A. Introduction

The twenty-first century has brought about many changes, technological, economic, political, and social around the world. One of these many changes has to do with democratization in Middle Eastern and North African countries after the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring consisted of revolutions within Middle Eastern and North African countries that lasted approximately a year, from the end of 2010 to the end of 2011. In several cases, these revolutions led to some move towards democratization. The degree of democratization after the Arab Spring will be the overarching theme throughout this paper and the research in this thesis will look specifically at the cases of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The specific question that will be researched in this thesis is, was the extent to which democratic changes in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco after the Arab Spring dependent on the degree of violence in the break from French colonial rule, the degree of violence during the Arab spring in each country, and the extent of social media coverage of the Arab Spring ("Arab Spring | Pro-democracy Protests;" Abouzeid; Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer).

It would first be beneficial to look at why researching democratization is important at all, especially when in reference to the countries of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. One reason that looking at democratization is important is that the Arab Spring marked a moment in history when democracy was occurring in the Middle East and North Africa. It is logical then to focus
on democratization because it was in a way a trademark of the revolutions. The democratization of these countries is what the revolutions hoped to provide ("Arab Spring | Pro-democracy Protests"). It is beneficial to see whether riots and protests have actually furthered this goal. If the approach is not working, then it is possible that other methods should be considered because they might be more helpful in reaching the goal of democratization ("Democracy Index 2010 Democracy in Retreat;" "Democracy Index 2012 Democracy at a Standstill;" "Arab Spring | Pro-democracy Protests").

The first step following the decision to research the democratization of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria after the Arab Spring was to find a way to measure democracy. There are many options. One could evaluate policy after the Arab Spring to see if it was more liberal, e.g. allowing women to vote. One also could look specifically at the structure of government, i.e., did the country go from an authoritarian to a parliamentary system of government. In this thesis the Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit will be used.

The Democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Countries are placed within one of four types of regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes ("Democracy Index 2012 Democracy at a Standstill").

This index will allow a simple way to measure democracy over time in these countries. It will also give the information in quantifiable data with numbers corresponding to how democratic the country was right before and after the Arab Spring. The country that changed the most between 2010 and 2012 will be the one which democratized the most due to the Arab Spring ("Democracy Index 2012 Democracy at a Standstill").
The selection of these three countries, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria is based on the following considerations. First, in order to draw meaningful conclusions it is necessary to look at countries that share many commonalities. It would be difficult to look at how any one factor affected the degree of democratization in Egypt and Morocco because they differ so much politically, culturally, historically, and geographically. Any information about democratization found during research on those two countries would reflect the many differences between them, not merely the factor one wished to consider. The observations made would be so greatly affected by such differences that no causal relationship could be found between the factor of interest and the degree of democratization. Thus, it is imperative to use countries in this study that have a similar culture, history, religion, and geography. To a considerable extent the differences in these variables are held constant for Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. All three are Islamic North African countries which were at one point colonized by the French. Since many geographical, historical, religious, and cultural variables are similar in these countries, then one can better determine what the causes of the differences in the degree of democratization after the Arab Spring were. Differences between the three countries could then be evaluated as plausible causes.

Even though these three countries, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are relatively similar in location and in historical background, they have progressed differently in their development of democracy. It will be interesting to see what factors come into play in accounting for the fact that these countries, with the same revolutionary movement, the Arab Spring, have different outcomes. Put differently, why would countries that share such common ground advance differently after experiencing the same movement?
Another important and interesting reason to do research in the area of democratization in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia is that there seems to be very little academic literature comparing why the outcomes of the Arab Spring have varied across countries, especially when talking about the previously mentioned North African countries.

B. The Hypotheses

1. Hypothesis I

The hypotheses that will be researched all reflect different ways in which to measure the degree of pressure put on the individual countries’ governments by internal or external forces. The first hypothesis is that the greater the degree of violence during decolonization, the less the degree of democratization. If there was more violence, then people living in a country would have been less likely to put pressure on the government to democratize. The reasoning behind this will be explained later, but the idea is important enough to bring up early in the discussion of hypotheses. The degree of violence will be measured on an ordinal scale, from greatest to least. The question used to make the decision about where each country will lie on the scale will be, “what form was used to break away from France?” “Form” will be defined as the type of conflict used to secede from France. E.g., Algeria experienced a war, while Morocco did not. Clearly one was more violent than the other; therefore distinctions will be made and the countries will be placed on the ordinal scale with a rating from greatest to least violent.
2. Hypothesis II

The second hypothesis is that the greater the use of social media for purposes related to the Arab Spring, the greater the degree of democratization that will occur within the country. The justification for this hypothesis is that social media will put pressure on the government to democratize. Measurement of “the degree of social media coverage” will be based exclusively on twitter. This is due to the feasibility of measuring the number of times the Arab Spring was mentioned on the website and due to the availability of twitter information to the general public. It is more difficult to come up with any empirical data from Facebook because information is often only available exclusively to people added as friends to one’s profile. This limits the amount of information accessible to an outside researcher.

Empirical data will be collected by looking at how often each country was mentioned on twitter. Due to excessive prices for twitter analysis and complications with finding the number of tweets with certain hashtags, a formula will be used inside Google search. In an article in the *The International Journal of Press/Politics* it was stated that “Previous studies found that Google searches are strongly correlated with real-world data” (Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Shaefer). Since Google searches seem to be a reliable source of information, this was the process that seemed best for this type of project. The hashtag “#arabspring” will be searched in concordance with #Morocco, then #Algeria, and lastly #Tunisia. The data will then be used to see which countries were most tweeted about and draw general conclusions about their prominence on social media during the Arab Spring. Qualitative data will also be collected by considering what scholars have said about how these countries used social media. Were the people in these countries even allowed by their governments to access twitter? Relevant questions like this will be answered within the thesis to give stronger support for the hypothesis that the social media used for the
Arab Spring did in fact put pressure on each particular country. The countries will then be placed on an ordinal scale of greatest to least social media use (Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Shaefer).

3. Hypothesis III

The final hypothesis states that the greater the degree of violence associated with the Arab Spring in each individual country, the greater the degree of democratization. This is due to the internal pressure placed on the government to democratize. This hypothesis will also be measured on an ordinal scale. The information on each respective country regarding the death tolls as well as the ways in which individuals protested during the Arab Spring e.g., demonstrations, riots, self-immolation, etc. will be gathered. Countries with more extreme approaches and more deaths will be categorized as more violent. This process will allow for use of an ordinal scale, measuring greatest to least violence during the Arab Spring.

C. Data

1. Data for Hypothesis I

The first hypothesis states that “the greater the degree of violence during decolonization, the less the degree of democratization.” The following section will show the data supporting the ordinal scale which was created to measure “degree of violence.” The following sections are not, however, complete histories of the conflicts during decolonization. The point here is to show relevant information pertaining to the violence in each country. The outcome of all of these conflicts is already known; decolonization occurred and independence was gained. One must keep in mind that the focus is on the violence pertaining to decolonization, not the strategies and politics involved in gaining independence.
i. Algeria, the Most Violent

Algeria is rated the most violent primarily because of its war with France, but the following will show qualitative data behind this decision. Algeria was the only one of the three countries to experience an outright war. The French and Algerian War was deadly and horrifying. Michael Brett in his article The Algerian War of Independence in Retrospect characterized the war by “savagery” (Brett). The war lasted from 1954 to 1962. In this time the Algerians would win their independence. Ultimately, they were able to vote for independence, but this was only after the war. In this fight the Algerians used what was categorized as “irregular warfare” (Duyvesteyn and Angstrom). The book Rethinking the Nature of War offers a definition of what exactly this entails. It states,

...the state (or incumbent) fields regular troops and is able to control urban and accessible terrain, while seeking to militarily engage its opponents in peripheral and rugged terrain; challengers (rebels or insurgents) ‘hover just below the military horizon’, hiding and relying on harassment and surprise, ‘stealth and raid’. Such wars often turn into wars of attrition, with insurgents seeking to win by not losing while imposing unbearable costs on their opponent (Duyvesteyn and Angstrom).

Resorting to this type warfare is understandable when considering that the colonized rebelling Algerians were fighting against the militarily equipped colonizing country of France. (Duyvesteyn and Angstrom; Brett; Alexander and Keiger; Henissart).

One violent means with which this war was fought was torture. The French integrated this into their conduct of war. Lou DiMarco states in his article “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War”, “High-stress interrogation techniques and torture were an integral part of this system…” The article “France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy” also talks about the use of torture. This article states “that torture was practised systematically” (DiMarco; Alexander and Keiger).
Other than the horrifying data showing the use of torture, there is another example of the violence during the French and Algerian War, pertaining to the other side. This violence was not inflicted on high officials in the French military or even on foot soldiers, but on civilians. The book *Rethinking the Nature of War* gives this information about such violence:

> Violence against civilians was plentiful and exercised by both sides. The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) used violence against French settlers and local competitors, but mainly against ordinary Algerian peasants who for one reason or another refused to collaborate. For instance, the massacre of 123 people (71 of whom were Europeans) on 20 August 1955 in the coastal city of Philippeville… (Duyvesteyn and Angstrom).

While this was just one specific instance of violence used in the French Algerian War, there were others. Some of the violence included “random bombing” and terrorism (Duyvesteyn and Angstrom). The French even attempted to displace whole groups of people. Simply put, the French and Algerian War was marked by violent acts that were absent in the other two cases and therefore deserves to be given the ranking “Most Violent” on the ordinal scale with Tunisia and Morocco, which will now be ranked in a similar fashion (Duyvesteyn and Angstrom).

### ii. Morocco, Intermediate Level of Violence

Morocco is considered “intermediately violent” because it in fact did not experience a war. Also, the events associated with Morocco’s decolonization are categorized as much less violent by scholars than those of the French and Algerian War, but to some extent more violent than those of Tunisia’s independence process, which is considered the least violent. The story of Morocco’s independence process is much less horrifying than Algeria’s. Morocco’s main focus was not on the strategy or art of war, but on the art of organization (Willis). Michael Willis explains this in the following quote:
From this period (“1920’s and 1930’s”), all three states saw the emergence of groups and associations that sought a more organised and modernist response to colonialism. In contrast to the earlier largely rural-based armed revolts these new groupings formed in the towns and cities of the Maghreb and used structured organisations, meetings, and the written word to spread their ideas and recruit supporters (Willis).

While a huge emphasis was put on organization, one cannot say that there was no violence in Morocco or Tunisia at all. In fact there was some violence, especially in the form of terrorism and assassination. Much internal strife occurred in Morocco between Moroccan and French leaders.

…there were strikes all over Morocco in the winter of 1951-2 and then demonstrations in which several hundred Moroccans and some Europeans were killed. The colons responded by setting up a terrorist group of their own, Presence Francaise, which attacked Moroccans. Within the Protectorate administration, the Resident-General and his officials plotted with El Kittani and El Glaoui to overthrow the sultan. In August 1953 Sidi Mohammed [the sultan] was arrested at gunpoint, deposed and flown to exile in Madagascar (Pennell).

Despite the violence in Morocco, much of its story is that elites in Rabat and Fez were able to work together to create a nationalist movement that would later become “a political party, the Istiqlal (Independence) party…” (Willis). This organizational ability allowed Morocco to gain independence without the outright war that occurred in Algeria. At the end of colonial rule French and Moroccan officials had a conference and a civil discussion. This allowed the sultan to come out of exile. “Having settled into the Chateau de la Celle de St Cloud, near Nice, Mohammed V [the sultan] made a new agreement with the French: Morocco would be an independent constitutional monarchy and he would return to rule it” (Willis; Pennell).

iii. Tunisia, The Least Violent.

Tunisia will be considered “the least violent.” Tunisia, like Morocco, used organization, especially in regards to the elites, to help gain independence from France. In many respects Tunisia and Morocco seem to be almost identical when it comes to violence in gaining
independence. In all honesty, distinguishing between the two is extremely difficult. This has much to do with the fact that there is not much information out there from scholars regarding Tunisia’s break from France. Scholars say it happened, but few really go into detail about how it happened. Tunisia did have some terrorism. La Main Rouge, a French affiliated terrorist group, was responsible for murdering “the Tunisian trade union leader Ferhat Hached, who had been gunned down in 1952” (Riegler). Yet, a French affiliated terrorist group, La Main Noire, also existed in Morocco. Thus, Tunisia is considered the least violent because there does not seem to be evidence to prove that much violence occurred. Tunisia seems to have experienced a similar civil ending to French colonialism as Morocco. These countries seem to be very close on this ordinal scale, and that should be kept in mind, but from the information available about these two countries, this seems to be the best decision (State Department and CIA; Riegler; Willis).

2. Data for Hypothesis II

Hypothesis II states that the greater the use of social media for purposes related to the Arab Spring, the greater the degree of democratization that will occur within the country. This hypothesis will be analyzed using two different numbers: one will be the number of times that certain hashtags are found on twitter, and the other is the rating of “freedom of the press” that freedomhouse.org gives for each individual country. It would be preferable to look at the numbers that freedomhouse.org provides for “freedom of the net” since this paper is specifically concerned with social media, but data for the year 2011, is not available. When rating “freedom of the press,” freedomhouse.org provides they include information about internet use and censorship. Since internet use has been taken into account in this category, and data is available for 2011, the category “freedom of the press” seems to offer valid information on internet freedom in each individual country.
When it comes to counting hashtags, there has been a consistent problem; there are hardly any programs on the internet that one can use to receive counts of past tweets with hashtags. Even twitter does not allow this. Those websites that analyze past tweets and provide counts charge hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of dollars. If one were to make this a bigger project, paying for this information would be beneficial, but for now one must make do. The only way to receive counts that go back more than 30 or 60 days is through Google. The way this is done through Google is that this formula, “#myhashtag site:twitter.com,” is placed into the search engine. This does not give a count of all tweets, but the numbers should provide enough data to allow some sort of generalized understanding of the amount of traffic these hashtags received over time (Mueller).

i. Tunisia, Most Social Media Use

Tunisia is ranked “most” in reference to the use of social media. When the formula “#arabspring #tunisia site:twitter.com” was placed into the Google search engine, the number that was counted was substantially higher than that for Morocco and Algeria. Google had 2,860 results. The high number in comparison to that for Morocco and Algeria makes sense because Tunisia is where the Arab Spring started. Thus, its mentions on Twitter would most likely be the most numerous. In addition social media is said to have been an extremely important part of Tunisia’s Arab Spring. The interesting part of Tunisia’s social media use comes from its rating on the “freedom of press” scale on freedomhouse.org. In 2011 Tunisia ranked 85 (100 being the worst.) If Tunisia has the most tweets, yet is the worst in terms of freedom, how can this be? There are at least two possible explanations for this. One explanation has to do with the percentage of people who could actually access the internet. One might think that if more people can access it, then more people will use it for Arab Spring activities ("Freedom of the Press:
Tunisia, 2011;" "Freedom of the Press: Tunisia, 2012;" "Google;" Huang; "Jasmine Revolution | Tunisian History.") Freedomhouse.org states:

Approximately 39 percent of the population had internet access in 2011. More people than ever used social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter in Tunisia during the year, and these platforms, along with mobile phone networks, helped spread information about the January uprising ("Freedom of the Press: Tunisia, 2012").

The 39 percent for Tunisia mentioned above is compared to 14 percent in Algeria and 51 percent in Morocco, both of which have lower traffic in terms of tweets than Tunisia. This seems to indicate that the number of people able to access the internet has little to no correlation to "freedom of press" or whether those who have access to internet actually use it ("Freedom of the Press: Algeria, 2012;" "Freedom of the Press: Tunisia, 2011;" "Freedom of the Press: Tunisia, 2012;" "Freedom of the Press: Morocco, 2012;" "Google;" Huang).

Another possible reason that Tunisia’s 85 rating on the “freedom of press” scale made no difference in how much people were posting on twitter about the Arab Spring is that limits on press freedom may have made protestors more willing to fight for what they did not have. One report states,

Just over a quarter of those polled (28 per cent in Egypt and 29 per cent in Tunisia) said the blocking of Facebook disrupted their efforts to organise and communicate. But more than half (56 per cent in Egypt and 59 per cent in Tunisia) said it had a positive effect, motivating them to press on and mobilising newcomers. The authorities’ efforts to block out information, the report said, ended up “spurring people to be more active, decisive and to find ways to be more creative about communicating and organizing” (Huang).

If this is indeed the case for Facebook, it seems reasonable to transfer this idea to Twitter as well. Thus, the very poor rating for “freedom of press” and the large amount of tweets from Tunisia are not contradictory to each other (Huang).
ii. Algeria, Intermediate Use of Social Media

Algeria has been found to lie somewhere between Tunisia and Morocco, although probably closer to Morocco, in terms of use of social media. When using the formula “#arabspring #algeria site:twitter.com” with Google, the number of results was 602. Its number from freedomhouse.org on its rating of “freedom of the press” was not in the middle however. Its number for “freedom of press,” in 2011, was 62; Morocco’s was 68. As seen above, with the case from Tunisia, these numbers do not necessarily have much in common. What is more important is what freedomhouse.org says happened to social media during the Arab Spring in Algeria ("Freedom of the Press: Algeria, 2011;" "Freedom of the Press: Morocco, 2011;" "Google"). Freedomhouse.org states,

In 2009, Algeria adopted a cybercrime law that gives the authorities the right to block websites deemed “contrary to the public order or decency.” The government monitors e-mail and online chat rooms, and internet service providers are legally liable for the content they host. Bloggers, like traditional journalists, are subject to defamation suits, and several have been fined for posting “defamatory material.” However, there were no reported cases of legal harassment against bloggers or online journalists in 2011. During the February protests, activists accused the government of shutting down internet service providers and attempting to block the social-networking site Facebook. The authorities denied these claims ("Freedom of the Press: Algeria, 2012").

The fact that there are regulations on the internet and that the government has possibly censored social media, may have had the same impact that this possibly had in Tunisia, that more regulation just made protestors that more willing to fight for what is being taken away from them ("Freedom of the Press: Algeria, 2011;" "Freedom of the Press: Morocco, 2011;" "Freedom of the Press: Algeria, 2012" "Google")

iii. Morocco, Least Use of Social Media

Last, is the case of Morocco’s use of social media, Morocco used social media least. The number that Google gave in its results for “#arabspring #morocco site: twitter.com” is 428. This
number is much smaller than of Tunisia’s, but fairly similar to Algeria’s. Morocco’s number for “freedom of press” is 68, which is in the middle of Tunisia and Algeria, but we saw earlier that this number does not necessarily mean anything in terms of social media usage. It seems that if one is to realize that “freedom of press” includes all press outlets and not just internet, and one looks at the data on the internet from freedomhouse.org, there is a fairly good argument for Morocco using social media the least ("Freedom of the Press: Morocco, 2011;" "Google").

Here is yet another quote from freedomhouse, “There is no official legislation regulating internet content or access, but the government sporadically blocks certain websites and online tools, including Google Earth and the LiveJournal blogging platform…” ("Freedom of the Press: Morocco, 2011"). One can see here that “no official legislation” ("Freedom of the Press: Morocco, 2011") exists for the internet in Morocco, unlike in Algeria. When one, once again, applies this idea from Tunisia’s example that more government press censorship means more social media use, one can see that the data collected from Morocco supports the findings from the other two countries. Morocco used social media less than Tunisia and Algeria because the government repression did not energize the people to use what the government, whom they were fighting against, did not want them to use ("Freedom of the Press: Morocco, 2011;" "Google").
3. Data for Hypothesis III

Hypothesis III states that the greater the degree of violence associated with the Arab Spring in each individual country, the greater the degree of democratization. This section will focus on that data which helps place Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia on the ordinal scale of most to least violent. Below is a table that combines all the information from the graphs that will be used later in this section. This table’s purpose is to allow an easier and simpler way to read some extremely complicated graphs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of Event</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Conflict Events</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots and Protests</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported Fatalities</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 (Moody)
i. Morocco, the Least Violent

The easiest of the three countries to locate on the ordinal scale has been Morocco. It has been declared the “least violent” of the three countries. Morocco’s rating was based on several kinds of data, some having to do with the types of riots and protests, and others relating to what information from scholars and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) have provided in regards to the Arab Spring in that country. First, a graph from the ACLED project will be discussed to help put the Arab Spring in Morocco into context (Moody).

![Figure 1](image)

Figure 1 shows the “Number of Conflict Events” along the y axis and the “Number of Fatalities” along the x axis (Moody). The left hand graph is from 2011, while the other side is from 2013. 2011 is the side that this research is most concerned about, as it was the time of all but one month of the Arab Spring. It is seen clearly that Morocco’s number of fatalities and conflict events during this time was lower than that of Tunisia and Algeria (Moody).
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of only “Riots and Protests Conflict Events”

Around the beginning of 2011 all three countries peak, but Morocco’s peak is clearly lower than those of Algeria and Tunisia. One thing that should be noticed is that Algeria tends to fall below Morocco for most of 2011 thereafter. That said, it should also be taken into account that the fact that Morocco experienced a more steady number of protests and riots does not mean that it was more violent than Algeria. Figure 1 should also be taken into consideration. Overall, conflict events and fatalities were higher in 2011 in Algeria than in Morocco (Moody).

The empirical data on Morocco is important and helpful, but it does not show the type of protests and riots that occurred in Morocco. Other research is needed to show this and prove that Morocco is in fact the least violent of the three countries. Camille Tawil, from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, states “Morocco avoided much of the Arab Spring violence because the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) had been a recognized opposition party in the years before its rise to power in the November 2011 elections” (Tawil). The importance of this quote is not how “Morocco avoided much of the Arab Spring violence”
(Tawil), but that Morocco did. Tawil also calls the transition process “smooth” (Tawil). This seems to be the consensus among most scholars. James N. Sater also backs up this claim. He explains that Moroccans have protested, yet violence has not been a main part of these protests. He also talks about the lack of violence used by the government (Sater; Tawil).

The Moroccan monarchy did not react to counter the February 20 movement with even a fraction of the violence that its neighbors used. Even the most violent crackdown on March 13 in Casablanca did not result in any deaths, and so far only one protester has died from police brutality in June (Sater).

The media have also helped solidify the rating of “least violent” for Morocco. PBS’s News Hour released an article with the headline “Morocco Avoids Arab Spring Violence, but Progress Is Mixed on Reforms” (Suarez). Michael J. Totten released an article on thetower.org website stating that Morocco has been “calmer” than many other Arab Spring countries (Totten). Evidence from scholars and the media suggests that Morocco is in fact the least violent of the three countries (Suarez; Totten; Sater).

i. Algeria, Intermediately Violent

Algeria has been categorized as “intermediately violent.” Again, this rating was given for several reasons. Some of these reasons have to do with the types of riots and protests, and others relate to what information from scholars and the ACLED Project has been provided in regards to the Arab Spring in Algeria. Once more this thesis will turn to the graphs from the ACLED Project.

In Figure 1 one can see that Algeria falls somewhere in between Morocco and Tunisia in terms of the “Number of Conflict Events” along the y axis (Moody). However Tunisia and Algeria seem to be very close in terms of “Number of Fatalities” along the x axis (Moody). This will be looked at further in a moment, but it is important to note Algeria’s position in Figure 2 as
well. While all three countries peak during 2011, Algeria again falls in the middle for the breakdown of only “Riots and Protests Conflict Events” (Moody). This data supports the claim that Algeria lies in the Middle of Morocco and Tunisia in terms of “conflict events” during the Arab Spring (Moody).

In terms of fatalities in Algeria, one can see that in Figure 1 it is hard to determine whether or not Algeria has more or equal amounts compared to Tunisia. Unfortunately, there seem to be no concrete reliable sources on the exact number of fatalities in Algeria due to the Arab Spring. In another graph, Figure 3, from ACLED one can see that overtime, starting in 2010, Algerian fatalities are rather stable (Moody).

The rising and falling adhere to a fairly consistent pattern, and at no point does Algeria develop a marked peak at the beginning of 2011 like Tunisia and the decline of fatalities in Morocco in the
beginning of 2011, both of which are consistent with their ratings on the ordinal scale. This seems to show that even if the fatalities in Algeria were slightly more than those in Tunisia, those fatalities are rather common and not necessarily due to the Arab Spring event itself (Moody).

Again, while the numbers are important, it is also important to look at what the actual Arab Spring events were like. Were they actually violent? Scholars and the media seem to indicate that they were in fact more violent in Algeria than in Morocco and very similar to Tunisia. Algeria had riots and protests, but like Tunisia it also had self-immolations. Al Jazeera tells the story of Mohsen Bouterfif who died by self-immolation. The story also goes on to say that “It was the one of four attempted public suicides in Algeria this past week in apparent copycat replays of last month's self-immolation of a 26-year-old man in Tunisia…” (Algerian Dies from Self-immolation”). This is one of the extreme ways in which Algeria is different in terms of violence during the Arab Spring than Morocco. Algeria may have experienced more violence due to police and security force actions. Algeria’s police force is large and not benevolent. Fox News States that “Early protests calling for reform fizzled and were quickly repressed by highly vigilant security forces” (Associated Press). Jean-Pierre Séréni writes that “the Algerian police, 140,000 strong, is well equipped for maintaining order, with water canons and light tanks, the anti-riot police are well trained and very quickly repressed the riots without too much bloodshed” (Barkaoui, Sereni, Hamouchene, and Benassi). These quotes are cited not to show that the police caused many of the fatalities, but because the police were so strong and stopped demonstrations using “water canons and light tanks” (Barkaoui, Seren, Hamouchene, and Benassi), it is likely that police violence was a factor. Hamza Hamouchene gives another example of violence in Algeria (Barkaoui, Sereni, Hamouchene, and Benassi; Associated Press; “Algerian Dies from Self-immolation”);
The reactions converged into violent riots between January 4 - 10 in several cities. These of course were contained by a bloated police force. ‘Algiers the White’ became ‘Algiers the Blue’ in reference to the uniform of 140,000 policemen who successfully suppressed all the marches and demonstrations organised by political parties and by figures of the civil society in the following weeks (Barkaoui, Sereni, Hamouchene, and Benassi).

Lastly, a quote from Miloud Barkaoui about police brutality:

…violent police crackdown on protestors is quite uncommon. However, when they fear rallies might serve as potential political platforms for revolt, the authorities do resort to heavy-handed repressive measures short of using firearms (Barkaoui, Sereni, Hamouchene, and Benassi).

This quote is helpful to show that police violence was a part of Algeria’s Arab Spring. Thus, the empirical data, along with the evaluations of scholars and news outlets, seems to point to Algeria being in the middle between Morocco and Tunisia on the ordinal scale for “degree of violence during the Arab Spring” (Barkaoui, Sereni, Hamouchene, and Benassi; Associated Press; “Algerian Dies from Self-immolation”).

ii. Tunisia, the Most Violent

Lastly, Tunisia has been rated the “most violent” on the ordinal scale. This rating was given using the same types of data as used for Morocco and Algeria. First, the ACLED Project will be cited once again. Looking at Figure 1, one can see that Tunisia, in terms of the “Number of Conflict Events” along the y axis, has the greatest amount (Moody). Again, one should notice that Tunisia and Algeria seem to be very close in terms of “Number of Fatalities” along the x axis (Moody). This is again when it is important to look at Figure 3. In Figure 3 one can see that Tunisia has a somewhat higher peak of fatalities in 2011, whereas Algeria’s rises and falls are rather stable. This could indicate more fatalities as a result of the Arab Spring than normally occur within the country itself, as Algeria’s graph could indicate (Moody).

Again, this thesis will focus on ways in which the protests in Tunisia were violent. As in Algeria, there were self-immolations. While there were at least 107 self-immolations in Tunisia,
the most famous is that of Mohammed Bouazizi. This self-immolation “started a revolution” (Abouzeid), the Arab Spring. This happened on December 17, 2010. Also, as in Algeria, police brutality was a problem (Bakri; Abouzeid). The use of actual live fire occurred and the following quote gives but a glimpse of what the protestors had to face:

The Tunisian government’s response to the protests attracted international criticism when dozens of protesters were killed in clashes with police…However, clashes between police and protesters continued and spread to the capital, where the government deployed troops to control the unrest ("Jasmine Revolution | Tunisian History.").

Unlike Algeria, where the nearly two-decade long state of emergency would no longer be intact due to the Arab Spring events, Tunisia would put a state of emergency into place ("Algeria Ends State of Emergency;" Zwitter; "Jasmine Revolution | Tunisian History;" Bakri; Abouzeid).

One last point to be made about the ranking of Algeria and Tunisia has to do with Algeria’s past. The following quote shows just how the past can affect the future, the specter of the 1990s civil war, which led to between 100,000 and 150,000 deaths, is still very fresh in people’s minds. Fears of another period of violence and insecurity keep many Algerians from seeking radical change, despite their economic and social grievances (Achy).

Essentially, Algerian’s fear due to past experiences could be the cause for less protests. Less protests, in turn, means fewer reasons to use police force and fewer chances for violence during the Arab Spring. Thus, Tunisia is able to come in the ranking as “most violent” (Achy).
D. My Findings

Now that the data for each hypothesis has been analyzed and each country has been placed on the ordinal scales, one will be able to see if the hypotheses given in the beginning of this thesis are correct. The first requirement for this objective is to look at the change in degree of democracy for each country. Since the time period being analyzed is that of the Arab Spring, from the end of 2010 to the end of 2011, the change in degree of democracy will be looked at between the years of 2010 and 2012. 2010 was chosen because, essentially, that was a whole year before the Arab Spring started, December 17, 2010. 2012 was chosen because it was a whole year following the Arab Spring. Looking at the change in degree of democracy between these two years with close proximity to the Arab Spring will help determine whether any change was a result of the Arab Spring events themselves. Looking at the changes in degree of democracy in 2015 seems more complicated because there are several years of other domestic and international events that could have led to a change in degree of democracy in each country (Abouzeid).

In order to determine the change in degree of democracy between 2010 and 2012, the Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit will be used. This index provides a rating for each country for any given year, although some years are not available. The higher the number, the less democratic the country is. Luckily, 2010 and 2012 are both available. This index is a simple and reliable way by which each country can be measured. Tunisia’s change in the Democracy Index will be seen first. Tunisia comes in first place in terms of “most positive change in democracy.” In 2010 Tunisia had a rating of 144. In 2012 Tunisia had changed significantly; its rating was 90. This is a change of 54 points. Algeria comes in second place. Algeria changed by 7 points between 2010 and 2012. It went from 125 to 118. Morocco ranks
last. It only moved 1 point between 2010 and 2012, going from 116 to 115 ("Democracy Index 2010 Democracy in Retreat;" "Democracy Index 2012 Democracy at a Standstill").

How exactly do these rankings stack up next to the hypotheses proposed earlier? Each hypothesis will briefly be looked at individually again to help determine the answer to this question. One should note that this section will not try to give answers to why the findings are what they are. That will be done in the Conclusions section of this paper.

1. Hypothesis I

The first hypothesis is that the greater the degree of violence during decolonization, the less degree of democratization. While this hypothesis originally sounded reasonable, the data does not completely comply with this theory. Algeria was considered “the most violent” and yet lies in the middle of the change in the Democracy Index comparatively to these three countries. Morocco was in the middle as “less violent,” but democratized the least. Lastly, Tunisia was “least violent” during decolonization while democratizing the most after the Arab Spring. The findings surrounding Tunisia are the only ones compatible with the above hypothesis.

1. Hypothesis II

The second hypothesis is that the greater the use of social media for purposes related to the Arab Spring, the greater the degree of democratization that will occur within the country. This hypothesis seems to be correct. Tunisia had the most social media use and it had the most change in democracy. Algeria fell in the middle with regard to social media usage and it also fell in the middle in terms of democratization. Lastly, Morocco experienced the least use of social media throughout the Arab Spring and also democratized the least after its occurrence. This is all consistent with the hypothesis.
2. Hypothesis III

The final hypothesis states that the greater the degree of violence associated with the Arab Spring in each individual country, the greater the degree of democratization. This hypothesis is shown to be correct. Tunisia experienced the most violence and also democratized the most. Algeria fell in the middle on both ratings, i.e., violence during the Arab Spring and democratization. Morocco comes in last with the least amount of violence during the Arab Spring and the least amount of democratization over the time period studied. The positive correlation between violence during the Arab Spring and democratization is clearly seen here.
E. Conclusions

Now that these hypotheses have been compared to the data provided in this thesis, one can see that two of the three seem to hold substantial merit and the third is not without merit. This section is then for the purposes of better understanding why these hypotheses were or were not found entirely correct. These conclusions are brief and were partially outlined in the beginning, but it seems beneficial to reiterate and take a closer look at the “why” behind the outcomes. Below is a table showing the rankings of each country for each hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Violence During Decolonization</th>
<th>Violence During Arab Spring</th>
<th>Social Media Use</th>
<th>Change in Political Ranking Among World Countries 2010-2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Least</td>
<td>Least</td>
<td>Least (-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Most</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Intermediate (-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Least</td>
<td>Most</td>
<td>Most</td>
<td>Most (-54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

1. Hypothesis I

Hypothesis I argued that that the greater the degree of violence during decolonization, the less degree of democratization. It was seen in section D that this hypothesis was found to be partially correct. The original idea behind this hypothesis came from sources that discussed Algeria’s Arab Spring. In “A Conflict Analysis of Algeria” it states that “Algeria’s violent
history is frequently cited as the reason behind the absence of large-scale protests in the country since 2011” (Strachan). Earlier in this thesis a quote was given by Achy that stated, in reference to civil war, “…. Fears of another period of violence and insecurity keep many Algerians from seeking radical change, despite their economic and social grievances” (Achy). Thus, the idea that past violence could keep the Arab Spring at bay led to the assumption that it would also lead to less democratization. Tunisia, with the least violence during decolonization from the French and the most democratization after the Arab Spring, is the only one of the three countries to support this hypothesis. Algeria had experienced the greatest amounts of violence during decolonization, and yet did not come in last for democratization. Algeria still did not have the substantial increase in democratization like Tunisia did, and that could be due to violence during decolonization. It seems that past violence can play a role in democratization, but more research clearly needs to be done. (Achy; Strachan).

1. Hypothesis II

Hypothesis II states that the greater the use of social media for purposes related to the Arab spring, the greater the degree of democratization that will occur within the country. As seen in section D, this was found to be correct. This overall does not seem surprising. Early, it was suggested that the basis for this hypothesis was that social media use allowed people to place some sort of external or internal pressure on the government. This argument is not only supported by the positive correlation observed between social media use and democratization, but also other sources as well. One example of this internal pressure being translated into democracy was in Tunisia.

Rapid internet interaction through Twitter and Facebook gave information to the protesters about how to counteract the security forces as they tried to disperse the protesters, maps showing locations for protest… All of these things increased the pressure that the protest movements were able to exert on their governments…. In
Tunisia, the effect was to increase the size of protest demonstrations and the Tunisian president, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, was forced to change his strategy…. He resigned on 16 January and an interim coalition government was set up ("World Development Book Case Study: The Role of Social Networking in the Arab Spring")

In an article in the Global Media Journal, the proposition that social media placed pressure on the government, especially in regards to “democratization and liberal reforms,” (Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos) was again argued and supported. It is clear that the quantitative data and other sources support Hypothesis II. ("World Development Book Case Study: The Role of Social Networking in the Arab Spring;" Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos).

2. Hypothesis III

Lastly, Hypothesis III states that the greater the degree of violence associated with the Arab Spring in each individual country, the greater the degree of democratization. This hypothesis, like Hypothesis II, has been proven correct according to the data provided. Again, reasoning behind this hypothesis is very similar to that underlying Hypothesis II. The pressure that violent protests can place on the government has definite benefits for democratization, as seen from the data. Other global examples help reinforce this correlation. The Wall Street Journal published an article on the violent protests in Hong Kong. It stated “Student leaders were defiant. ‘We will continue our fight for democracy,’ Oscar Lai, a spokesman for Scholarism, yelled to the crowd Sunday night, as they chanted along with him. ‘We will keep up the pressure on the government’” (Hervé and Cowell). Another article in the New York Times about Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, explained,

…after days of turmoil in which protesters burned the Parliament building here and set fire to the homes of his relatives and aides, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso announced Friday that he had stepped down — a rare case of the kind of popular uprising that toppled autocrats during the Arab Spring succeeding in sub-Saharan Africa (Steger and Lamar).
These two articles, along with the data provided earlier, show a glimpse of how violence in protests can amount to pressure, and sometimes lead to democratization (Hervé and Cowell; Steger and Lamar).

F. Implications

My research has helped establish two important findings; that social media usage and democratization have a positive relationship and that violence in social movements and democratization have a positive relationship, especially in regards to the Arab Spring. Moreover, the degree of violence in recent historical memory may play a role in impeding democratization.

I would like to suggest ways in which scholars might continue my research further. First, if someone would like to contribute anything in regards to North African history, it should be a more comprehensive study of Tunisia’s independence. The information on this topic is limited and further research in that area would have helped the progress of this thesis immensely.

Secondly, I would suggest that a researcher who has the funding to use an analysis of Twitter that provides an actual count of hashtags between the earlier specified time periods, 2010 and 2011, should do this. I believe that Tunisia would still rank highest in terms of social media usage, but it is possible that Morocco and Algeria could switch places since their numbers were so close in proximity. I would also suggest someone with the knowledge of Arabic to analyze counts of hashtags in the Arabic language, in order to be more accurate and to compare usage over languages. I think that there is a possibility that these numbers will change because one will most likely be receiving their tweets from inside the country. English tweets are limited in that they capture only those people in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia that speak English or those from other countries that speak English.
Since my research focused specifically on whether or not a country democratized after the Arab Spring, I was not able to focus a great deal on the effects that past violent history might have on the Arab Spring or social movements within a country in general. As one can see from my findings and data in earlier sections of my research, there do seem to be some ways in which violence in the history of Algeria affected the nature of its Arab Spring. I would suggest starting with the case study of Algeria and then maybe move on from there to other countries with a violent ending to decolonization. This study will be extremely interesting and if I had the time would love to be able to figure out what implications violence in the past might have for social movements of the future.

Lastly, I would like to suggest a study on the sustainability of continual democratization after the Arab Spring, or a social movement in general. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index from 2014, Tunisia moved 20 more points from 2012-2014, from 90 to 70. Algeria moved 1 point, from 118 to 117, and Morocco actually moved back 1 point to where it originated, from 115 to 116. It would be interesting to see why Tunisia has had continuous and stable democratization since the Arab Spring, while Algeria has only slightly democratized and Morocco has actually de-democratized ("Democracy Index 2014 Democracy and Its Discontents").


Huang, Carol. "Facebook and Twitter Key to Arab Spring Uprisings: Report | The National." Facebook and Twitter Key to Arab Spring Uprisings: Report | The National. N.p., 6 June


