Escaping the Constraints:

A Focus on the United Nations Security Council to Explain the United States Use of Force

Triet Pham

Undergraduate Honors Thesis

Department of Political Science

Indiana University

May 2014

Timothy Hellwig (Thesis Advisor)

Nick Cullather (Second Reader)

Jacob Bielesiak (Honors Program Director)
Abstract

International relations legal scholars have argued that non-liberal superpowers, such as Russia and China, will take advantage of their procedural powers within international security institutions to discourage Western countries from resolving external conflicts through the use of force. As a major power that endeavors to represent democratic ideology and human rights’ protections, and to secure its interests abroad, the United States never accepts the obstacles caused by those non-liberal powers. In this paper, I argue that the United States leaders, when perceiving the increase in military and economic powers of non-liberal powers, compared to itself and other liberal countries (i.e. France and Britain) in the UN Security Council, will act unilaterally to achieve quicker outcomes. Using probit regression to analyze the data, my empirical evidence suggests that the rising powers of non-liberal powers do lead to U.S. unilateral decisions. However, when comparing between non-liberals and liberals’ military spending, it contradicts my prediction about the effect of the Security Council power dynamics on the U.S. use of force.
# Table of Contents

## Section 1: Introduction
- Research Question .......................................................... 3
- Why does the Study of U.S. Use of Force Matter? ........................................... 6
- Outline of the Paper .............................................................................. 7

## Section 2: Literature Review and Introduction of Theory
- Contending Explanations ........................................................................ 9
- The U.S. Concern about the Security Council Authority to Resolve Conflicts ............................................................... 16

## Section 3: Empirical Conceptualization and Operationalization
- Empirical Contribution ........................................................................... 19
- The Concept of Unilateralism and Multilateralism ...................................... 20
- Typology of Multilateralism ..................................................................... 22

## Section 3: Hypotheses and Empirical Analysis
- Hypotheses ......................................................................................... 23
- Explanatory Factors ............................................................................ 24
- Control variables ..................................................................................... 26
- Statistical Testing Models ......................................................................... 27

## Section 3: Discussion ........................................................................ 33

## Section 3: Conclusion ........................................................................ 36

## Works Cited ..................................................................................... 38
Section 1: Introduction

Research Question

As a hegemonic power on the world stage, the United States (U.S.), since the Second World War, has taken advantage of its economic might and military capability to resolve international disputes. Specifically, the U.S. has been militarily involved in various political conflicts not only within the borders of sovereign states, but also between states. Recently, in the war on global terrorism, the U.S. economic strength has been the backbone of the entire international community’s response because many less-developed states rely on this hegemon’s contributions to reinforce their domestic security.\(^1\) However, being a hegemon paves the way for a high level of discretion in deciding to employ force whenever the leader assesses the need for military intervention in external crises.

In the process of use-of-force assessment, political actors of a hegemon, according to Podliska, take a two-step approach\(^2\). The first stage is to evaluate whether military action is necessary for foreign crises. In other words, the political actors must take into consideration the overall benefits and costs of the upcoming warfare to make the decision. The second stage of calculation is the decision whether unilateralism or multilateralism will be the preferred option for military operation. On the one hand, unilateralism refers to a “tendency to opt out of a multilateral framework or to act alone” in resolving a specific global issue\(^3\). Multilateralism, on

---


the other hand, refers to “an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.”

Specifically, multilateral agreements must satisfy three conditions: compliance with the common rules, supervision of overarching international institutions, and level of coordination. Firstly, the initiated military operation should be a result of agreements among key members of the security organizations to which the United States belongs. Secondly, a global institution should supervise how the operation is conducted in the region of crisis to ensure adherence to norms and rules. Finally, elements of military or intelligence inter-state cooperation should be present as a sign of multilateralism.

Interestingly, the pattern of U.S. use of force throughout its foreign intervention history has not been always consistent or predictable, a variance which has sparked intellectual curiosity among the community of political scientists. In theory, extensive resources and unrivalled military capabilities of a hegemon should have significantly affected U.S. politicians’ decisions to set the unilateral use of force as the default choice. Indeed, this proposition does hold true in some historical instances in which U.S. leaders initiated military deployments and attacks that undoubtedly violated foreign territories’ national sovereignty. For example, during the Reagan administration, the U.S. directly provided military assistance and training for the anti-Sandinista group, known as the Contras, to overthrow the Nicaraguan legitimate government. The questionable justification used was that the Sandinista regime would likely turn into an increasingly Communist authoritarian state and assist Marxist revolutions in neighboring states.

---

In light of the crisis, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared that the U.S. had breached the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, as well as humanitarian law. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration defied the ICJ judgment by vetoing measures of enforcement by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The Nicaraguan case demonstrates that the United States, as a superior power, could disregard the rules and norms established by international institutions while pursuing its national interests.

Nonetheless, unilateral use of force was not the only option for the United States, as the hegemon in other cases advocated the authority of international institutions and preferred cooperation with other states to fulfil its military goals. One of the most illustrative examples of U.S. multilateralism is the Persian Gulf War in 1991, in which the U.S. and the UNSC contributed forces to tackle the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This multilateral action was remarkably preceded by a series of unilateral interventions commencing in 1987.

The variability in the U.S. approach to the use of force, either unilateralism or multilateralism, leads to a research puzzle: what factors determine the military approach that US leaders have employed to resolve international crises? In other words, with the preponderance of military capability and technology in relation to other states, why does the United States choose to act unilaterally in some cases, but multilaterally in other cases? In this thesis, I argue that shifts in relative power among permanent members of the UNSC have impact on the U.S. use-of-force calculation. Particularly, the rise of power, including military and economic, of non-liberal members, namely Russia and China, triggers U.S. unilateralism because the hegemon intends to avoid as many obstacles as possible to pursue its national security and interests.

---

8 Podliska, p. 2.
Why does the Study of U.S. Use of Force Matter?

Research on the alternatives to the hegemonic use of force in the context of the growth in transnational terrorism and humanitarian crises is conducive to the construction of international order in two ways. First, understanding which alternatives could produce the best outcomes for global security will give future politicians valuable advice in dealing with international tensions. On the one hand, although multilateralism enhances inter-state collaboration through equal contributions from member states, the United States has in reality been proven to share larger responsibility. Since 1988, European military expenditures have failed to keep up with the U.S. military expenditures, which demonstrates the lack of European willingness to share equitable military burdens with the U.S. Indeed, with the decline in power of the Soviet Union, European nations no longer feel urgent needs to invest in their military expenditures. On the other hand, through unilateralism, the U.S. hegemon would be able to pursue its security goals without encountering problems of responsibility sharing and mutual trust. However, pure reliance on the hegemon’s capability to resolve international crises would incur unnecessary costs and consequently domestic opposition. Therefore, it is indispensable for U.S. leaders to employ the best strategy possible to manifest the hegemon’s leadership power, while at the same time attaining the best outcomes in foreign dispute resolutions.

Second, since mutual trust and reciprocity are key elements for successful international cooperation, the hegemonic choice of military action has significant impact on how other members of UNSC perceive the true intentions of this actor. As Mendelsohn comments, although the U.S. leadership is endorsed by the international community, its “imperial temptations” could

---

be perceived as a threat to effective multinational collaboration.\textsuperscript{10} In other words, when the hegemon decides to settle the conflict within a foreign territory without consulting with other powers in the collective security system, its action could immediately be seen as being driven by self-interests. Even in the event that the hegemon appeals for international engagement, its cooperative intention could be doubted by European counterparts to prioritize the U.S. national security over that of other countries. For these two reasons, the study on the causes of hegemonic use of force, with the emphasis on the organizational structure of security institutions, could help mitigate the problem of trust and burden sharing in international politics.

**Outline of the Paper**

Section 2 begins with the introduction of explanations about the U.S. historical use-of-force decisions. These explanations include the presence or absence of another significant rival power, the U.S. perception of its own military strengthen relative to the adversary, domestic concerns, the characteristics of foreign crises, and consideration for enhancing legitimacy through international institutions. This section then describes my theory which suggests the dynamics of one international body, the Security Council, influences the U.S. use of force. The theory is followed by a detailed explanation of how the power of the five permanent members in the UNSC affects U.S. use-of-force decisions the most.

Section 3 focuses on empirical aspect of the thesis by presenting several International Relations concepts associated with the U.S. foreign policy behaviors. The purpose of this presentation is to narrow down what this paper means by “unilateralism” and “multilateralism” for the sake of classification of U.S. historical use-of-force instances. The next step is to introduce several operationalized hypotheses about the relationship between power dynamics among UNSC permanent members and the U.S. use-of-force behavior.

\textsuperscript{10} Mendelsohn, p. 195.
Section 4 details how independent variables, dependent variables, and control variables were measured and coded for the quantitative analysis. It then presents all empirical findings from the probit regression to indicate whether my hypotheses are confirmed.

Section 5 provides tentative explanations for some findings in the previous section that do not confirm my hypotheses.

Finally, section 6 offers a conclusion to the paper and gives direction for future research.
Section 2: Literature Review and Introduction of Theory

Contending Explanations

The subject of U.S. unilateralism and multilateralism in its military intervention has been studied and researched by many scholars. Some argue that the emergence or existence of a significant threat to the unipolar world, dominated by the United States, influences the foreign policy considerations of U.S. decision makers. Others maintain that the probability of gaining a quick victory against the adversary leads to unilateral decisions to employ force. Some others attribute the U.S. use-of-force behavior to a variety of domestic factors, particularly economic indicators and political changes in the U.S. government. Crisis triggers are also the focus of some scholars, who argue that identification of foreign crises as a threat to national security or as an extreme violation of human rights shapes the U.S. behavior. The last explanation is concerned with the complications of international institutional procedures, especially in the UNSC, that stimulates the U.S. to take actions unilaterally.

a) The invincible America in a unipolar Post-Cold War world

David Skidmore, through the analysis of 16 post-Cold War cases, argues that the United States has never opted for a multilateral approach as a genuine attempt to demonstrate its compliance with the rules established by international institutions.\(^\text{11}\) Specifically, the abandonment of a multilateral framework in a U.S. president’s use-of-force calculation is concerned with the absence of a powerful rival which strives to maintain a global bipolarity, as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.\(^\text{12}\) As the logic of realism holds, the external threat

\(^\text{12}\) Skidmore, p. 17.
from another power compels the United States to establish collective institutions to maximize its chance to win the war and protect its security.

However, if the explanatory factor is merely the presence or absence of emerging rivals, then the study of U.S. use of force will be of no interest for international relation theorists after the Cold-War. Podliska provides an alternative explanation based on the U.S. “military revolution enabling advantage.”13 This concept can be measured by the military gap between the United States and its adversary in a crisis. His logic is that the president will choose a unilateral approach if the military operation can be implemented quickly with possibly lower costs. When the military gap is significant, the probability that the U.S. army accomplishes the mission early is higher, which eventually leads to minimal costs.

b) Domestic influences on the president’s use of force decision

If Skidmore and Podliska focus on systemic analyses of the question, Atsushi Tago attempts to understand and predict the president’s use of force calculation by analyzing domestic factors, such as the state of economy, the cost of elections, and divided government.14 First, he suggests that during a period of weak economy, the president tends to seek multilateral cooperation to relieve the burden of incurring military expenses. Second, electoral occasions are when the president opts for a multilateral approach, as acting unilateralist receives less public support. Third, unilateral use of force will encounter stronger opposition if the government is divided between the Republican Party and Democratic Party.

c) Nature of the crisis

According to Podliska, crisis triggers, including endangered national security and escalation of human rights violation, are also key factors influencing how the president uses

---

13 Podliska, p. 70.
force. Particularly, in the event of crisis which prospectively jeopardizes the U.S. security, the president will prefer unilateral force. This hypothesis rests upon American exceptionalism, the idea that the hegemon is not bound by any common rules or principles shared by international community. When dealing with national security, the U.S. hegemon is unwilling to put its complete faith in less powerful allied members, which could make the overall mission less efficient.

The other factor related to crisis triggers is the degree of human rights violation occurring in the region of crisis. Podliska argues that humanitarian crisis will change the U.S. foreign policy toward a more multilateral approach. To explain, the media coverage of atrocities committed by the villains in crisis regions stimulates the public in developed countries to exert pressure on their government to take actions. The multilateral agreements on military operation to stop the atrocities will pave the way for inter-state cooperation under the leadership of the United States.

d) Legitimacy through international security institutions

Edward Luke argues that the problem of legitimacy through international security institutions is a hindrance to the U.S. attempt to establish multilateral military actions with its allied members. According to the majority of legal scholars, legitimacy is “ultimately the process that may allow participations who are somewhat distrustful of one another to believe in

15 Podliska, p. 74.
18 Podliski, p. 75.
and support the organization.”21 For this reason, for a military operation to attain international legitimacy, it must pass through the process of concurrence and ratification by key members of an international organization. However, while the U.S. authority strives to attain international legitimacy of military actions, other non-liberal members of the UNSC take advantage of the intricate ratification process to “delegitimate Western values.”22 Perceiving potential hurdles from non-liberal countries, the United States, known for its pragmatism in foreign diplomacy, would rather make decisions based on the right results than the right process.23 As a result, the United States tends to opt for unilateralism since it is the quickest route to achieve the right results in resolving international tensions.


From the theoretical perspective, I suggest that the study of use-of-force behavior needs to consider the role of an international security institution in constraining or incentivizing certain behaviors of actions. Although this argument has been advanced by Luke and other legal scholars, it does not account for variations in the U.S. foreign policy through its history. In other words, since the United States decided to act unilaterally in some instances, but multilaterally in others, there should be some changes in the UNSC that explain these variations. I argue that these changes deal with economic and military dimensions of power in the five permanent members of UNSC.

Particularly, it is important to consider the unique features of the powerful non-liberal members of this international security institution to recognize the impact they have on the military actions of other powerful actors. As a result, my theory claims that the increases in

---

power, including military and economic, of non-liberal permanent members of the SC lead to unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. The logic of this argument is based on the assumption that the United States manages to stay away from the intricate process of authorization by other members of the UNSC, especially non-liberal countries. When non-liberal countries increase in power, in relation to other members, these countries tend to exert more pressure on the negotiation process within the UNSC. When U.S. leaders perceive more challenges in persuading other members to authorize military operations, they will be more likely to act unilaterally to avoid complication. When non-liberal members decline in power, they will be more likely to focus on their own domestic agendas and therefore, not pose significant challenges to the U.S. hegemon. In this case, U.S. leaders prefer a multilateral approach since the hegemon could convince other members of its military intentions more easily.

The logic of this theory is reinforced by many critics of the Security Council, who argue that its objective of defending international peace has not been accomplished as expected due to a variety of problems. The next part of this section discusses approaches that the UNSC adopts to maintain peace and key problems pertaining to the function of this body that cause the U.S. to refrain from acting multilaterally under some circumstances.

**How does the Security Council Implement its Duty to Maintain Peace and Security?**

According to Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, two main approaches that the UNSC could follow to fulfil its responsibility of “the maintenance of international peace and security” are peaceful resolution of conflicts and peace enforcement\(^24\). While the first procedure grants permission for the involved parties to seek appropriate peaceful resolutions on their own, the second one entails active interference by the UNSC in one way or another.

a) Peaceful resolution of conflicts

\(^24\) The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945)
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.\textsuperscript{25}

As this provision of UN Charter Chapter VI spells out, the key to successful peaceful resolution advanced by the UNSC is the cooperative spirit of the conflicting parties. This procedure provides leeway for the parties to resolve tensions with the exclusion of violence or war.\textsuperscript{26} In the event that the parties have engaged in armed conflicts, the Security Council might request ceasefire and assign international observers to monitor the behaviors of the parties during the ceasefire. Since this approach is purely designed for the prevention of warfare, the success of this peaceful settlement depends on the intentions of the government of the territory on which the dispute takes place. That is, before the UN can dispatch peacekeeping troops to the region to prevent war, there must be consent of the government for the deployment.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, the United Nations does not have the authority at this stage to intervene in the dispute with the intention of supporting either of the parties. In short, this stage rules out subjective decisions of the UN, as well as the direct involvement of permanent veto members.\textsuperscript{28} However, after efforts at mediation turn fruitless and with the escalation of conflicts beyond the control of the UN, the Security Council can resort to military enforcement to regain the peace.

\begin{itemize}
\item[b)] Peace enforcement
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{25} Chapter VI, UN Charter
\textsuperscript{28} Spanier & Wendzell, 9\textsuperscript{th} ed, p. 448
When all peaceful solutions recommended do not come to fruition, and a regional crisis declared by the Security Council to be a “threat to the peace, breach to the peace, or act of aggression,” further coercive measures will be taken. The first approach to regaining peace is known as “provisional measures.” These measures take the form of non-military resolutions, such as appeals for economic sanctions, cutting off communication means to the violating party, and the temporary end of diplomatic ties. When these “provisional measures” fail to force both sides to relinquish war-making intentions, the Security Council changes its approach to military peace enforcement.

Peace enforcement refers to “the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions.” Doyle and Sambanis associate peace enforcement with the UN “war-making” power as this intergovernmental organization commences the use of force on unyieldingly hostile factions to achieve its peace-keeping purpose, “ranging from disarmament, to safe havens, ‘no fly zones,’ and new state borders.” Due to the absence of a UN standing army, its peace-making efforts rely on the contribution of troops and weaponry from many nations in the world. However, this military deployment must be authorized by the UNSC, including five permanent members and other ten non-permanent members responsible for making decisions regarding the use of force. This leads to the next discussion on procedural voting within the UNSC and the importance of the five permanent members.

c) Veto power and the influence of five permanent members

---

29 Chapter VI, UN Charter
30 Baehr, the United Nations: Reality and Ideal, p. 64
31 United States Army, Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operation, p. 6

15
The decision-making procedure within the Security Council for the authorization of force can be summarized through paragraph 3 of Article 27:

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.  

In short, each of the permanent UNSC members, including Russia, China, the United States, Britain, and France, reserves the power to reject any resolution to authorize forces to retain international peace. This veto power grants them enormous voice in determining peace outcomes throughout the world. As long as the region of crisis does not directly involve one of the great powers, they can equally influence resolutions advocated by other permanent members. Due to the strict procedural rules for decisions within the UNSC, major state actors in the world, especially the United States, have the ambition of enforcing peace by themselves without the need for UNSC authorization.

The U.S. Concern about the Security Council Authority to Resolve Conflicts

Given the purpose of the Security Council to keep and enforce peace, there are several problems that cause the United States to be concerned about the organization’s capability to resolve disputes. The first challenge to seeking resolutions through the UNSC path is the divergence of interests among the five permanent members, which eventually leads to multilateral stalemates whenever a resolution is proposed. Specifically, in every international crisis, permanent Council members exert their decision-making power to guarantee that

34 Article 27, Chapter V, UN Charter
resolutions do not negatively affect their own interests. The veto power is the most critical mechanism taken advantage by these superpowers to change the course of SC resolutions. For instance, when Israeli forces occupied Egypt during the crisis of 1958 in the Middle East, the United States presented an agenda to the Security Council to demand the withdrawal of Israeli troops and urge other superpowers to relinquish the use of force. Immediately, this resolution encountered negative votes from both France and Britain, while these two superpowers still pressed ahead with their military attacks on Egypt to maintain the Suez Canal control. This example illustrates the reality that states could barely abandon the pursuit of their interests which are conventionally at odds with the function of the Security Council.

The second challenge for the UNSC peace-making purpose is the shared concern among all superpowers whenever they perceive the increase in power of their rivals on the world stage. Specifically, the hegemonic ambition of the United States to expand its democratic idealism across the globe has been perceived by other powers as a threat to multipolarity. The common fear of other powers about the rise of unipolarity is indeed justifiable. On September 12, 2002, among a series of reactions to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush used the UN General Assembly to advance his intention to use force in Iraq. However, President Bush publically declared that if the authorization of force in the UN was halted, the United States would "act alone." This message implies that the U.S. power could not be restricted by the UN Security Council and therefore could not be challenged by the opinions of other superpowers. Regarding the debate on the use of force in Iraq, diplomats at the UN headquarters characterized the UNSC efforts as not only focusing “on the means of disarming Iraq but on the American use

38 Glennon, Michael F. "Why the Security Council Failed."
of power.” Therefore, Thomas G. Weiss argues that since the UN capacity to enforce authority depends on the U.S. military contributions, UN-authorized resolutions must be first approved by U.S. decision makers in Washington. In response to this U.S. supremacy, the rest of the Security Council, together with other emerging powers, more or less counter the hegemonic influence through their UN Charter-provided power to check the U.S. behavior. These two critical obstacles to the U.S. advancement of resolutions to international crises lead to my UNSC power dynamics and U.S. use-of-force theory, which will be quantitatively tested in this paper.

---

Section 3: Empirical Conceptualization and Operationalization

Empirical Contribution

This paper does not only offer an alternative theoretical explanation for the U.S. unilateralism and multilateralism, but also improves on empirical aspects of previous research. One of the empirical problems in the literature is the failure to consider more recent events in the analysis. For example, the crisis dyad dataset that Podliski and Skidmore use to generate their regression analysis only records the events up to 1997. The omission of more recent data from the beginning of the 21st century makes these studies incomplete because they fail to capture the rise of global terrorism and a series of democratic transitions in the Middle East and Africa. During this period, the United States alternates between unilateralism and multilateralism in dealing with foreign crises. Therefore, the addition of more recent incidents into the existent database is one of the focuses of my thesis.

The second empirical contribution of this paper is to look quantitatively at the institutional arguments pertaining to the U.S. use of force. It is important to quantitatively analyze the theory because legal arguments or case studies are not able to entirely measure and interpret the changes in the organizational structure of the UN Security Council over time that have accounted for the shifts in U.S. military approach between multilateralism and unilateralism. For this reason, with quantitative approach, I expect to generate a more comprehensive and valid set of findings that reflect the influence of UNSC on the United States foreign policy. The data is based on the listing of U.S. uses of force by Grimmet in Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010.\textsuperscript{41} Overall, my dataset has the total number of 101 cases. The next challenge is to figure out whether these instances of use of force abroad were implemented

unilaterally or multilaterally. To overcome this challenge, it is essential to redefine the concepts of unilateralism and multilateralism for the purpose of classification.

The concept of unilateralism and multilateralism

Unilateralism or multilateralism in foreign policy is characterized by the choice of the U.S. to act singly or to act with the shared responsibility of other allies. Patrick Callahan places the concepts of unilateralism and multilateralism on a continuum. He identifies four related doctrines concerning international relations which are located along the continuum from left to right: isolationism, hegemonism, realism, and liberal internationalism.

According to isolationism, the procedure for compelling other states to collaborate in most cases seems arduous, and therefore as a great power, the optimal foreign policy for the United States is to act by itself. Furthermore, isolationists are worried that collaborations would restrict the United States’ freedom to act on its national interests. For this reason, isolationism entails the largest degree of unilateralism in the continuum. To put it simply, under this logic, the United States will never be tempted to join other states against an aggressive force. Even under critical circumstances which threaten national security, the United States would rather rely on its own might than on cooperation.

Hegemonism, slightly different from isolationism, permits some degree of international cooperation, given that the leadership role belongs to the hegemon. The hegemon takes the responsibility of persuading other allied states to contribute forces and share the burden in resolving global issues. Yet, Callahan emphasizes that hegemonism is more likely to lead to

---

42 Callahan, p. 133.
43 Callhan, p. 133.
unilateral use of force because the leading state, when dealing with urgent matters prefers solitary actions or simply abuses its influence to draw other states into the campaign.\textsuperscript{44}

The basic assumption of realism in international relations revolves around national interests. On the world stage without an effective common regime, states become the key entities which take responsibility for their own interests, primarily security. This characteristic of realism, according to Callahan, guides the U.S. foreign policy toward multilateralism in order to “maintain the balance of power.”\textsuperscript{45} To explain, joining forces with other powers in international institutions is a strategy to maximize U.S. gains, in relation to the powerful rival. However, realism does not guarantee multilateral use of force, especially when there is a need for swift response to crises that endanger national security.

In contrast with isolationism, liberal internationalists strongly believe that collective agreements and collaborations can maximize the benefits of all involved actors. The assumption of liberalism holds that every individual state shares common interests to construct a collective system based on “principles of restraint, reciprocity, and sovereign equality.”\textsuperscript{46} Therefore, the most reasonable foreign policy is to cooperate under a multilateral framework.

As these doctrines suggest, unilateralism and multilateralism entail a variety of diplomatic strategies. Unilateralism can be understood as conducting foreign policy either to keep a distance from international crises or to handle conflicts single-handedly (i.e. isolationism and hegemonism). On the other hand, it can also be interpreted that multilateral policy involves economic sanctions, use of force, or other methods of influence, as long as the policy emphasizes the intention to seek military assistance from other partners (i.e. liberal institutionalism). The

\textsuperscript{44} Callahan, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{45} Callahan, p. 30.
scope of this paper is only on instances of military force that the U.S. imposed on foreign territories and governments. That is, unilateralism and multilateralism in my theory is limited to the use of force.

**Typology of Multilateralism**

Although Callahan’s description of International Relation theories on a unilateral-and-multilateral dimension is extensive, it does not provide any guidelines to clearly define unilateral action and multilateral action. It is still a challenge for IR theorists to determine how to classify a military act which appears in the middle range of the continuum. Particularly, how could one classify an act which involves only military contribution from the United States, but receives endorsement from international institutions? Also, how could one classify an act which witnesses a multinational effort to combat the enemy, but merely as a result of pressure from the hegemon?

Podliska attempts to resolve the dilemma by introducing two concepts of multilateralism: procedural multilateralism (PM) and operational multilateralism (OM). Procedural multilateralism implies the presence of “a formalized international, regional, or specific agreement to act in concert with one or more nations.” Operational multilateralism exists when the U.S. actually joins forces with one or more states on a particular campaign. Multilateralism is the combination of the Podliski’s two categories. Therefore, with this new typology, a certain crisis intervention by the U.S. would be considered unilateral if it does not involve a formalized endorsement from other states and does not involve the military engagement of other states.

Despite categorizing in three levels of multilateralism (PM, OM, and both PM and OM), Podliska uses code 1 for multilateralism and 0 for unilateralism, regardless of what types of multilateralism the U.S. employed. In this research, I employ the same coding by Podliska for simplicity.

---

47 Podliski, p. 78.
Section 4: Hypotheses and Empirical Analysis

In this section, I introduce a set of hypotheses predicting the effect of power changes within the five major state actors, including the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China, on the U.S. type of force used to handle foreign crises. These five major actors, which are also permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, have played a critical role in deliberating multilateral authorization of force in crisis-afflicted territories, as detailed in section 3. In terms of power changes, I focus on two dimensions of power, namely economic might and military investment. Both economic power and military investment are single-variable indicators that many political scientists use to measure national power.\textsuperscript{48} Other political scientists have employed multivariate approaches, including the combination of different variables to derive several indices, to capture all aspects of their measured targets. For example, Podliska devised a Composite Indicator of Military Revolutions index (CIMR) to capture military capabilities, based on preponderance gap, technology gap, and target country employment.\textsuperscript{49} Since my analysis is limited to the five big powers rather than multiple countries, I opt for the single variable approach for simplicity. Specifically, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) serves as the economic indicator, while military expenditure serves as the military power indicator. However, I do not measure absolute values of these indicators, but calculate their ratios among the five permanent members. To test these hypotheses against spurious relationships, I introduce three other control variables, namely U.S. economic and military preponderance, divided government factor, and U.S. president partisanship.

The final stage of this section is the binomial probit regression analysis of all the variables. Instead of putting economic statistics and military statistics together in the analysis, I


\textsuperscript{49} Podliska, p. 81.
separate them into two independent models in order to observe the relationships individually. Furthermore, for every model, I first examine statistically the effect of the individual ratio on the U.S. use of force type while controlling for other variables. The purpose of this individual analysis is to reject the possibility of no relationship of all the hypotheses. Finally, all independent variables (in terms of ratios) and control variables are tested in the binomial logit regression model together to generate conclusive findings of the research.

**Hypotheses**

When the ratio of GDP or military expenditure between non-liberal members and liberal members is smaller, it indicates that the power of Russia and China together does not exceed significantly that of Britain and France together in a specific year. The narrowing power difference implies that the dominance of non-liberal countries will be weakened in multilateral discussions on the UN-authorized use of force abroad. Together with the fact that Russia and China are historically skeptical of the deployment of troops in foreign territories, they will be likely to cause obstacles for the U.S. negotiation for military operations. The United States will also not expect other liberal members to make a credible commitment of force contribution due to their declining economic and military status. Consequently, the U.S. would rather act alone first than wait for the green light from the Security Council.

*H1a: The United States is more likely to intervene multilaterally in foreign crises, if the ratio of GDP between non-liberal and liberal permanent veto members (excluding the U.S.) is smaller.*

*H1b: The United States is more likely to intervene multilaterally in foreign crises, if the ratio of military expenditure between non-liberal and liberal permanent veto members (excluding the U.S.) is smaller.*
The difference in economic and military power between the United States and either of the two non-liberal countries influences the former’s use-of-force calculation. Preponderance in power signifies higher superiority in the UNSC. It is also possible that declining power of the non-liberal members paves the way for quicker reconciliations on their sides. When either of the two non-liberal powers prioritizes domestic issues over international issues, it would be easier for the United States to negotiate an authorization of force in the UNSC.

*H2a:* The United States is more likely to intervene multilateral in foreign crises, if the ratio of GDP between the United States and non-liberal members is larger.

*H2b:* The United States is more likely to intervene multilateral in foreign crises, if the ratio of military expenditure between the United States and non-liberal members is larger.

These hypotheses entail the fear of U.S. foreign policy leaders for sharing the burden of costs and casualties with unenthusiastic allies. These liberal allies, namely Britain and France, might support the authorization of force as a result of the pressure to conform to international norms and to maintain cordial relations with the U.S. Nevertheless, economic and military figures do not indicate the level of preparedness and long-term commitment to share the burden with the United States. For this reason, the United States will decide to initiate military action unilaterally to avoid the uncertainty of mutual cooperation in the future.

*H3a:* The United States is more likely to intervene multilaterally in foreign crises, if the ratio of GDP between the United States and liberal members (average) is smaller.

*H3b:* The United States is more likely to intervene multilaterally in foreign crises, if the ratio of military expenditure between the United States and liberal members (average) is smaller.

---

50 Two non-liberal countries will be statistically tested individually.
Explanatory Factors

1. Economic development

The level of economic development of every permanent UNSC member is argued to have significant impact on how U.S. leaders perceive the necessity of multilateral collaboration for military intervention. Economic development level is measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These data are obtained from Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita published by the University of Groningen.\(^{51}\) To be consistent with the hypotheses, five great powers will be divided into three groups: the United States, non-liberal group, and liberal group. The ratio between GDPS of individual groups is calculated to reflect the difference in economic power among the great powers.

2. Military investment

Given the importance of economic strength, the level of military investment of a particular power indicates the level of preparedness for upcoming operations. No matter how prosperous an economy appears to be, it does not reflect a credible commitment in a long-term multilateral military campaign in a foreign territory. Therefore, changes in military spending year by year should be taken into consideration as a contributing factor to the U.S. use of force. These national military expenditures are available on the Correlates of War (COW) dataset.\(^{52}\)

---


\(^{52}\)National Material Capabilities (v3.02). [http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm](http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm).
Control Variables

1. Domestic constraints

a. Party identification of U.S. presidents

The quantitative analysis will control for party identification of U.S. presidents since it is believed that Republican presidents are more likely to opt for unilateralism than Democratic presidents. The Republican president is coded as 1, and the Democratic counterpart is coded as 0.

b. Divided government

This alternative explanation for U.S. use of force is suggested and tested by Atsushi Tago to show that during the period in which the U.S. government is divided between two parties, unilateralism is more unlikely to happen because the decision for unilateral action could trigger the mounting opposition from the other party. Therefore, years during which the U.S. government is divided are coded 1, and 0 for the rest.

2. The preponderance of the U.S. force against the adversary

One of Podliski’s arguments in *Acting Alone: A Scientific Study of American Hegemony and Unilateral Use-of-force Decision Making* is that U.S. presidents calculate the costs and benefits of acting unilaterally or multilaterally, based on its “military revolution enabling advantage.” That is, the U.S. government is more likely to act alone if the size of its power exceeds that of the adversary by a significant level. Podliski calculates the preponderance gap by setting the ratio between the percentage of U.S. GDP over the world GDP and the percentage of the adversary’s GDP over the world GDP. However, my analytical model includes the ratio of absolute GDP between the U.S. and the adversary in every individual use-of-force instance as a control variable.

---

53 Podliski, p. 70.
Statistical Testing Models

1. Binomial probit regression

   a. Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ind. Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Liberal / Liberal</td>
<td>1.6785***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5453)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. / Soviet-Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1746***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0483)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. / China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.4811***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1525)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. / Liberal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0303***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided government</td>
<td>-0.0606</td>
<td>-0.0733</td>
<td>-0.0888</td>
<td>-0.1585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3120)</td>
<td>(0.3135)</td>
<td>(0.3075)</td>
<td>(0.3051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President party</td>
<td>-6.4573*</td>
<td>0.4081</td>
<td>-0.0740</td>
<td>0.0609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3426)</td>
<td>(0.3680)</td>
<td>(0.3216)</td>
<td>(0.3313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preponderance gap</td>
<td>-0.0004***</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.6232</td>
<td>-0.9090**</td>
<td>1.7298***</td>
<td>-5.8207***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0249)</td>
<td>(0.4592)</td>
<td>(0.4843)</td>
<td>(2.1123)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p <= 0.1      **p <= 0.05      ***p <= 0.01

Table 1: Economic probit regression of U.S. use-of-force instances from 1975 to 2004

The binomial probit regression of U.S. use-of-force instances from 1975 to 2004 yields the following results:

- The findings in all four models confirm Podliski’s theory linking the preponderance of U.S. economic power, compared to the power of the adversary, and the U.S. president’s decision to act unilaterally and multilaterally. Specifically, this relationship is negatively significant, which proves that the U.S. tends to conduct unilateral interventions whenever there is a bigger gap between its GDP and the adversary’s GDP. However, the U.S. refrains from acting alone when realizing an emerging threat from the adversary, due to the latter’s stabilized economy.
• Non-liberal and liberal ratio: The distribution in economic power between non-liberal UNSC permanent members and liberal members has a significantly statistical relationship with the U.S. use of force in a positive direction. This means that when the U.S. perceives the overwhelming economic status of Russia and China, over that of France and Britain, multilateral force is employed. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis which predicts an opposite direction.

• U.S. and Soviet-Russia ratio: The causal relationship between the distribution of power between U.S. and Soviet-Russia and U.S. use of force decision is statistically significant in a positive direction. Every one-unit increase in the US-Russia ratio yields 17.4 percent increase in the probability of multilateral force. This relationship confirms my hypothesis.

• U.S. and China ratio: The causal relationship between the distribution of power between U.S. and China and U.S. use of force is statistically significant in a negative direction. Every one-unit increase in the US-Russia ratio decreases 48.1 percent in the probability of multilateral force. This result shows an opposite direction with the relationship predicted in my hypothesis.

• US and liberal ratio: The ratio between U.S. and liberal members is shown to be positively correlated with the U.S. use of force. That is, when the U.S. economy performs much better than either France or Britain, the former employs multilateral force. Although the relationship is significant, it is in the opposite direction with my hypothesis.
b. Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ind. Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Liberal / Liberal</td>
<td>-0.2967***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0878)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. / Soviet-Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2857***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0845)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. / China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0175*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. / Liberal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided government</td>
<td>0.2256</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
<td>-0.1879</td>
<td>-0.0405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3608)</td>
<td>(0.3531)</td>
<td>(0.3419)</td>
<td>(0.3713)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President party</td>
<td>0.2261</td>
<td>0.1279</td>
<td>-0.0887</td>
<td>-0.2757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4023)</td>
<td>(0.3935)</td>
<td>(0.3692)</td>
<td>(0.3758)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preponderance gap</td>
<td>-0.0002**</td>
<td>-0.0002**</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.8615</td>
<td>-0.7116*</td>
<td>0.4116</td>
<td>0.4555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3403)</td>
<td>(0.3925)</td>
<td>(0.2822)</td>
<td>(0.9004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p <= 0.1  **p <= 0.05  ***p <= 0.01

Table 2: Military probit regression of U.S. use-of-force instances from 1975 to 2004

The binomial probit regression of U.S. use-of-force instances from 1975 to 2004 yields the following results:

- In terms of military spending, the preponderance of U.S. power appears not to have a significant effect on its use-of-force calculation. Only in the first two models the negative correlation is statistically significant at the medium level. Nevertheless, it still proves Podliski’s argument about the relationship between military preponderance and use-of-force decisions.

- Non-liberal and liberal ratio: The difference in military power between non-liberal UNSC permanent members and liberal members has a statistically significant relationship with the U.S. use of force. Different from the economic model, the relationship in the military model shows a negative direction, which is consistent with
my hypothesis. For every unit increase in the ratio between non-liberal and liberal, the predicted probability of U.S. multilateral approach decreases by 29.7 percent. This means that the U.S. foreign policy leaders tend to consider unilateral force when being aware of the military dominance of the non-liberal camp over the liberal camp in the Security Council.

- **U.S. and Soviet-Russia ratio**: The correlation between the distribution of power between U.S. and Soviet-Russia and U.S. use-of-force decisions is statistically significant in a positive direction. Every one-unit increase in the U.S.-Russia ratio yields 28.6 percent increase in the probability of multilateral force. This relationship confirms my hypothesis.

- **U.S. and China ratio**: The correlation between the U.S.-China ratio and U.S. use-of-force decisions in the military model is less significant than that in the economic model. Despite weaker relationship, it shows an opposite direction from my hypothesis.

- **U.S. and liberal ratio**: In terms of military investment, it appears that there is no significant correlation between the U.S.-liberal ratio and U.S. use-of-force decisions, although the negativity in the relationship implies the confirmation of my hypothesis.

So far, it is empirically demonstrated that my theory about the relative changes in power among the SC permanent members is partially verified. At the same time, there are some findings which do not support my theory’s hypotheses:

- Why do ratios of economic power and military spending among non-liberals and liberals produce opposite outcomes?
• Why does the relative power difference between the U.S. and China point to an opposite direction with that between U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia, although both states are non-liberal?

The next section will provide hypothetical explanations of the different impacts that economic development and military spending have on U.S. unilateral and multilateral use of force. The second unexpected finding will be the subject of future research.
Section 5: Discussion

Section 4 shows that my hypotheses about the causal connection between relative differences in power within the UN Security Council and the U.S. use-of-force decisions are statistically verified. However, there is an inconsistency that deserves a legitimate explanation. This inconsistency happens between the two dimensions of power: economic development and military investment. That is, in terms of economic development, the greater the gap between non-liberal states and liberal states becomes, the more likely a multilateral approach is preferred by the United States. In contrast, the greater the gap in military investment between non-liberal states and liberal states, the less likely it is that the United States engages in multilateral operations. I argue that this inconsistency is attributed to the fact that superpowers might suffer from domestic economic fluctuations, but they rarely give up military spending for the fear of being dominated by other rivals.

Economic power and military power have been conventionally argued to be highly interdependent. Economic power refers to a nation’s capability to take advantage of its prosperous economy to compel other states, as well as non-state actors, to pursue policies favorable to that nation. In contrast, military power is depicted as “coercive power” through the manifestation of both strong standing army and advanced weaponry. Since the building of army and development of advanced technological weaponry are the means to a strong military, states with higher economic capability can easily transform their economic resources into military power. Conversely, some states strived to expand their military capability in hopes of boosting their economic development to a more desirable standard. The most typical example in the

contemporary world is North Korea. North Korea’s leaders fervently maintain that their country’s strategy of total investment in military capability, especially nuclear capability, could in the long term lead to “economic recovery and prosperity.”\textsuperscript{56} For this purpose, North Korea persists in the continuance of its military revisionist goal at the expense of a deteriorating economy.

Another example is the Soviet Union. Further back in its history, the Soviet Union and later Russia adopted a similar strategy during and after the Cold War to pave the way for the successful pursuit of economic goals. Specifically, in the 1970s, the Soviet government recruited approximately 10 million Russians solely for its military sector, which contributes a quarter of the USSR gross national product.\textsuperscript{57} Despite the massive expenditure on military power, the Soviet economy suffered from such an unprecedented severe decline by the 1980s that it could no longer back up its military. According to the CIA database, in terms of economic development, the GDP of the Soviet Union during this period was approximately half of the U.S.\textsuperscript{58} However, the Soviet/Russian government, with the status of a superpower, did not accept the prospect of being surpassed by its rivals, particularly the United States and NATO, in military capability because its interests, such as oil resources and national security, would be at stake. The fear of a loss of national interests accounts for the fact that the Soviet/Russian government has continuously invested in nuclear weapons as balance-of-power strategy against the growing capability of the U.S. military.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57} Graham, James. "Military Power vs Economic Power in History."
According to my research, the economic gap between non-liberal states and liberal states is negatively related to the likelihood of unilateral use of force by the United States. This relationship is not what my hypothesis expected, but it is justifiable given my previous explanation. That is, the widening discrepancy between the non-liberal economic development and liberal economic development can be perceived by the United States an obstacle to its unilateral behavior. This perception supports the fact that the United States would rather reinforce its NATO alliance to counter the rising power of Russia. If the Russian economy prospers, this superpower is more likely to revive its ambition to exert influence on smaller states through military means. In short, economic power will support its military capability. On the other hand, the military non-liberal and liberal hypothesis, which is confirmed by the empirical findings, states that a greater military gap between non-liberal states and liberal states leads to the U.S. unilateral use of force. Military spending, though varying from year to year, could hardly be taken lightly by superpowers, because military influence overseas could potentially lead to economic recovery, as elaborated previously. Therefore, when U.S. leaders perceive decreases in liberal UNSC power’s military expenditure by liberal UNSC powers and increases in non-liberal counterparts’ military expenditure, they act unilaterally to avoid complicated process of bringing the agenda to the Council. Under this circumstance, the United States could not expect committed collaboration from the liberal members in international affairs, as these states would rather rely on the U.S. contribution of forces. Meanwhile, the non-liberal counterparts would rather build up their military capability than expect military assistance from the United States. For this reason, the United States, foreseeing the deadlock in Security Council, would act alone first, before anticipating collaboration.
Section 6: Conclusion

The relationship between the power changes among UNSC permanent members and the U.S. use of force has been partially confirmed by the empirical findings. There are several implications that can be derived from the following results:

1. The U.S. inclination for multilateral framework in recent decades

Statistical evidence in this research suggests that the rivalry between Russia and the United States still constitutes the most influential factor in the U.S. calculation of foreign policy. Different from Skidmore who argues that the existence of an emerging rival on the world stage triggers more collaborative alliance involving the United States to deter that power, my theory makes a claim in the other direction. In the case of Russia, the weaker its power appears to be, based on economic and military indicators in relation to those of the U.S, the more likely it is that the U.S. acts multilaterally. The implication of this theory is that the U.S. in the last three decades has considered multilateral use of force extensively, and only opts for unilateral decisions when it perceives unsurmountable challenges to the multilateralism framework.

2. The different effects of non-liberal and liberal economic and military powers on the U.S. use of force

One of the findings points out that the rising military power of non-liberal UNSC members causes the U.S. to act unilaterally, whereas the increasing economic might of these members leads to the U.S. multilateral inclination. One of the justifications for this contrast, as elaborated in the last section, is that while powerful states’ economic situations fluctuate from year to year, their governments, especially military leaders, never accept the inferiority of their
military capability in relation to other states. For this reason, the effects of economic power and military power do not converge.

3. The non-significance of liberal powers in the U.S. calculation

The results show that among all the factors, the difference between the U.S. power and other liberal members’ powers does not have significant effects on U.S. use-of-force decisions. It is inferred that the decision to employ force by the U.S. has not been influenced by economic and military changes within liberal powers. One possible reason for this non-significance is that many American decision makers consider Western European powers as allies and believe that they will exert little negative influence on the U.S. military intervention overseas. However, evidence that supports this claim needs to be confirmed in future research.

However, the limitation of this research is its inability to measure unilateral and multilateral use of force in a more comprehensive scale than just a 0-and-1 classification. An extensive inclusion of varied types of unilateralism and multilateralism would explain in further details the role of international security institutions to the U.S. foreign policy choice. Given the current availability of historical data and the complexity of individual instances, this research could not extend its analysis to meet this expectation. Nevertheless, empirical findings from this research are still of practical importance for U.S. political decision makers in the event of international crises. Understanding the influential roles of international security institutions and characteristics of their members leads to prudent approaches in resolving overseas conflicts with the support of both public and international communities.
Works Cited


http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2642&context=facpubs


http://www.global-politics.co.uk/Archive/Security%20Council%20Impasse.htm

(accessed March 8, 2014).


Grimmett, Richard F. *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2008.*


