). As long as Chinese dominant ideas continue to rally support for its integrationist inclination, America should need not feel any security threat from it. If non-integrationist ideas inflamed by nationalism begin to predominate in Chinese foreign policy beliefs, America then should pursue a strategy of containment (Legro 2005, 178).

The principle of American grand strategy of the twenty-first century would be based on two central themes: support for American internationalism and for integrationist actors in China. For America, the former would keep strengthening institutional and multilateral ties with Europe in the Western Hemisphere. The latter would prevent the birth of a vicious counterweight state from competing against America in the Pacific Hemisphere. Embedded in the merger of these two postulations within the American collective foreign policy ideas, regional hegemons would not arise in the Eurasian continent.

It is now necessary to code the features of Kupchan’s and Legro’s liberal strategy arguments so that I can compare them to Barack Obama’s foreign policy decisions during his first term. In my description of the Kupchan and Legro arguments, a president following a liberal grand strategy would pursue security policies based on liberal internationalism and balance of power. Liberal internationalism suggests that the United States must build cooperative relationships with European powers by devoting military capacity in a multilateral framework and promoting institutions. The projection of this in East Asia would be to bring China into a peace-partner relationship with the United States and keep China as an integrationist power. Balance of power indicates that America with its allies must militarily balance if there is a revisionist power in Eurasia challenging the United States. I
have identified balance of power as a feature of both realist and liberal grand strategies; what differentiates the liberal balance of power from the realist coding is that the purpose of liberal balancing is not to maximize US influence but to create a deterrence system and benign international conditions, thus ultimately engendering a less conflict-prone and more peaceful environment. Also, whereas the realist balancing accepts the United States' unilateral balancing against rivals, the liberal balancing recommends balancing in a multilateral approach together with US allies. Therefore, I will look for these two features in Barack Obama's first-term policy decisions.

Liberal Strategy: Analysis

*Kupchan*

As profoundly as the demarcating character of liberal strategy is informed by the theory of collective security, Kupchan’s grand strategy shows the application of this concept in systematizing the mental picture of world politics according to the preference of the designer. Kupchan’s strategy on the normative side subscribes to regional collective security principles and in practical application corresponds to cooperative security strategy arguments. The Kupchan strategy is the most expansive and its arguments are grounded on an international system that is shaped by the multipolar distribution of material capabilities. Without preconceiving such characterization, any strategy based on collective security inherently cannot be created. Strong opposition to US unipolarity and making the case that its once hegemonic power will not endure (due to the rising centers of power such as European Union and China and Japan in East Asia) establishes a foundation of regional collective security systems in the Kupchan strategy. It follows that by having regional poles such as the United States, European Union, Japan, and China, with each responsible for Latin America, Russia, Africa, Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, respectively, Kupchan’s strategy
explicitly advocates a regional collective security system. This regional system, in Kupchan's words, can also be designated as a new concert system which is "a reasonable hybrid version of collective security" (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991, 120).

Because of the United States's role as one of the major contributors to the institutionalized regional system of balancing, its security threats are also collectivized to other members of the great power union. The threats are non-state actors such as terrorists centered in non-democracies of the Middle East. If the United States were to refuse to join the concert system, its nature of threats would then be widened, including even the European Union, reviving the traditional great power rivalry. This security threat perception of Kupchan's strategy coincides with that of cooperative security in that it also marks non-democracies as the prime dangers to global peace.

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature that sets liberal strategy apart from realist strategy would be the role of international institutions in world politics. With regard to Kupchan's strategy, it powerfully assents to cooperative security arguments' emphasis on international institutions, such as the UN and NATO. According to both claims, it is recommended for the United States to engage in multilateral action with these institutions and, of course, with the great powers that constitute the concert system as well. The institutions in Kupchan's strategy are especially significant since they are the basis of facilitating the balancing institution that is conducive to indivisible global peace. The regional poles of the global concert system are the main actors, being loyal to conducting this rule-based and institutionalized balancing in a regulated and norm-driven international environment.

Ultimately, what the Kupchan strategy suggests for Washington is to realize that in the near future, the international system is not a United States-centered unipolarity, but a multipolarity composed of Russia, China, Japan, and the European Union. The United States cannot override these actors, as it might have been able to during its unipolar moments pre-9/11. The
United States is simply another great power member in the list. Subsequently, it is this multipolar world order setting that sets the stage for the Kupchan strategy's global concert system to play in theoretical accordance with the concept of regional collective security. After all, collective security and its regional and cooperative variants comprise a deterrence system to prevent aggression from the states challenging it (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995). It follows then that in the concert system, international institutions are coordinators of collective action among great powers who are inherently engaged in multilateral actions with them to solve any disputes. Hence, concerning all these dispositions, Kupchan’s strategy fundamentally and staunchly balances against realists' notion of balancing under a self-help anarchy system.

Legro

Legro’s grand strategy is perhaps the most unconventional in its formulation, predictions, and stance on what the appropriate role of the United States should be in world affairs. While all the preceding strategists showed an analytical interest in the structure of international systems in formulating American grand strategy, Legro does not see this as a necessary starting point. Rather, in Legro’s strategy, there is a predetermined conception of American’s standing in the world predating the World War II era where US liberal internationalism captured the direction of policy. To put this in structural realist terms, Legro’s strategy preconceives that the future world order would be a multipolar international system where US actions would be guided by the notion of liberal internationalism. Therefore, Legro’s strategy can be delineated essentially as a strategy of liberal internationalism. The liberal internationalism strategy is based on the principle that, according to Legro, the United States would ensure its peace and prosperity by being deeply involved in international affairs through its active participation with international institutions. In so doing, the use of military power is required not to promote conflict, but peace-based
international cooperation, particularly with European great powers. Consequently, the United States is bound to behave in multilateral actions to promote democracy outside its territory. The basic principles of liberal internationalism embody the collective security concept, the most dominant measure of liberal strategy.

The Legro strategy's liberal internationalism analytically shares the same dimension as Ikenberry's (2009) liberal internationalism 2.0 concept. Both Legro and Ikenberry adhere to the liberal internationalist tradition proclaimed by Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) in the 1940s to build America's relationship to other great powers of Europe and East Asia through economic and military commitments driven by multilateral actions with international institutions, thus facilitating international cooperation abroad (Legro 2000). The United States's active international engagement came into existence at the time of a weakened Europe and a rising Soviet power; unintentionally, America became the leader of liberal international order in the Atlantic region. Although the United States was the most dominant military and economic power, the exercise of those powers was confined to institutional and rule-based multilateral actions that promoted cooperation with European and East Asian great powers, respectively Germany and Japan during Cold War periods (Ikenberry 2009). In this sense, liberal internationalism strategy does not advocate American unipolarity in the international system. Rather, it favors a secondary collective security concept, namely, cooperative security. As Ikenberry elucidates, the United States's ambitious pursuit of a liberal internationalism 2.0 strategy "became a Western-oriented security community organized around cooperative security" (Ikenberry 2009, 76). The manifestations of the strategy have been externalized by the creation of NATO embracing European great powers and the expansion of the US alliance to Japan and South Korea in East Asia.

It is in this perspective that Legro strategy does embody the concept of collective security because without it, cooperative security loses its conceptual root as well. Surely, the
Legro strategy does not favor Wilsonian collective security per se because that is precisely that with which FDR disagreed. However, it agrees with the basic understanding of the nature of institutionalized balancing in a benevolent international environment. In other words, Legro's strategy opposes collective security practice but is faithful to its Kantian hypothesis to the effect that promotion of democracy creates world peace because democratic regimes do not use offensive capabilities against each other.

All three—collective security, along with its cooperative and regional variants—after all essentially favor great powers' institutionalized balancing under a regulated, rule-based, and benevolent international environment. Subsequently, the three oppose arbitrary balancing under anarchic settings in which great powers behave in a self-serving manner. In so doing, international institutions are the key actors facilitating cooperation and multilateral actions among great powers. Rather than creating a completely new grand strategy, Legro created a strategy that argues America actually has been exercising a liberal strategy of cooperative security. This strategy must be pursued continuously in the post-Cold War era to meet new geopolitical challenges. Pursuit of this strategy is especially important in East Asia, for example with regard to a rising China. Considering all these features of the Legro strategy, the strategy corresponds to measures of liberal strategy, especially cooperative security, multilateral action, and collective security, but not regional collective security.

To conclude, the biggest difference between Kupchan's and Legro's strategy lies in the degree and scope of US national interests. While the Kupchan strategy considers that US national interests should be about assuring peace everywhere in the world by practicing regional collective security with great powers as a concert system, the Legro strategy proposes that the US national interest is about continuing to keep peace in key regions such as Europe and East Asia by executing cooperative security strategy—in other words, liberal internationalism. Global peace can be created either by establishing a concert system of great
powers or by maintaining liberal hegemonic order in the key regions of the world that create incentives for the United States to engage in multilateral cooperation rather than international conflict with its vital partners.

Another immense nonconformity between the two liberal strategies is rooted in their theoretical structures. The Kupchan strategy basically is formulated in a top-down direction, that is, funneled through structural realism. The rationale for the regional collective security strategy is grounded in the fact that the international system can no longer be characterized as American unipolarity; rather, the structure of international politics has already become a multipolar order (Kupchan 2003). For Legro, the route is the opposite. It is bottom-up, meaning mechanized by constructivism. Liberal internationalism strategy since 1946 would be dominant again in the post-Cold war era because sufficient American collective foreign policy ideas have been continued to rally on it, thus making it gain societal support. Additionally, there are still many elites in the foreign policy community who support this strategy as it has historically shown results favorable to American interests (Legro 2009). "In short, grand strategy is filtered through domestic politics" (Legro 2007, 519). Although Kupchan’s and Legro’s strategies are derived from contrasting theoretical roots, the genealogy of their thoughts arrives indeed under the same broader canopy of Immanuel Kant’s ideas as argued in Perpetual Peace. These differences and similarities between Kupchan’s and Legro’s strategies answer part of RQ2: To what extent are the two liberal arguments congruent?
CHAPTER 3: PRESIDENTIAL IDEOLOGY, DOMESTIC POLICY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Barack Obama

I use five indicators to determine presidential candidates' positions as being liberal. They are (1) change, requiring reform movements to the status quo; (2) equality, favoring egalitarian conditions and treatment in social life; (3) permissiveness, accepting and supporting lifestyles that radically depart from traditional institutions and exercises; (4) civil liberty, advocating freedoms in speech and actions of people in their political life; and (5) government intervention, encouraging the national government to actively engage in the problems of business and economy (Smith 1990). If three or more indicators match President Barack Obama’s preexisting ideological character, then it would be fair to identify him as being a political leader with views skewed towards the liberal position. To do this litmus test in a qualitative method, I look extensively at the debates between presidential candidates. Instead of fragmenting parts of the three debates held in 2012, I look at them as a whole and see how Obama’s arguments fit with the above indicators.

Presidential Candidate Debates

Moderated by Lehrer, the first debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney focused on domestic affairs, and consisted mostly of economic issues such as tax cuts and job creating-approaches. Both envisioned their own arguments, but the main difference was how they strategically framed the overall debates in the preference of the issues they saw as appealing to their base of voters. Obama tried to show a sense of loyalty to his base voters who viewed him as liberal in general. In so doing, he consistently and strategically framed most of the economic and other domestic issues in the notion of “reform” and “equality.” To do this effectively required government intervention and educational development, and these two liberal positions anchored him rhetorically throughout all three debates.
In the first keynote speech, Obama explained the principles that America must preserve to make sure that it recaptures its world-class economic status. "First, we've got to improve our education system and hire another 100,000 new math and science teachers, and create 2 million more slots in our community colleges so that people can get trained for the jobs that are out there right now. And I want to make sure that we keep tuition low for our young people" (Obama 2012a). This emphasis on educational improvement continued to reappear. On economic growth, instead of focusing on discussion elements pertaining to past economic and financial policies, he positioned educational improvement as a vehicle for economic growth because by "making sure that we are continuing to invest in basic science and research" (Obama 2012a), education can train workers whose job needs would be fulfilled by entrepreneurs in small businesses. Principles antithetical to these were portrayed as heretical since "That is not a recipe for growth. That's not how America was built" (Obama 2012a).

Even when he was asked about the issue of criminals owning an AK-47 in the second debate, although he stated that he strongly opposes gun ownership by murderers, he quickly digressed the discussion to claim the need for education policy improvement. The federal government would uphold policies for community colleges where dropout students and workers could earn a higher education that was not available before. Such education would connect employers' and job-seekers' needs.

Additionally, in the third debate, he changed the topic of the dialogue from foreign policy to domestic affairs despite when asked about America's role in current world affairs. Instead of answering the question based on his outlook on international affairs, he returned to the need for educational improvement by hiring more teachers in math and science to support
the creation of startup companies. In other words, America's role in the world was determined overwhelmingly by the degree to which its educational system is advanced.

**Government Intervention for Economic Growth**

Obama's being in favor of government intervention to address economic conditions is apparent through the first two debates. On this topic particularly, he distinguishes himself from Romney by framing the discussion on the dichotomy between one candidate who represents wealthy constituents and another who represents the middle class.

Stated in the first debate, Obama's basic principle (2012a) on government intervention was (by self-applauding the successful settlement of 2008 economic crisis) "So what did we do? We stepped in and had the toughest reforms on Wall Street since the 1930s," and "when we reform Wall Street, when we tackle the problem of pre-existing conditions, then, you know, these are tough problems and we've got to make choices. And the choices we've made have been ones that ultimately are benefiting middle-class families all across the country." Obama basically claimed that the government intervention since 2008 was one of the successful economic policy principles of his administration and that this interventionist approach would ultimately allow America to advance education which in turn would strengthen the economy. All the reforms that were part of the intervention were not created for wealthy people but for rejuvenating the economy of the middle-class electorate. However, wealthy people would benefit from the lowered income tax even if there were no intervention under Romney's plan. In the second debate, Obama made explicit arguments in favor of a future interventionist approach. In answering a college student's question about the student's economic security after graduation, Obama (2012a) revealed, "I want to build manufacturing jobs in this country again, not just in Detroit, but all across the country [with an effort] to reduce our deficit [by] asking the wealthy to pay a little bit more." He took a position against the free-market economic system, which, in his view, was the approach favored by Romney,
who, according to Obama, wanted to let the auto industry fall into bankruptcy. The notion of government intervention became reinforced when Obama put it in the context of economic inequality because such framing mustered the polarization of the existing base voters of the two candidates. For Romney, the principle of economic growth was based on his plan (as Obama described it) "to make sure that folks at the top play by a different set of rules."

According to Obama, the officials who share the same rules with Romney over the last decade had been "squeezing middle class families" (Obama 2012a). Even though Romney contended that he stood for the middle-class throughout the debates, his attitude was mainly reactionary compared to Obama, who was rarely accused of being on the side of the rich. Strategically counter-framing Obama as being with the wealthy was difficult because the notion of economic inequality became a preemptive rhetorical weapon from the first debate, for example, "Donald Trump is a small business" (Obama 2012a).

Ultimately, the government intervention that was successful in the Wall Street was continued in the auto industry necessarily due to the American fact that the workers in the auto industry were not only making outstanding cars but also rejuvenating America in the broader sense. Obama's main interventionist argument implicitly compassioned with the low and middle class people who would revitalize economic conditions. Obama was attacking Romney and the wealthy, but not directly rejecting the rich per se in general.

*Evaluation of Obama Ideology*

Throughout the analysis of Obama's two rhetorical tactics in the debates with Romney in 2012, the broader concepts overriding these devices were the two tenets of the liberal: reform and equality. In fact, Obama's concept of educational development and government intervention for economic growth revealed the same messages of reform and equality. The basic precept of education development was to give opportunities to workers, drop-out students, and other low- and middle-class families to be educated so that they can be prepared
for the job market. In this model, employers can hire qualified workers and the shrunken economy can be revitalized. The workers, low and middle income class families in this precept become the political activists in externalizing Obama's reform movement by playing within the same rules of equality. In essence, Obama's idea of educational improvement shows his favor toward reform and equality, but that presentation would not have been rationalized without rhetorically bringing in the low and middle class families. In this sense, Obama was standing for positive reform and equality of the low and middle class voters, but whether he would apply this concept to the wealthy was left absent in the debates.

The notions of reform and equality also figure in Obama's views on economic growth. In promoting economic revitalization, the fundamentals he outlined were that all industries, including the crippled automobile industry, must be in check with governmental intervention. Furthermore, the resources needed in stimulating growth must come partly from the wealthy, and the financial surplus resulting from economic growth would be used for educational improvement which in turn could provide industry with highly skilled workers. Similar to educational policy, the concept of economic growth was only another large segment of the broader notion of reform and equality. It was a linking variable between the education system and reform and equality. Particularly observing Obama's first and last debate closing statements, his rhetorical sequence started from delineating his administration's endeavors in economic recovery and then moved on to the need for improving the educational system. The concept of economic stability and growth stood as a prerequisite type of reform to effectively justify public education reform. These types of reforms were grounded on the common vision of social justice that embraced them—equality. Within this polemic structure, the notion of government intervention simply became an autonomous supplementary reflection of the two leading deliberations of principles: reform and equality.

In speeches outside the presidential candidate debates, Obama's stance toward civil
liberties and permissiveness can be observed. In the debate with Alan Keyes in a 2004 Illinois Senate debate, Obama explicitly asserted that "I believe that marriage is between a man and a woman" (Obama 2004). However, in the 2012 presidential campaign, he reversed his original position. "What I've come to realize is that for loving, same-sex couples, the denial of marriage equality means that, in their eyes and the eyes of their children, they are still considered less than full citizens," and because of this new posture, "I believe that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry" (Obama 2012b). According to Obama, the fight for homosexual rights should be championed in parallel with the broader civil rights because legal rights are not applied equally to gays and lesbians. The principle of equality must be applicable to all people.

Obama's advocacy of homosexual marriage is a different embodiment of equality. In this issue, the scope of equality is extended beyond economics. Obama conceptualized the notion of equality as a cognizant living organism that is ready to be injected into many social problems in order to rethink them from the perspective of equality. In fact, throughout many social and economic issues including the homosexual marriage debate, encouraging equality was the core of his dominant moral representation as a political leader. By the ubiquitous and omnipotent character of equality, social problems can be solved with efforts to achieve the common good. In essence, Obama's equality is an exogenous operation to endogamous anomalies. This is quintessential Obama.

In this part of the study, the purpose is to determine whether Obama's ideological preferences adhere to the liberal dimension of political division. In fact, all five indicators of a liberal perspective matched Obama's ideological positions on the domestic economic and social issues. On reform, equality, and governmental intervention, the issue of education improvement and of economic stability and growth corresponded whereas the homosexual marriage issue conformed to reform and equality realms. The structure of five liberal spheres
is established for Obama's unidimensional ideological space—reform, permissiveness, civil liberty, and governmental intervention in order to achieve equality.

George W. Bush

Since we have observed the ideological character of Obama as a public actor on the liberal/conservative continuum, it is necessary to examine how another presidential ideology can or cannot be categorized in the remaining political spectrum of conservatism. As this case study pays particular attention to the George W. Bush's presidency, determining whether Bush's ideological character complies with the indicators of conservative presumptions is then desired. The five indicators of conservative creeds are (1) tradition, continuing the established social and political order and institutions is preferred, and gradual rather than sweeping change is to be sought out when necessary; (2) constitutional interpretation, favoring the upkeep of the founding fathers' original intentions by strictly applying constitutional interpretation to current affairs; (3) the limited role of government, encouraging the national government not to intervene in laissez-faire capitalism and economy; (4) deity, maintaining the belief that political problems are not unrelated to religious ones after all, thus having a strong belief in a transcendent entity, God; and (5) hierarchical leadership, advocating the view that the country's social political order is best sustained by the elite class that abhors a tyranny of the majority (Dunn and Woodward 2003). If at least three of the five match Bush's issue positions, then it would be fair to describe Bush as being conservative in ideology. In a manner similar to Obama, I examine the transcripts of George W. Bush's presidential candidate debates on economic and social issues. Moral issues will also be taken into account.

Presidential Candidate Debates

The presidential debate of 2000 was a signaling moment for explicating twenty-first century American principles: where the nation should go and what it must fix to maintain its
political and cultural influence. The two candidates illustrated the core of their arguments in issues related to the role of government, abortion, same-sex marriage, the constitution, the overall economic conditions, and public education improvement to their base voters whose preferences had been divided along the liberal/conservative dimension in general. Despite some irregularities, Bush's statements were mostly framed in the notion of tradition and order, particularly on the issues of public education, abortion, and same-sex marriage, especially the last two matters of contention where alternatives differed to a great extent. Bush's claims on the issues of interpretation of constitution, affirmative action, religious faith, and the federal budget surplus agreed uniformly with conservative creeds: constitutional interpretation, hierarchical leadership, deity, and the limited role of government, respectively. Unlike Obama, Bush's rhetorical devices were multilayered.

The Federal Budget Surplus

In the first debate, moderated by Jim Lehrer, the main topics were Medicare, tax-cuts, and prescription drugs. In fact, these subjects were mainly discussed throughout the debate in spite of repeated responses from the candidates. In a discussion of the differences between the candidates on tax cuts and the government's role in the national economy, Bush criticized Gore's plan by arguing that it "will increase the size of government dramatically [and] it is a plan that will have 200 new programs—expanded programs and creates 20,000 new bureaucrats. It empowers Washington" (Bush 2000). What the government should do instead, according to Bush, is allow American citizens to expand their horizons in determining their own choices by offering more institutional opportunities. The role of government, Bush argued, is not to interfere with the process of decision making by people. Rather, it must recognize that such processes are owned only by the people themselves. Therefore, if applying such principles to the question of how to handle a financial surplus in the federal government, the answer should be anathetical to the notion that "the surplus is the
government's money" (Gore 2000). Bush argued that it is less tampering in people's decisions by the national government that produces small government that is more efficacious and accountable. In essence, the issue of surplus federal money was a supplementary mechanism in arguing for the limited role of government by Bush. In other words, strategically driven by Bush, the economic issue rhetorically became a conflicting philosophical issue. The issue was whether to give authority to the people or accumulate it in the national government. Bush's preference in the debates was for the limited role of government.

*American Constitutionalism, Abortion, and Same-Sex Marriage*

The founding fathers' principles of democracy, liberty, and the federal republic are embodied in the American constitution that was created in 1787. Although it is common in general to celebrate the wisdom and talent of these fathers' authorship in creating the constitution, the degree to which the constitution's framers intended their words to be applicable to modern political reality has been indeterminate. This question of interpretative merit has been evident among scholars and judges (Goldford 2005). That issue also arose in the presidential debates. When the moderator asked the candidates about their views of judicial appointments concerning the issue of abortion, Bush asserted that "[judges] are appointed for life and that they ought to look at the Constitution as sacred. They shouldn't misuse their bench. I don't believe in liberal activist judges. I believe in strict constructionists" (Bush 2000). Bush believed that Supreme Court judges must constitutionally protect born and unborn children. Bush's pro-life stance was rhetorically supported by and strictly framed in American constitutionalism.

Such a constitutional view extended to the issue of same-sex marriage. In a 2000 presidential debate, in answer to a question of the candidates' positions on same-sex relationships, Bush (2000), without hesitation, declared, "I'm not for gay marriage. I think marriage is a sacred institution between a man and a woman [because] I just happen to
believe strongly that marriage is between a man and a woman." The once political issue of
the homosexual marriage became rhetorically layered with legal concern for Bush in the
subsequent 2004 presidential debate. "I proposed a constitutional amendment. The reason I
did so was because I was worried that activist judges are actually defining the definition of
marriage" (Bush 2004a). In a similar vein to the subject of abortion, the same-sex marriage
issue was framed in his preferred view of the judicial appointments. Showing a dedication to
his base voters in these two contentious issues, Bush's positions strategically emphasized that
judicial decisions should be derived from scrupulous and strict interpreters of the constitution.
The necessary course of action in which the constitutional change is needed must
contemplate if any change could harm the overall interests of American community. For
Bush, therefore, the call for an amendment was needed not to change the constitution per se.
This community was established by the children of the American Revolution such that the
definition of marriage was meant to be not homosexual but heterosexual, according to
prevalent social norms. Counter-intuitively, he opposed homosexual marriage and called for
an amendment to maintain the constitution as a distinctively shared part of American
communal life. As definitive as his position was, not only is strictly interpreting the
constitution important but so also is the stringently restrained intention of doing it as well.
Therefore, both the issue of abortion and same-sex marriage were, in fact, the two rhetorical
anchors that were designed to allude to the significance of the America's institutions and
traditions in America's constitutionalism, which emphasizes the stringently restrained
translations of its interpreters.

Affirmative Action

One of the heated moments in the debates between Bush and Gore came when the
candidates answered the audience's affirmative action question. The responses revealed
significant tensions. Instead of directly answering the question, Bush gave his own definition
of affirmative action, one that is overtly opposed to quotas. "I want a diverse administration [but] I don't like quotas. Quotas tend to pit one group of people against another. Quotas are bad for America. It's not the way America is all about" (Bush 2000). What America should focus on is about giving the minorities "equal opportunity people to realize their potential. [Thus] I guess the way to put it is [I support] affirmative access" (Bush 2000). To answer the question, Bush never explicitly used the term affirmative action, and he switched action to access.

The rhetorical implication of his argument is that he equated affirmative to diversity and action to quotas. Since he favored diversity and abhorred quotas, he had to come up with a replacement term for action that still had an embedded nuance of action. It was access which alluded to his support for equal opportunity. Bush was against any action of any group that resorted to oppression even if they were minorities, but he was for any action of any group that subsequently interacted with diverse opportunity within the social tradition.

Based on the calculus of Bush's conceptualization of affirmative action, it is difficult to imagine that his statement was intended to be supportive of only the White race and was, therefore, discriminatory in nature. Nor did he consider the White race as superior to other races. This notion is conclusive primarily because of Bush's intransigent noncommittal stance on quotas that cause discriminatory action. Since his focus was on the action of the group and not the race of that particular group's participants, it is invalid to label him as a political leader who was antagonistic to diversity and only upheld the White race over other races.

Faith and Policy

Most topics of presidential debates deal with policy stances and their differences, issue positions, and other contentious elements such as competing political philosophies of the two candidates. Unlike the 2000 debates, the three 2004 debates between Bush and Kerry mostly consisted of foreign policy issues due to the political impact of 9/11 and the war in
Iraq in 2003. As the most sweeping moment of American foreign policy in the twenty-first century, Bush throughout the debates tried to make an appeal to the voters how audacious he had to be as a decision maker. In so doing, unusually within the debate, he had to reveal his personal religious faith overtly. On the question of how his personal faith played in policy decision making, he declared, "when I make decisions, I stand on principle, and the principles are derived from who I am. I believe that God wants everybody to be free. That's what I believe. In Afghanistan, I believe that the freedom there is a gift from the Almighty" (Bush 2004a). His statements were explicit and an almost self-fulfilling delineation of the single most important factor in the decisions he made during his presidency. Observing his argument, it is clear that he regarded his decisions as representative concrete actions of his abstract belief in God and as projections of the American principle of freedom. In other words, Bush considers freeing bound people to be a religious responsibility and moral duty for him as an American president. The interplay in Bush's decision-making process embodied the notion of communality which emphasized the upkeep of established institutions and values. To sustain communal interests, necessary defensive reactions have to be made regardless of where values were at risk, either at home or at abroad. Bush was against abortion and same-sex marriage at home and opposed to the fact that Afghan citizens do not have enough political and religious freedom. All three issues were disadvantageous to the dual interplay of the decision-making process. In short, recognizing the relationship between man and morality is the commanding psychology within Bush's deliberative mental picture. 

Evaluation of Bush Ideology

In this section, the purpose was to determine whether George W. Bush can be categorized as a proponent of the conservative tradition. Through the analysis of Bush's issue positions on the federal budget surplus, abortion, same-sex marriage, American
constitutionalism, affirmative action, and faith and policy, the indicators confirm Bush’s membership in the conservative tradition.

Foremost, abortion and same-sex marriage can be incorporated into the tradition of conservative tenets. As described above, these two issues were mainly opposed by Bush because they swam against a historic tide of American culture and tradition. Perhaps, Bush’s most powerful assertion was that "America’s a free society which limits the role of government in the lives of our citizens. This commitment of freedom, however, does not require the redefinition of one of our most basic social institutions" (Bush 2004b). In other words, Bush’s conception of freedom requires that the exercise of freedom must not come at the expense of the dominant societal-institutionalized system. In this sense, Bush’s perception of freedom is immanent in nature—refusing liberty from the system but accepting freedom only within the system.

Three issues—the federal budget surplus, American constitutionalism, and faith and policy—speak to the linearly-related conservative dimensions of the limited role of government, constitution interpretation, and deity. In the first issue, by providing authority for people to make their own choices rather than authorize the national government to make choices for them, Bush supported the small and limited scope of government’s social influence. In the second issue, Bush strongly expressed being in favor of judges who strictly interpreted the constitutions in legal opinions and rulings. He backed up this belief by making conservative judicial appointments rather than what he might call liberal activist ones. On the third issue, Bush’s personal reverence for God is projected in his policy decision-making process in line with morality. Put simply, political problems were in fact religious and moral challenges for Bush. Among the issues, however, affirmative action could not match the hierarchal leadership aspect of the conservative dimension. This is primarily because Bush’s arguments on affirmative action concentrated mostly on the action part, meaning implicitly
that he acknowledged diversity and nondiscrimination principles since he revealed no objection to using *affirmative*. Such a notion is contrary to the tradition of meritocracy which indicates that conservatives favor an aristocratic class in a sense that they provide social order. What Bush stated was that any American can become a leader and any attempt to create an obstacle to those opportunities—especially by the powerful groups currently benefiting from these opportunities—should be avoided. Thus, today's elites may not be tomorrow's. Since more than three conservative indicators match Bush's issue positions based upon the 2000 and 2004 presidential debates, it is legitimate to conclude that the ideological character of Bush is conservative.

Briefly scrutinizing the structure of Bush's conservative ideology, it is evident that no one criteria trumps another. Although the tradition and order tenet is a likely candidate, its framing is incomplete because the varying social settings of the rest cannot fully be accommodated under the tradition and order umbrella. Constitutional interpretation is still subject to political and social realities even when strict judges are on the bench. Economic conditions are becoming more interdependent with those of other states, and what God would tell to a faithful leader is not predictive of anything. The role of conservatives in this milieu for sustaining American tradition is to narrow down their role in the most sensible common denominator; that is, abortion and same-sex marriage. In this sense, the nature of Bush's ideological structure is anarchical in contrast to Obama's hierarchal one. It follows that Bush's tradition and order is an endogamous countermeasure to exogenous deviations. It is quintessential Bush. Both Bush and Obama's ideological structure were cognitive in their general dimension but not evaluative nor relative and nor experiential. They arrived at the expected *ideological episteme* from the broader American liberal/conservative traditions that provided them the cerebral process of filtering out notable and heretical incongruities.
International Environment

In this section, I describe the international conditions that shaped the period from 2001 to 2013 during which time George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Barack Obama (2009-2013) were incumbent. The explanation of the international environment is vital in that the role of the United States during these periods reflected the distribution of capabilities that shaped power relationships in world politics. Synthesized with presidential ideology, the international environment as another independent variable would help to explain the foreign policy choices of Bush and Obama.

It is important here to observe the prospective role of the United States in relation to the world outlook between 2001 and 2013. This background comes from the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2015 report (NIC 2000). In it, international conflict was be driven by state and nonstate actors whose goal was minimizing the United States's preeminent geopolitical, economic, and technological power. In order to fulfill this purpose, those actors' use of force would be confined to asymmetrical means such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In other words, threats to US leadership would be nontraditional as great states' power rivalries from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries faded into remote history. US leadership in Eurasia could be influenced mostly by how effectively it could "deal with the military, political, and economic dimensions of the rise of China and India and the continued decline of Russia," according to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) (2000). Whatever influence the challengers have in the world politics, the United States would "remain the dominant military power during the next 15 years" (NIC), thus allowing it to "ensure its preeminence" (NIC). This US posture would be strengthened additionally by the country's global economic and military power. Political scientists describe the United States's dominant power in the international system since the end of the Cold war as the beginning of the era of unipolarity (Krauthammer 1991). To understand the
term unipolarity, being acquainted with intellectual delineation of the structure of international politics—developed by the neorealism school—is crucial.

According to Robert Gilpin in his seminal book *War and Change in World Politics* (1983), three types of structures exist in the international system: hegemonic (unipolar), bipolar, and a balance of power with three or more states (multipolar). "Poles" represent powerful states in the system, and the number of such dominant states determines the structure of that system. Therefore, poles are defined by relative power rather than an absolute or fixed scale. Specifically, in a unipolar environment, a single state sets out rules and orders which other states must follow because the single state is the most powerful state; the power balance is skewed towards only one state. In a bipolar environment, the concentration of power is distributed between two states who share interests and decide the rules by which lesser states may act. In a multipolar environment, three or more powerful states balance each other for their security "through diplomatic maneuver, shifting alliances, and open conflict (Gilpin 1983, 29)." International conflict would be reduced most when the international system is bipolar (Waltz 1979; 1964; Mearsheimer 1990), but there is also a danger of instability due to its transitory propensity (Gilpin 1983).

In measuring polarity, the traditional outlook built upon Waltzian theory suggests that we should look at many components of state capability such as economic and military capability, size of population and territory, resource endowment, and political stability and competence (Waltz 1979, 131). But this study focuses primarily on military capability because of three theoretical reasons. First, the concentration or distribution of material power among states is defined primarily by their relative military capability (James and Brecher 1988). In other words, the distribution of material power (for instance, economic capability, territory size, and resources) could in fact mean that of military capability. This notion implies that power should be defined as resources and not influence. Therefore, this study
focuses on observing military spending of major powers in world politics to see whether the international system during the Bush presidency and the first term of the Obama presidency was unipolar. Possessing resources should generate desired outcomes and, therefore, actually influence world politics. Resources reflect choices and, therefore, they certainly help the power of states (Nye 2011). Second, the concept of unipolarity I employ is used in the "Huntingtonian sense" (Huntington 1999) and not the "Waltzian sense" (Waltz 1979). The United States is the only great power in spite of the existence of other substantial powers because of its far superior military strength. Third, one can argue that states' military strengths are incomplete ingredients in the way they influence the distribution of power in the international system unless one takes into account states' "conceptions of self and other" (Wendt 1992, 397). Nevertheless, military capability in an anarchic environment is paramount to all other ingredients of a state's power measures simply "because resort to force is the ultimate card of all states, the seriousness of a state's intentions is conveyed fundamentally by its having a credible military posture" (Art 1980, 35). Put simply, military behavior is states' most substantial externalization of their 'self' in world politics. Because of these three conceptual reasons, I chiefly explore the military capability of major powers as measured in military spending in US dollars to determine the structure of the international system.

To say that military capability is the ultimate determinant for the distribution of material power in the international system does mean that—by default—it establishes threshold values in distinguishing polarity. While military spending is an important indicator to explore the relative state capability of major powers, other economic and technological indicators such as GDP and Research & Development spending are also useful benchmarks to measure a state's capability. To mitigate the defects in measurement of this study that stem
from mainly observing military spending, I introduce scholars' assessments whose measurement methods include various other indicators.

In what follows, I observe whether the NIC's prediction that the period between 2000 and 2015 would be unipolar and United States-centered were accurate. To incorporate this approach into my study, I specifically confine the range of observation from 2001 to 2013, the era of the Bush and Obama presidencies. In so doing, I look at military indicators: military expenditures in US dollars. The results of this methodological approach will determine whether the international environment during the Bush presidency and the first term of the Obama presidency was structured as a unipolarity.

The nation-states I look at are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, India, China, Russia, and the United States. This list is chosen because these are the traditional great powers of the two central blocs—Atlantic and Pacific—of Eurasia, with the addition of the potential rising power (India). From the perspective of military capability, Figure 1 shows that there is no single close competitor to the United States in terms of military spending, and it seems according to this figure that not Russia but China will gradually accumulate more resources to invest in its military power.
Based on the quantitative data of military capabilities of the traditional great powers in the Atlantic and Pacific zones, the international environment during the Bush and Obama presidencies (2001-2013) was shaped by US unipolarity. This notion validates the National Intelligence Council's prognosis that the United States would be the dominant player in world politics. Even though it can be counter-argued that the economic powers of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan have been strong and may in the future become geopolitical rivals with the United States, the United States's military might is at this time far too superior to others. Hence, even without measuring specific economic and other relevant indicators, it is still fair to claim that the United States's unipolar position endured from 2001 to 2013 simply because of the overwhelming strength of its military capacity.

My measurement result—US unipolarity—conforms also to the results of IR scholars who have taken into account other economic and technology-related indicators of state capability. Michael Beckley, John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William Wohlforth have concluded that the structure of the international system has been shaped largely by a single pole since the end of the Cold War. That pole is represented by the United States.
particular, according to Beckley (2012), the United States's economic capability far surpasses other major powers especially in relation to China when considering indicators such as per-capita income, working age and dependent population, and technology indicators such as total R&D spending and triadic patents. Beckley (2012) claims that the United States's economic capacity has not declined after the Cold War, but rather, it actually has increased in some manner, thus contributing to sustain the US unipolarity in the foreseeable future as well.

Similar to Beckley, Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlfarth (2009) carried out a traditional method of measuring polarity that focused on two major indicators, GDP and military spending. They looked additionally at science and technology indicators such as high-tech production and internet access per 1000 people. In all three categories of indicators, these authors concluded that the US unipolarity is a fact of international political life that IR scholarship must take into account to generate new theories and to revise traditional theories such as balance of power. In fact, the concept of US unipolarity after the Cold War is no longer an aberrant issue. As Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlfarth (2009, 6) have noted, "scholars largely agree that there were four or more states that qualified as poles before 1945; that by 1950 or so only two measured up; and that by the 1990s one of these two poles was gone. They largely agree, further, that no other power—not Japan, China, India, or Russia, not any European country and not the EU—has increased its overall portfolio of capabilities sufficiently to transform its standing. This leaves a single pole," and, ineluctably, that pole is the United States. Encompassing all of the scholars' arguments and my quantitative data, it is fair to claim that the international environment during the George W. Bush presidency and the first term of Barack Obama's presidency was shaped largely by the structure of an international system defined by US unipolarity.
CHAPTER 4: US FOREIGN POLICIES FROM 2001 TO 2013

US Foreign Policy during the Bush and Obama Presidencies

This section is devoted to introducing the Bush and Obama administrations' foreign policies. These selected cases will contribute to the testing of my hypothesis. In explaining the cases, I first describe the dominant principles that guided Presidents Bush and Obama, whose role as a head of state made policy decisions that were constrained by these principles. Since I have observed four scholars' realist and liberal grand strategies in Europe and East Asia earlier in Chapter 2, accordingly I look at US foreign policies in those regions during the Bush and Obama administrations.

US Foreign Policy during the Bush Presidency

*The Principle*

Before the 9/11 terrorist attack, Bush's political attention was directed more toward domestic affairs than international issues. He was dubious about military intervention, and supported containment approaches to rogue states like North Korea, instead of taking active preventive measures. After the 9/11 attacks, however, US foreign policy came under the sway of the National Security Strategy (N.S.S.) in 2002. Prominent Yale historian John Gaddis described it this way: "President George W. Bush's national security strategy could represent the most sweeping shift in US grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War (Gaddis 2002, 50)." In the N.S.S, what was so sweeping was not only its radical presence, but its core creeds that showed the American public what elements Bush thought to be most important for US foreign policy in the twenty-first century. These were (1) preemptive unilateral action, (2) equal treatment of terrorists and their supporters, and (3) assertive freedom. These three precepts were consistent throughout Bush's N.S.S. in 2006.

Scrutinizing these principles specifically, Bush declared that the United States's "priority will be to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach, and attack their
leadership" (Bush 2002, 6). In so doing, Bush stated that the United States would need to advance its already unprecedented military power and it "will not hesitate to act alone [emphasis added], if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people," (2002, 6). Bush concluded that since the nature of threats against the United States had expanded to a global scale, the same degree of scope needed to be applied in US security policy, thus validating his preemption and prevention approach.

In terms of the second principle, Bush considered that the United States should "make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them" (5), and this is "because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization" (5). As a direct link to the first precept, this statement justifies Bush's threat perception, namely, that the threats against the United States had become omnipresent. Recognizing this new nature of security threats is vital, from the third principle perspective, in that the United States's goal is "building a balance of power that favors freedom" (5) to defend the peace of the nation against terrorism. The progressive N.S.S. became known as the Bush doctrine, which led directly to the war against Iraq and subsequently to the war in Afghanistan in 2003. This war was conceived and implemented based upon the mistaken perception that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

*Foreign Policy Practices toward Europe*

Under the guidance of the Bush doctrine principles, the United States should have had a favorable and even more vitalizing relation with Europe, particularly in security concerns through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). As Bush (2006) explicitly said in his N.S.S., NATO's invoking of the Article V self-defense clause suggested that United States-EU relations with respect to transatlantic security depended on the strength of NATO. The threat of terrorism in the United States is the same for NATO, thus advancing NATO's
military forces and expanding its membership are crucial. In other words, according to Bush, US security policy towards Europe should be based on empowering the existing NATO framework. This approach could be successful if the United States and Europe focused on the common threat of terrorism.

In contrast to Bush's expectations, however, NATO's actual security policy practices in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars lagged behind. US military capabilities were too powerful to be orchestrated in a balanced manner with their European counterparts (Layne 2003). The abstract Atlantic alliance was refashioned into a concrete United States-centered military operation with European ally followers. The NATO members strongly opposed such behavior from Washington. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer pointed out that leaders and the general public of Europe were distressed about the United States approaching its allies as "satellites" (Erlanger 2002). In the battlefield, variation in combat guidelines and constrained air force projections were prevalent among NATO members, all of which was evidence that unilateral US military exercises were prevalent (Kober 2008).

The ineffectiveness of NATO underlies a deep conceptual dissimilarity between the United States and Europe in the perception of terrorism. The European states did not perceive terrorism as a security threat to be annihilated as the United States did, did but as a political means to be dwarfed with acknowledgement of the unfeasibility of total subjugation in world politics (Bruyn 2009). Europe historically had experiences with terrorism, unlike the United States, whose response was the global war on terror; the former saw terrorism as a political crime while the latter considered it a security issue (Rees 2011). The implication of this intangible disparity between Europe and the United States indicates that the nature of threats has changed for the United States whereas for Europe it has remained historically the same.

The frayed NATO alliance in the Afghan and Iraq wars suggests that the United States was overconfident in its military capability. This posture was not surprising concerning
Bush's earlier nationalist decision before 9/11 to rescind the US signature in the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court and to withdraw from an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Kyoto Protocol treaty. Additionally, the decision to deploy anti-missile facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic to prevent missiles from rogue states like Iran exacerbated overall relations between the United States and Europe. This was particularly true concerning Russia whose security scope would be minimized and to Germany whose security concern dealt with the revival of the traditional European great power politics (Kober 2008). In short, US foreign policies toward Europe with respect to the broader Bush doctrine initiative of global war on terror were chiefly expressed in the unproductive—and somewhat weakened—NATO security alliance.

**Foreign Policy Practices toward East Asia**

Similar to the trajectory in Europe, the basic direction of US foreign policy in East Asia during the Bush administration was captured in the 2002 N.S.S. In it, the strategy of the United States favored the continuation of upkeep of East Asian allies Japan and South Korea, in large part to promote regional stability and face challenges from rogue states like North Korea. With respect to China, the United States would encourage seeking common security interests with them in the realms of terrorism and North Korea, thus enabling both great powers to promote a constructive relationship. The variance between the United States and China lies in the level of democratic political freedom (Bush 2002). Put simply, the US foreign policy direction in East Asia was to keep a Japanese-US-South Korean alliance stable while bringing China into this security context peacefully. In reality, there were consistencies in the Bush administrations' implementation to follow this set direction, although minor irregularities appeared. Such uneven US experiences can be observed in the context of North Korea's nuclear program, Taiwan's political independence, and the global war on terrorism.

In relation to Japan, the United States has never received such a meaningful and
favorable diplomatic salutation from the Prime Minister Koizumi in its fight against terrorists. Koizumi, who was an enthusiastic supporter of Bush, said, "When the United States, an absolutely invaluable ally of our country, is sacrificing itself, it is natural for our country to back the move as much as possible" because "it is not another person’s affair" (Agence France-Presse 2003). Such rhetorical support was manifested in action. Japan deployed its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq in 2003. Particularly, the military personnel of maritime, ground, and air SDF were dispatched to the Iraqi city of Samawah with a total number of 1,100 soldiers to seize territory in support of the United States-controlled jurisdiction (Conachy 2003). Japan's security commitment as an ally of the United States remained until early in Bush's second term and this behavior by Japan should not be interpreted as an independent nationalist agenda. Although the Japanese deployment was grounded in and legitimized by reasons of humanitarian assistance, it was not a novel thought that the distance between Samawah and Baghdad was only 240 kilometers (Conachy 2003). In other words, the implication is that Japan's security commitment in Iraq was in direct support of the United States's war on terrorism as a symbolic manifestation. This gesture allowed Japan to continue the extant United States-Japan security tie in East Asia so that it could deny North Korea's possible concession that the bilateral relation had lost vitality. The United States-Japan security relationship, therefore, was stable throughout the Bush administration as both projected their military power on their common interest, terrorism, and East Asian security stability.

In relation to China, there were good and bad periods in US foreign policy. Prior to the 9/11 incident, the EP-3 crisis provoked a temporary conflict between the two nations. When a US EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft was on a surveillance mission over South China Sea, it collided with two of China’s J-8 planes near Hainan. The aftermath took conciliatory fashion especially from the United States's "Letter of the two sorries," but when China was
implicitly identified as a strategic competitor and a security challenge in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (DoD 2001, 4), it only reaffirmed that Bush's approach would deviate from that of Clinton's cooperative stance.

It was only after 9/11 that a turnaround in relations between the United States and China could be discerned. In the mission of the global war on terrorism, China supported the United States by voting in favor of a UN Security Council anti-terrorism resolution, UNSCR1373, by contributing $150 million toward Afghan reconstruction, by providing intelligence information, and by halting terrorists' financial actions in Chinese banks (Glaser 2001). When Bush visited China in October 2001, he showed appreciation toward China, which now is considered a friend by virtue of assistance provided to the United States (People's Daily 2001). After 9/11, the United States saw China less as a security threat than as a strategic partner. This is similar to the way in which following the Cold War, the Soviet Union was replaced as a threat to the United States by terrorists and their supporting states.

Sino-US relations, however, in the context of Taiwan, were a blend of frustration and acclamation. Prior to 9/11, Bush claimed that his administration would approach Taiwan with strategic clarity: The United States is required to protect Taiwan, which "China must understand...," through "'whatever it took' to help Taiwan defend itself" (Sanger 2001). Bush's intense statement was manifested in his decision to sell arms to Taiwan, including submarines, reaching a total package value of $18 billion (Kan 2014). Unsurprisingly, Chinese officials castigated this decision. They declared that the "[United States should] immediately withdraw this mistaken decision and stop selling arms to Taiwan to avoid new grave damage to China-United States relations" (Sanger 2001). After 9/11, however, the US stance towards Taiwan tilted in a direction that China would favor. In a 2003 meeting with Wen Jiabao at the White House, Bush changed his early position by declaring, "We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the
comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose" (White House 2003).

Wen's response revealed appreciation for the United States's firm posture against Taiwan's independence, a goal expressed by Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian. The reversal of the US policy on Taiwan in favor of China's perspective suggested that the larger security issues proved more politically weighty for the United States, most notably North Korea's nuclear program (Carpenter 2004). Additionally, China's hard line attitude against Taiwan in that the use of military force is preferred if Taiwan continued to delay reunification negotiations with China (Carpenter 2004) may have triggered the United States to shake hands with China as its primary interest was to avoid military engagement by or with any great power in the region. Conclusively, it follows that Taiwan was serving a dual security policy for the United States—to balance militarily against China to deter its possible overstretch in the region and to balance politically against Taiwan for assuring China that it is a de facto member of the "One China" state.

The North Korean nuclear program issue was a major policy area in which the United States and China cooperated with consistency in a multilateral framework. Although Bush designated North Korea as a rogue state, the solution to the authoritarian state's nuclear ambition was more geopolitically complex than Iraq, thus making the United States reluctant to employ unilateral force. Rather, the United States took a multilateral approach in creating routes to negotiation. Obviously, as an ally for more than a half century, China was North Korea's chief mediator with the United States. However, when Kim Jong-il reclaimed his nuclear ambitions by reactivating the Yongbon nuclear facilities that had been closed under the 1994 United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and withdrew from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferations Treaty), China became a more active partner in the United States-led multilateral security framework. The shared interest of both the United States and
China in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula culminated first in the trilateral talk (United States-China-DPRK) and the United States-driven six-party talks (South Korea, Japan, United States, China, DPRK, and Russia). Surely, frustrations were present diplomatically, especially when Chinese officials saw the United States as too inflexible and, thus, a main obstacle in the talks (Kahn 2003). However, the results of the six-party talks became known as evidenced in joint statement created in 2005. This statement declared that DPRK would denuclearize and the United States would not militarily attack it, with other members of the talk emphasizing economic assistance (State department 2005). Soon, however, DPRK's sustained provocative moves—nuclear testing and the launching of missiles—proved that the multilateral diplomacy approach was naïve but, counter-intuitively, only strengthened US-Sino relations. As Christopher Hill (2007) noted, "This whole six-party process has done more to bring the United States and China together than any other process I'm aware of." The issue of North Korea's nuclear ambition played a role as a diplomatic gateway for the two dominant poles of power in the Pacific and Atlantic to cooperate and construct future relationships.

US Foreign Policy during the Obama Presidency

*Foreign Policy Practices toward Europe*

It is usual for presidents in democracies not to maintain the policies of their predecessors, a condition also true of Barack Obama's first-term foreign policy practices. His basic agenda in the United States's role in international affairs was “Anything But Bush” (ABB), and thus there was no enunciated Obama doctrine. This posture was manifested in Obama's focus of his power more on domestic issues such as the economic downturn in the United States, the financial crisis of 2008, and health care reform than on terrorism and international security. Concentrating public consciousness at home, the United States
specifically took a pragmatic approach in recapturing its relations with its allied European
great powers, particularly within the NATO alliance framework.

The US foreign policy practices within the NATO alliance framework are reflected in
the major military and diplomatic operations in the Middle East, notably Iran and Libya. To
start with, the United States had decided to calm the non-NATO state of gigantic nuclear
power, Russia, by shifting the earlier Bush policies and quashing the plan to install a missile
defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic in 2009 (Dempsey and Baker 2009). This
policy change implied that Obama's years would feature a less conflict prone relationship
with Russia in the Atlantic region.4

At a glance, it seemed that the Cold War-driven strong tie of transatlantic relation
(US-EU) was declining. As Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Philip Gordon stated, "our cooperation with Europe might not be so impressive" (Gordon
2009). However, the geopolitical reality of the Middle East invoked the significant common
threat to both the United States and its European allies, in particular Iran's nuclear program.
The multilateral diplomacy of the transatlantic alliance prevailed in the conduct of dealing
with Iranian nuclear ambitions. Despite the fact that the Bush administration's effort in
urging Iranian leadership to forget its nuclear ambition brought limited results due to
institutional resistance from China and Russia and a lack of threat perception by European
powers, the multilateral diplomacy implemented by the Obama administration with its
European allies proved to be more productive (Miller 2012; Parsi 2009). Part of this
favorable posture was brought by European allies’ novel recognition that Iran was a clear
security threat, made noteworthy by the Iranian protesters' attack on the British Embassy in

4 This relatively low-conflict relationship obviously changed in connection to the Ukrainian revolution in 2014
during the second term of the Obama presidency, especially following the entry of Russian troops into Ukraine.
This study acknowledges these active situations but cannot discuss them as they are beyond the chronological
scope of this study.
Teheran. The United States and the EU shared a sense of common threat to their Atlantic alliance structure.

Diplomatically, the United States coordinated states that could reinforce oil reserves in the face of an insufficiency that could be caused by a reduction in Iranian crude oil exports to Europe. A Europe that was less dependent on Iranian crude oil would be more cooperative with the United States. It followed that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE) would fill the potential gap if created by a shortfall of Iranian oil (Landler 2012). More stringently, the United States and its European allies continued to place severe economic sanction on Iran's banking sector, including a termination of financial transactions with Iranian central banks (Calmes and Gladstone 2012; Landler and Castle 2010). Although completely denuclearizing Iran was not feasible, the Obama team with its European diplomatic partners generated a positive result: Iran allowed IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors to visit the country and Iran returned to the negotiating table (Gladstone 2012; Landler 2013).

If the political vitality of the transatlantic alliance was demonstrated through its multilateral diplomacy in resolving the Iranian nuclear program, the US-EU military operation in Libya also externalized that energy in battlegrounds. In fact, it was the European powers, particularly France and Britain, which initiated the attacks on Libya, not the United States. Unlike in Iraq, the United States this time took the backseat, reflecting the US decision not to inject its military into every hotspot that affected European security. Put simply, the United States would not take the costly lead in war affairs when European member-states of NATO could do the same. This US approach was already envisioned through Obama's willingness to put more emphasis on the national economy and less on demonstrating its image of global world leadership. As Obama explicitly asserted, "The nation I am most interested in building is our own" (Obama 2009).
With the United States supporting from behind, France and Britain took the lead in the Libyan campaign. They called for a military no-fly zone in Libya, and the Obama team made efforts for the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force against Qaddafi's military resistance. It followed that the NATO intervention in Libya was to implement Security Council Resolution 1973 which emphasized the need "to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians (UN Security Council Resolution 1973 2011)." Although Germany abstained from deploying military forces and agreeing to the resolution, Germany supported the campaign with economic sanctions by freezing the Libyan government's assets (Editorial 2011; Hollinger and Peel 2011). The UN resolution as a casus belli endowed the operations with moral strength. Obama did decide to deploy US forces including predator drones, intelligence, and conventional armed forces. However, the United States's role in Libya was mainly to buttress mainstream European forces dispatched from the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey striking Qaddafi's forces (Valesek 2011).

Probably in the most imperative fashion, this US posture was exhibited through its leadership in the National Defense University.

The United States will play a supporting role. The risk and cost of this operation—to our military and to American taxpayers—will be reduced significantly. As we have in Libya, our task is instead to mobilize the international community for collective action. Because contrary to the claims of some, American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all of the burden ourselves. Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well; to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs. (White House 2011)
NATO’s mission was successful in tempering Gaddafi’s forces under codename *Unified Protector* and with its decision to allow Libyan civilians to restore necessary governmental institutions and organize aid. The campaign in Libya signaled that the United States would no longer be a leader of an ad hoc coalition of the willing. Rather than minimizing US global leadership, Obama’s multilateral military action with its European allies under the NATO alliance structure showed the power of mobilization from behind. Put differently, the US military role in relation to its NATO member-states in the Libya campaign can be philosophically characterized as *a posteriori leadership*—deviating from a predominantly *a priori* stance under which the United States would have taken the main lead.

To sum up, the Iranian nuclear program issue and the Libya humanitarian intervention campaign showed that the United States’s relationship to Europe within the NATO framework was stable throughout Obama’s first term. This posture can be also observed in the cooperative triangular relationship of the United States-European Union-Russia agreement with Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach which is to promote regional defense capability through developing existing BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) systems such as the Aegis BMD system to counter Iran’s missile strength. The Lisbon Summit brought NATO member-states and Russia together as well in defining common objectives and constructing a European territorial missile defense system (Hildreth and Ek 2011). The Atlantic alliance has been stable and even became more invigorated through the United States’s multilateral approach to essential security issues during the first Obama administration.

*Foreign Policy Practices toward East Asia*

Even before being elected as the 44th US President, Barack Obama explicitly stated his foreign policy objectives in *Foreign Affairs* at the time he was running for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. Criticizing his predecessor’s past practices, Obama argued for more US attention in the Asia-Pacific region, while also adhering to the NATO alliance
structure. The United States's foreign policy focus, according to him, should shift from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region where great powers, such as China, are emerging (Obama 2007).

Obama's emphasis on Asia-Pacific region became more hardened and emboldened during his visit to Australia in 2011. Diverting the allocation of military resources from the Middle East, Obama asserted that the US "presence and mission in the Asia Pacific [is] a top priority." In so doing, Obama declared that "reductions in U.S. defense spending will not—I repeat, will not—come at the expense of the Asia Pacific" (The White House 2011). This budgetary commitment would be translated to the more "broadly distributed" US defense of the region. Obama's focus on the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Northeast Asia, obviously included continuing the existing alliances with Japan and South Korea while keeping an eye on China's rise to ensure that it grew in a manner consistent with regional stability. This security posture toward Northeast Asia in the broader Asia-Pacific framework can be characterized as "rebalancing." As National Security Advisor Tom Donilon stated, "We set out to rebalance our posture in the world." This rebalancing plan, without directly referencing China, was emphasized as not "an attempt to contain any other nation" (The White House 2012), but certainly indicated that China's rise in the region would not come at the expense of US influence. Therefore, the US policy toward East Asia should be understood in this context of rebalancing.

In the United States-Japan relationship, a major controversial issue was the relocation of a US Marine Corps base in Okinawa. This issue can be explained in the context of the 2006 agreement, which stated that the Ginowan City-based Futenma Marine Corps Air station would be transferred to Camp Schwab. Following the agreement, 8,000 US navy personnel in Okinawa would move to Guam in return for Japan allowing the construction of a new navy facility in Camp Schwab. The American contingent arrived in Japan as the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power under the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, who had promised his constituents to oppose the relocation. Eventually, Hatoyama and subsequent successors agreed to the relocation, and that agreement was adjusted in the 2012 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting. The result would be that about 9,000 navy personnel would be relocated outside Japan to reduce potential conflicts between Okinawan and US soldiers (Tiron and Hirokawa 2012). This alteration served the rebalancing strategy of Obama administration as it was "necessary to realize a U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable" (Department of Defense 2012). Additionally, the adjusted agreement reflected Japan's concern toward security challenges and threats from China. With regard to the territorial dispute on Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the United States reassured that it would make a military commitment to protect the territories under Japanese administration. This firm position is valid under the Article 5 of the United States-Japan security treaty (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2013). Although it may seem that the United States-Japan alliance was shaken due to the relocation issue, the alliance performance in response to the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami paved the way for a stable bilateral relationship that ultimately set the stage for the successful SCC meeting in 2012. The Obama administration initiated "Operation Tomodachi (friends)" to provide aid to the victims of the disaster. The provision included about 24,000 US service members, 189 aircraft and 24 naval ships, with approximate cost of $90 million (Johnston 2011). Also, for the first time in the alliance’s existence, Japanese command took the lead, which the US military units followed to smooth out communications. Furthermore, the cooperative operation strengthened the alliance system that was once strained because of the relocation issue, and gained Japanese public support (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2013). Therefore, during the Obama administration, the United States-Japan alliance was reaffirmed with a rebalancing strategy, humanitarian relief, and a
redeployment of a US Marine contingent. The alliance has been sustained cooperatively and peaceful even throughout many changes in Japanese leadership.

Sino-US relations during the Obama administration were clouded by a series of conflicts, particularly in the military arena, as both powers concentrated on the change in the security environment of East Asia and Southeast Asia through incompatible perspectives. To start with, Obama's rebalancing strategy, mainly his pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, coinciding with China's rise, was marked by inconsistent reactions from both sides. As delineated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the United States would foremost reinforce its treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand "to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests" (Department of Defense (DOD) 2012, 2). China and the United States, in this context, "have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China's military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region" (DOD 2012, 2). In so doing, the existing allies are important so that the United States can "continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation" (DOD 2012). The statements from the Department of Defense show the Obama administrations' uncomfortable stance toward China in an overt way. While the United States recognizes China's rise, such a rise must conform to the United States's interests, otherwise, China would be perceived as a challenge to US power. More specifically, according to the DoD, the United States would not allow such a military rise if the use of that rise could only serve to unseat the United States in the Asia-Pacific region and create a China-centered East Asian security order. On the other hand, if the use of that rise contributed to an overall increase of
the United States's strategic share in the region, the United States would welcome China's military rise as a partner.

To realize this strategic notion, the Obama administration decided to dispatch approximately 500 rotational troops to the Philippines, station four Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, and deploy about 2,500 troops in Darwin, Australia, all the while keeping the existing bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam (Manyin et al. 2012). From China's perspective, this military decision was not a cooperative move toward regional stability and thus claimed that the United States should "abandon their zero-sum game and cold war mentality when considering the development of bilateral relations" (Xinhua 2011). China held that the United States's interference should not engage in security issues exclusively related to only regional players whereas Washington sought to internationalize them to expand its influence of military power and become a more active regional player (Bland and Dyer 2012; Sutter et al. 2013).

The growing antagonism in Sino-US relations became more pronounced in the maritime territorial dispute in the East China Sea in which Japan and China's security interests conflicted. Historically, Japan claimed that an uninhabited island chain in the East China Sea is under the sovereignty of Japan, which calls them the Senkaku islands. China made the same claim, applying the name Diaoyu Dao. During the Obama administration, the tension between these nations intensified when Japanese Coast Guard vessels crashed into a Chinese fishing boat adjacent to the contentious island. In response to the event, Japan detained and convicted the Chinese captain under Japanese law, triggering more tension. In the territorial dispute, the United States did not make an explicit statement in choosing sides but fully recognized the political salience of the Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security under which the United States should assist Japan if a third party attacked. The treaty encompassed areas—including the Senkakus/Diaoyu Dao—under Japan
administration. Although no major great power war broke out because of the collision, the United States's recognition transplanted legally in the domestic sphere through politicians' legislation of the National Defense Authorization Act which basically reemphasized the United States-Japan treaty. In a more explicit sense in Obama's second term, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated, "although the United States does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands, we acknowledge they are under the administration of Japan and we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration" (Department of State 2013).

Although Obama's national security decisions reflected a hard line approach toward East Asia, he did not let engagement through multilateral institutions be derailed. Indeed, the United States and China shared a common interest in promoting nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula and passed sanctions against North Korea as members of the U.N. Security Council. The United States's institutional involvement also included a US secretary of state's first visit to ASEAN secretariat, which set the stage for the United States to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The United States also participated in other meetings such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), in which Obama was the first US president to participate. The United States's involvement in these regional institutions was in large part to avoid being excluded from the regional players' discussions and also to engage China in these settings in the context of maritime security territorial disputes and regional stability (Feigenbaum and Manning 2009). Therefore, the US commitment can "reinforce the system of rules, responsibilities, and norms that underlies regional peace, stability, and prosperity" (The White House 2011). While participating in these events, Obama's hard line stance was still intact with the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan, which China abhorred. China in turn showed reluctance to condemn North Korea's provocations, which the United States detested.
In short, the US rebalancing policy toward East Asia during the Obama administration demonstrated its security interest through not only maintaining its existing alliance structure but also broadly distributing that military stance to other Asia-Pacific regions. These military moves obviously reflected the United States's willingness to project its sphere of security influence internationally. It followed that the United States's efforts were also projected in multilateral diplomacy. Obama participated in regional institutions such as ARF and EAS, manifesting Washington's propensity to engage in the region's multilateral institutional architecture.
CHAPTER 5: TESTING

Hypothesis Testing

In this section, I do simple hypothesis testing by observing whether realist grand strategies are congruent with Bush's (conservative) foreign policy practices and whether the liberal grand strategies are congruent with Obama's (liberal) foreign policy practices. If the result produces an understanding that the hypothesis is false, then it would mean that my limited data do not support the hypothesis. In turn, if the result turns out that they both do correspond in this way, then it would mean that my limited case studies do support the hypothesis. In particular, this means that presidential ideology as an explanatory variable is qualified to explain the US grand strategic behavior during Bush and Obama presidencies.

Realist Grand Strategy and Conservative Foreign Policy Practices

Europe

Realist grand strategies hold that the United States should practice primacy towards Europe and with it to other regions of the world. In so doing, particularly, they assert that revitalization of NATO is imperative. A commonly-suggested step is to bring post-Soviet member states such as Ukraine into NATO so that the United States can contain Russia more effectively. Obviously, this is not a simple task; recent events in Ukraine (which in their current unresolved state are again beyond the scope of my study) demonstrate just how complex a shift in historical alignments might be. Innovating the NATO framework automatically implies that the balance of power logic has been and will be successful in the future toward former European great powers as well. It is not likely for European great powers to be as militarily competitive as America is and, even if they do, they would be vulnerable as they were in the 20th century. The United States would follow the balance of power logic and not allow the uncontrolled growth of European independent military power because the foremost principle of the realist strategy is to make sure no regional hegemon
arises in Eurasia. Rather, Europe would be involved in the broader expansive manifestation of American power especially in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

The conservative foreign policy practices during the Bush presidency toward Europe were congruent with the notion of realist strategy. In particular, the United States's overwhelming military power with respect to its European allies served the immediate response to international terrorism. The NATO alliance structure facilitated the combination of the US and European forces in appropriate places where the threats should be targeted, as, for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan. To be sure, the actual practices of NATO military exercise on battlefields was not cooperative and harmonious. Rather than NATO as a whole, the manifestation of NATO's military power was shaped by the United States-centered ad hoc alliances that could have been achieved even without the NATO framework. These notions—more importantly—tell us that realist strategies influenced conservative practices. Primarily this is because the manifestations of US military power were in accordance with the balance of power perspective. The United States's strategic balance of power behavior engendered its unilateral security practices that were brought mainly by nationalist responses to exogenous threats. The conservative practices became more offensive and unilateral to resist the assault of terrorists who wanted to break down traditional US exceptionalism. In this sense, the NATO alliance became more strengthened, not because of its multilateral approach but because of the lead of the United States in resisting and offensively exercising a realist strategy of primacy to confront international terrorism. Such US moves towards Europe and reaching to the other regions of the world automatically implied that Europe could not become an independent military power to challenge the United States in the self-focused anarchic structure of the international system. Counter-intuitively, a stronger NATO alliance meant the likelihood of Europe becoming a military regional hegemon competitive to the United States was reduced because NATO without the United States means a (militarily)
powerless Europe. During the Bush presidency, a regional hegemon did not arise in Europe because the US strategy of primacy made it impossible for Europe even to consider.

**East Asia**

The orientation of conservative policy practices toward East Asia were also not a radical departure from practices applied to Europe. Realist strategy holds that the underlying approach to East Asian politics is the balance of power logic. In so doing, the United States already has an effective partner, Japan, who could align with the United States and balance against the reemerging geopolitical power, China. The United States has to contain China militarily which would obviously not favor such actions. However, effective management of the United States-Japan-China triangular relationship can engender regional stability in East Asia. In order to achieve this status, US strategy should be aimed at upgrading Japan's security role because this induces Chinese leadership to sustain its relation with the United States. In this sense, the US strategy of engagement shines in shaping the behavior of Japan and China. Japan, being allied with America, cannot militarily provoke and destroy the regional stability and China, being fearful of the upgraded security role of Japan, cannot militarily cause affront either. The US strategic engagement prevents any state in East Asia from becoming a regional hegemon and keeps peace in the region.

The conservative policy practices indeed followed this logic of a realist strategy of selective engagement. The United States and its relationship with Japan was stable and became revitalized by Japan's military support to the United States-driven "Global War on Terror." What signified the notion of Japan's military support was the fact that it reaffirmed Japan's consistent security dependence on the United States. In other words, Japan did not seek a geopolitical opportunity to militarily strike the regional order to its own favor at the expense of the United States or China, especially when the United States paid more strategic attention to the Middle East. Japan stayed as a true security partner to the United States.
Subsequently, this stable United States-Japan relation gave no room for China to cause military provocation in East Asia. Rather, China too chose to support the United States legally within the UN multilateral framework.

Although United States-China relations oscillated between accommodation and vacillation, the constant was that China did not seek to reshape the security order in East Asia to its own favor—although such a reshaping could potentially serve their security and economic interests. Perhaps more accurately, the United States prevented a potential challenge from taking shape in the first place. In part, the United States contained China by adhering to its multilateral approach such as the six-party talks convened to solve the key security issues of the region, notably North Korea’s nuclear capability. By bringing China to this framework and making it an important player in shaping the talk, the United States set the stage for China not to resort to aggressive unilateralism. Consequently, the multilateral approach provided a stable relationship between the United States and China. In fact, DPRK’s nuclear ambition was more of a greater security concern for Japan than it was for China (Sloan 2003). The way the United States approached this issue was by bringing in China and upgrading its diplomatic role in dealing with DPRK. However, China’s role fit into the United States’s broader emphasis on ameliorating Japan’s worry and the United States-Japan security alliance. DPRK’s nuclear ambition was a security threat to Japan but not to China who has been a mediator between the United States and DPRK. Because of this multilateral setting under the trilateral and six-party talk, for example, the United States-Japan-China triangular relationship stayed healthy, thus preventing either Japan or China from becoming a regional hegemon and instead maintaining regional peace in East Asia. It is in this sense that the unilateral action of the US strategy can be observed due to the fact the main player in organizing the talk from the beginning was the United States. Other parties to the talks, other than Japan and China, were only the partners conducive to the United States-driven triangular...
relationship. Conclusively, the US selective engagement strategy paved the way for making the triangular relationship work.

Liberal Grand Strategy and Liberal Foreign Policy Practices

Europe

Liberal strategy maintains that the US stance toward Europe should not be based on a unilateral but on a multilateral framework. In particular, it suggests that the United States needs to engage in global affairs through international institutions and multilateralism with Europe. To do so effectively, the United States should not view Europe as an entity that subordinates its independence for US national interests, but rather, as a self-regarding actor that has independent capability outside the United States to shape the world. In order for the United States to remain an influential actor in international politics, therefore, it has to accept the fact that its strategic engagement cannot be successful without the understanding that the United States is merely one of the great powers that happens to be the most powerful.

Because Europe can become a threat, the United States must not limit its geopolitical ambitions but rather must accept its equal status. The upkeep of US security should be rooted in the larger institutionalized multilateral security framework. This must involve other great powers, such as China, Russia, Japan, and Europe. Such a course for the United States would contribute to international cooperation. In essence, the United States should pursue a strategy of internationalism.

Liberal policy practices toward Europe during the Obama administration turned out to be the exemplar for exerting military power in a way the strategy of internationalism suggests. The United States forced itself not to lead the NATO alliance structure in the Libya campaign, but instead passed the leadership to its European allies. To be sure, such change in taking the leading role may have had to do with the fact that the United States needed to focus more on its domestic problems, such as the economy. However, as a matter of fact, the change
occurred because of the geopolitical concern for the European powers. European great powers' security was interconnected to the security of Libya's neighbors. The Libya campaign mattered to Europe more than the United States. Both sides after all shared the common threat perception, thus facilitating their multilateral approach in their executions. The United States as a crucial NATO member-state was involved in part of this larger multilateral military action in Libya not for strategic but for humanitarian reasons. Moreover, it resisted a commanding role unlike during the Bush administration and instead followed the European powers' directions. In this multilateral setting, NATO promoted a truly institutionalized security structure for its member-states rather than acting as an ad hoc coalition of the willing driven by US leadership. International cooperation was invigorated between the United States and Europe. The United States saw Europe as an important actor with the military capability to cooperate with the United States even though the United States would be taking the dominant role in global affairs. Finally, cooperation between the two great powers was also manifested in exercising multilateral diplomacy in meeting the Iranian nuclear issue. Put simply, the United States exercised an internationalism strategy with Europe in the necessary geopolitical areas.

**East Asia**

The basic conceptual focus of liberal strategy in East Asia remains as in the case of Europe, with some major exceptions. Liberal strategy asserts that the United States should accept the greater role of East Asian great powers in the twenty-first century but does not state that it should stop the balancing game. Rather, liberal strategy advises the United States to keep the current practice of balancing against rising powers like China, or even more radically, to the extent that China does not show clear nationalism impulses manifested in its military power. Withholding the principles of liberal strategy such as multilateral action and
international cooperation through institutions remain the same in East Asia for the United States.

In a contrasting way, however, the US rebalancing strategy toward East Asia was not an explicit expression of liberal strategy promises. In fact, what the US rebalancing strategy represented was exactly the opposite. It practiced the realist strategy of primacy. To start with, the United States-Japan alliance during the Obama presidency in facing the plight of the Japanese public in the earthquake and tsunami disasters proved that the alliance can overcome not only common geopolitical threats, but also even the threats that are exclusively related to only one side. To be sure, the United States helped Japan because the circumstances were so terrible, but more broadly, its help as an ally upgraded the scope and dimension of the threat perceptions shared by both parties. More explicitly, this became demonstrated through the improved national belief that the United States is a benign and cooperative power to Japan and that the United States deeply cares about the impact of its military forces in place, as with its effort to lessen conflict between Okinawan residents and US soldiers. In this sense, the natural disaster broadened threat perception for the United States and Japan, which subsequently triggered strong public support for the alliance, and consequently crystallized the alliance in a security environment where China has been a strategic rival.

In such an energetic setting made up by the United States-Japan alliance, the United States showed a clear strategic move toward containing China with no ambiguity. It declared that it would deploy military forces in more broadly distributed regions of Asia. Obviously, this course of action meant that the US forces would be stationed in the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia on a rotational basis. The biggest reason why this rebalancing move rests on primacy strategy and not on liberal strategy lies in this US international political action. The new forces deployed in these new areas are not meant to be placed at the expense
of the forces already stationed in Japan and South Korea. Rather, the new deployments were in addition to the status quo. Such US action meant that it seeks to be the most influential actor and the most preeminent military—particularly navy—power in the region. More importantly, the United States exhibited its intention that it would not allow China to become the most dominant player at the expense of the United States. The only option for China, the United States suggests, is to rise peacefully and become a contributor to the stability of East Asia that puts emphasis on the role of the United States as the most influential player. Through the US strategic move, China's strategic projection of its navy forces became checked under the more broadly distributed eyes of the US forces in Southeast Asia.

To be sure, there were elements of policy practices in instances when the United States engaged multilaterally with East Asian powers including China in regional institutions such as ASEAN and EAS. These can seemingly be depicted as the demonstration of liberal strategy. However, in fact, even those examples were primarily pushed by economic concerns and chiefly intended to engage Chinese security interests in different contexts whereas the US adherence to promoting its preponderant US military power in the region was intact.

The US rebalancing strategy was the realist strategy of primacy that was exceedingly offense-oriented in its exercise with its allies and strategic partners. It was not surprising at all when Washington announced that it would side with Japan in the Senkakus/Diaoyu Dao issue instead of China, and this notion reflects the realist strategy's advice, namely, to upgrade Japan's security role. Eventually, the management of the balance of power in East Asia was offensively motivated under which no regional hegemon could seek to arise and present an overwhelming challenge to the United States. Rather, the peace and stability in the region was sustained, as evidently manifested through the lack of an interstate war. The liberal foreign policy practices during Obama were informed not by liberal strategy of internationalism but by expansive realist strategy of primacy.
Implications

The congruence between conservative policy practices, realist grand strategy, and the inconsonance between liberal practices and liberal strategy was in fact affected by the international environment under which US behavior rarely faced constraints. More specifically, the distribution of material capabilities in the international system during the Bush and Obama presidencies was slanted towards the United States, whose military resources surpassed great powers in Eurasia, thus characterizing the international system as a US-unipolar order.

To be sure, that unipolarity does not have a major effect in international politics because of prevalent norms; the social structure of the international system reduces the impact of polarity (Finaemore 2009). Albeit that differences exist on how the actual effects of the structure of the international system can be scrutinized, “we should still start our analysis with structure” (Jervis 2009, 188). In fact, it was the US-unipolar order of the international system that created structural incentives for the US grand strategic behavior during the Bush and Obama eras.

In particular, the US realist strategy behavior during the Bush era was in large part in response to exogenous threats, terrorism, and to check any great powers' attempt to rise as a regional hegemon in Europe and Asia. There was no dominant state like the Soviet Union during the Cold war to counterbalance or even one that might seek an opportunity to attack the United States in Eurasia during the Bush presidency. In other words, although the United States had terrible security experiences surrounding 9/11, the great powers of Eurasia did not see such an event as a sign of US decline, in particular, the decline of its military capability. Consequently, the Eurasian great powers' counterbalancing behavior toward the United States did not occur because of their lower material capability and resources. Rather, the great powers behaved cooperatively with the United States. Through NATO and the traditional
ally framework, most great powers in the system helped the United States's global war campaign. The United States faced no structural constraint as it sought to exercise a realist strategy offensively to show their military might not only to states (Iraq and Afghanistan) but also more importantly to non-state actors (Al-Qaeda). From a structural perspective, Eurasian great powers' behavior was not irrational since their attempt to change the US-unipolar system would have only caused them to sustain high costs.

The unipolar system effect during the Obama presidencies was manifested in a different manner compared to the Bush era. US behavior was shaped by both liberal and realist strategy in Europe and East Asia, respectively. The US grand strategic behavior in Europe sought a cooperative relationship with the United States's European allies for the effectiveness of the Libya campaign, for example. Should we consider such US behavior as a sign of passing the leadership role of the international system to Europe? The answer is clearly not. The United States's practice of an internationalism strategy was not for the purpose of passing its role on to others. Nor did the United States consider Europe to be equally as powerful as the United States. Here the system effect lies. Security involving Libya inevitably influenced Europe's security, and in order for Europe to become a more active player in meeting its military challenges, the structural incentives had to lean toward Europe. Europe needed to behave according to the balance of power logic, but the international system was shaped by the US-unipolar model. However, because the Libyan campaign was also essential to the United States for humanitarian purposes and because many leading states in the campaign were US allies that had shared common threats since the Cold war, there were structural incentives for Europe that enabled them to effectively pursue a balancing game at the front. US-unipolarity did not generate structural disincentives to Europe in the international system because European great powers did not challenge the extant system, nor did they have sufficient military capabilities to do so. In essence, the
United States's liberal strategy in Europe was conducive to maintaining the extant unipolar international system.

Obama’s practice of the US realist strategy of primacy in East Asia helped to sustain the United States-centered unipolar international system. Also, it is a clear example of Robert Jervis's (2009) notion that leading states can become a revisionist power in a unipolar system. The US grand strategic behavior offensively pursued military containment against China in broadly distributed areas of the Asia-Pacific region even while continuing a traditional balancing posture in Japan and South Korea. The United States as a unipolar power took a revisionist stance to occupy a more commanding position in East Asia chiefly because a big rising state, China, had reemerged in the scene. China has historically been one of the most dominant players in the region—pragmatically, the United States cannot simply and naively claim its position unless it manifests its aspirations by reinforcing its military capability. In so doing, the United States pursued a strategy of primacy toward East Asia, which contributed to sustaining the United States's lead role in the region to contain and suppress China's rise by solidifying traditional alliances and incorporating more allied security partners.

Now, it may seem that the US containment practice targeting China in East Asia can be explained through the logic of offensive realism; the U.S. suppresses China to ensure their survival and maximize their relative power. Such an approach, however, is mistaken because the logic does not embody great power behavior in the unipolar system. In other words, realism in the broadest sense mainly takes into account state behavior within bipolar and multipolar systems where interstate conflicts that could lead to war are highly likely to happen. Attempting to explain US containment behavior toward China through offensive realism therefore automatically assumes that the U.S. is not a unipolar power but one of several multipolar stakeholders. This is not accurate. Instead, I hold that the U.S. is a unipolar power and the existing theoretical framework—which rests on a conception of the U.S. as
merely one of a group of multipolar powers—cannot explain its behavior. Such a theoretical
dilemma can still be solved without withdrawing or negating the core of realism—
international politics is power politics. The following theoretical discussion will attempt to
provide answers to this quandary.

The U.S. and its allies have engaged in war many times since the Cold War, although
these have been limited wars and not wars between major powers. This fact implies with no
surprise that U.S. has been practicing suppressive behavior in a unipolar system toward other
states. In unipolar architecture, the state that represents the single pole can engage in
offensive military behavior according to its own interest, either with allies or alone. The
suppression or containment exercised by a unipolar power is intended to maintain the
unipolar system by distributing its share of offensive military capabilities in the necessary
places. Unlike orthodoxy realism that connects to the Waltzian idea of survival and the
Mearsheimerian idea of maximization of relative power—the ultimate end of states, my
theory holds that neither survival nor power is the end, particularly for a unipolar power.
Rather, a unipolar power's end is peace through persistence of the extant system. Hence, the
unipolar power would suppress other potential challengers to promote peace by continuing to
demonstrate its offensive capabilities in the necessary regions. In this sense, the
Clausewitzian theory's claim that war is politics by other means is essentially synonymous
with the argument that says that peace is war by other means.

A unipolar power needs peace to preserve the extant system and in order to do that, it
must exercise and project its military capabilities to contain other states. Failing to manage
the degree or extent of power demonstration could lead to overextension, which could change
the structure of the system. I label this theory of unipolar power behavior "Offensive
Unipolarity." In the case of Sino-US relations, the United States was able to keep peace in the
region and maintain the system by distributing its offensive capabilities (primarily naval
assets) alongside allies to suppress China who overtly wanted to become a regional hegemon, a geopolitical standing that could shackle American unipolarity within the overall international architecture.

Offensive Unipolarity theory does not deviate from traditional realism, but is perhaps best thought of as a radical variant. It conceives peace as an exogenous end and power-maximization and survival as endogamous process features (or as means) in international politics, rather than considering survival and power-maximization as exogenous ends. A unipolar power is already more powerful than competing states, therefore what it needs is peace in order to keep the extant system as a single pole. Materialized attempts to realize a unipolar power's desired end include containment policy; at the very least, international politics is still power politics. Hence, more power is a prerequisite to more stable peace. In other words, peace is not an independent deliberation. By subjugating peace in the power equation, the theory is not only faithful to orthodoxy realism but also empowers and increases the orthodox's analytical leverage.

In short, Obama's primacy strategy toward East Asia contributed to the upkeep of the US-unipolar international system. Such a system, however, did not provide structural incentives for China to become a regional hegemon in East Asia; instead, China increased its military spending to advance its offensive capability, but it did not project this power outside its borders to a degree that could weaken Washington's position. In turn, America exercised containment against China because it had more incentives to do so. Explicating this claim in a theoretical manner, the essence is "that polarity structures the horizon of states' probable actions and reactions, narrowing the range of choice and providing subtle incentives and disincentives for certain types of behavior" (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 5).

It follows that structural incentives were provided for the United States, whose interest was to

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5 I conceptualize peace in this context as an adjusted power that comes out of conflict and not as the absence of war. This definition owes an intellectual debt to Keohane's (1984) understanding of cooperation which is conceived as mutual adjustment that arises from discord and not harmony.
maintain a Eurasian great power peace and prevent the emergence of any regional hegemon in both Europe and East Asia. The United States's offensive containment exercise became more pronounced with the United States's extant ally, Japan, in the Senkakus/Diaoyu Dao dispute.

To conclude, US grand strategic behavior in East Asia demonstrated its intention to become a more active and significant player in the region than China. Such behavior contributed to sustaining the US-unipolar international system which provided the United States with structural incentives and flexible strategic choices. In this sense, the system effect of unipolarity was massive and significant on US grand strategic behavior. This explains the negligible extent to which the United States faced a serious geopolitical challenge from other great powers in the international system. To be sure, the terrorist attacks in New York were an exogenous shock, but it was hardly an assault that could change the system or pose a threat that harmed US military capability. In fact, one international relations scholar argued that there has been no single military balance against the United States since the end of the Cold War when the era of US unipolarity began (Beckely 2012). Thus, it is fair to state, "unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics" (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 4).

Results

Unfortunately, the main hypothesis has proven false simply because there was no congruence between realist strategy and conservative practice and similarly for the liberal side. The hypothesis proven false leads to a conclusion that grand strategies (realist and liberal) do not correspond to a predominant ideological character of a presidency (conservative and liberal) in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies between 2001 and 2013. Subsequently, I found that it is the international environment that has more explanatory power than presidential ideology in explaining the US grand strategic behavior
during this period. In this sense, grand strategy appears to influence presidential ideology less than the international environment because unipolarity provides structural incentives to the United States which remained as a single pole after the Cold War. Presidential ideology could have made a greater contribution as an explanatory variable if Obama pursued only realist strategies, but that was certainly not the case.

Thus, I find the following answers to my research questions:

**RQ1.** Do grand strategies—realist and liberal—correspond to the predominant ideological character—conservative and liberal—of the presidency? No, while realist grand strategies corresponded to the predominant conservative ideological character of the presidency as demonstrated during the George W. Bush presidency, no such correspondence was found during the first term of Barack Obama presidency.

**RQ2.** To what extent are the two liberal arguments congruent? What about the two realist arguments? The Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski strategies are compatible in that they both adhere strongly to realist strategy measures of primacy and selective engagement but they also show differences in the extent to which America should pursue a realist grand strategy. The Charles Kupchan and Jeffrey Legro strategies are congruent in that they both agree to the Immanuel Kant's arguments delineated in *Perpetual Peace*, but they differ in defining US national interests and adopt contrasting theoretical tools in creating their own strategy. More specific answers to this question are provided in Chapter 2.

**RQ3.** Does realist grand strategy influence conservative presidential ideology? And **RQ4.** Does liberal grand strategy influence liberal presidential ideology? I find that neither realist nor liberal grand strategy significantly influenced conservative or liberal presidential ideology during the George W. Bush presidency or Barack Obama’s first term because the international environment played a larger role in explaining the US grand strategic behavior.
Conclusion

This study sought to find the association between presidential ideology and grand strategy by observing whether congruence between realist/liberal strategy and conservative/liberal foreign policy practices exists. In so doing, I chose to do a qualitative case study approach observing American foreign policies during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies. Despite the fact that the result has proven my hypothesis false, the study found that the impact of the international environment surpasses presidential ideology. For future research, it may be practicable to test the main hypothesis against various US presidencies and even to other democratic states whose structure of domestic governance lies in a presidential system with two dominant parties. Moreover, the future research should ask

- Why do great powers change their strategy to either liberal or even a more offensively driven realist strategy?
- How does multipolarity or bipolarity influence great powers' grand strategic behavior?
- Is liberal strategy feasible in a multipolar or bipolar structure of the international system?
- Which type of grand strategy, realist or liberal, is more feasible in the unipolar world order for great powers?
- More fundamentally, can realist or liberal grand strategy cause international cooperation without the existence of hegemony?

To be sure, answers to these questions require new powerful theories of grand strategy and a more systemic approach in conceptualizing it. However onerous those intellectual tasks may be, a fact of international political life is that states' grand strategic action is indeed *zweckrational* action in Weberian fashion: the rational calculation of means to achieve an end.
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